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Abstrat
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the feasibility of authentiated throughput-eient
routing in an unreliable and dynamially hanging synhronous network in whih the majority
of maliious insiders try to destroy and alter messages or disrupt ommuniation in any way.
More speially, in this paper we seek to answer the following question: Given a network in
whih the majority of nodes are ontrolled by a node-ontrolling adversary and whose topology
is hanging every round, is it possible to develop a protool with polynomially-bounded memory
per proessor that guarantees throughput-eient and orret end-to-end ommuniation? We
answer the question armatively for extremely general orruption patterns: we only request
that the topology of the network and the orruption pattern of the adversary leaves at least one
path eah round onneting the sender and reeiver through honest nodes (though this path may
hange at every round). Out onstrution works in the publi-key setting and enjoys bounded
memory per proessor (that does not depend on the amount of tra and is polynomial in the
network size.) Our protool ahieves optimal transfer rate with negligible deoding error. We
stress that our protool assumes no knowledge of whih nodes are orrupted nor whih path is
reliable at any round, and is also fully distributed with nodes making deisions loally, so that
they need not know the topology of the network at any time.
The optimality that we prove for our protool is very strong. Given any routing protool, we
evaluate its eieny (rate of message delivery) in the worst ase, that is with respet to the
worst possible graph and against the worst possible (polynomially bounded) adversarial strategy
(subjet to the above mentioned onnetivity onstraints). Using this metri, we show that there
does not exist any protool that an be asymptotially superior (in terms of throughput) to ours
in this setting.
We remark that the aim of our paper is to demonstrate via expliit example the feasibility
of throughput-eient authentiated adversarial routing. However, we stress that out protool
is not intended to provide a pratial solution, as due to its omplexity, no attempt thus far has
been made to make the protool pratial by reduing onstants or the large (though polynomial)
memory requirements per proessor.
Our result is related to reent work of Barak, Goldberg and Xiao in 2008 [8℄ who stud-
ied fault loalization in networks assuming a private-key trusted setup setting. Our work, in
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ontrast, assumes a publi-key PKI setup and aims at not only fault loalization, but also trans-
mission optimality. Among other things, our work answers one of the open questions posed
in the Barak et. al. paper regarding fault loalization on multiple paths. The use of a publi-
key setting to ahieve strong error-orretion results in networks was inspired by the work of
Miali, Peikert, Sudan and Wilson [13℄ who showed that lassial error-orretion against a
polynomially-bounded adversary an be ahieved with surprisingly high preision. Our work is
also related to an interative oding theorem of Rajagopalan and Shulman [14℄ who showed
that in noisy-edge stati-topology networks a onstant overhead in ommuniation an also be
ahieved (provided none of the proessors are maliious), thus establishing an optimal-rate rout-
ing theorem for stati-topology networks. Finally, our work is losely related and builds upon
to the problem of End-To-End Communiation in distributed networks, studied by Afek and
Gafni [1℄, Awebuh, Mansour, and Shavit [7℄, and Afek, Awerbuh, Gafni, Mansour, Rosen,
and Shavit [2℄, though none of these papers onsider or ensure orretness in the setting of a
node-ontrolling adversary that may orrupt the majority of the network.
Keywords: Network Routing; Error-orretion; Fault Loalization; Multi-parity Computation
in the presene of Dishonest Majority; Communiation Complexity; End-to-End Communia-
tion.
1 Introdution
Our goal is to design a routing protool for an unreliable and dynamially hanging synhronous
network that is resilient against maliious insiders who may try to destroy and alter messages or
disrupt ommuniation in any way. We model the network as a ommuniation graph G = (V,E)
where eah vertex is a proessor and eah edge is a ommuniation link. We do not assume that the
topology of this graph is xed or known by the proessors. Rather, we assume a omplete graph on
n verties, where some of the edges are up and some are down, and the status of eah edge an
hange dynamially at any time.
We onentrate on the most basi task, namely how two proessors in the network an exhange
information. Thus, we assume that there are two designated verties, alled the sender S and the
reeiver R, who wish to ommuniate with eah other. The sender has an innite read-one input
tape of pakets and the reeiver has an innite write-one output tape whih is initially empty. We
assume that pakets are of some bounded size, and that any edge in the system that is up during
some round an transmit only one paket (or ontrol variables, also of bounded size) per round.
We will evaluate our protool using the following three onsiderations:
1. Corretness. A protool is orret if the sequene of pakets output by the reeiver is a
prex of pakets appearing on the sender's input tape, without dupliation or omission.
2. Throughput. This measures the number of pakets on the output tape as a funtion of the
number of rounds that have passed.
3. Proessor Memory. This measures the memory required of eah node by the protool,
independent of the number of pakets to be transferred.
All three onsiderations will be measured in the worst-ase senario as standards that are guar-
anteed to exist regardless of adversarial interferene. One an also evaluate a protool based on
its dependene on global information to make deisions. In the protool we present in this paper,
we will not assume there is any global view of the network available to the internal nodes. Suh
2
protools are termed loal ontrol, in that eah node an make all routing deisions based only
the loal onditions of its adjaent edges and neighbors.
Our protool is designed to be resilient against a maliious, polynomially-bounded adversary
who may attempt to impat the orretness, throughput, and memory of our protool by disrupting
links between the nodes or taking diret ontrol over the nodes and foring them to deviate from our
protool in any manner the adversary wishes. In order to relate our work to previous results and
to larify the two main forms of adversarial interferene, we desribe two separate (yet oordinated
with eah other) adversaries
1
:
Edge-Sheduling Adversary. This adversary ontrols the links between nodes every round.
More preisely, at eah round, this adversary deides whih edges in the network are up
and whih are down. We will say that the edge-sheduling adversary is onforming if for
every round there is at least one path from the sender to the reeiver (although the path
may hange eah round)
2
. The adversary an make any arbitrary poly-time omputation to
maximize interferene in routing, so long as it remains onforming.
Node-Controlling Adversary. This adversary ontrols the nodes of the network that it has
orrupted. More preisely, eah round this adversary deides whih nodes to orrupt. One
orrupted, a node is forever under omplete adversarial ontrol and an behave in an arbitrary
maliious manner. We say that the node-ontrolling adversary is onforming if every round
there is a onnetion between the sender and reeiver onsisting of edges that are up for the
round (as speied by the edge-sheduling adversary) and that passes through unorrupted
nodes. We emphasize that this path an hange eah round, and there is no other restrition
on whih nodes the node-ontrolling adversary may orrupt (allowing even a vast majority of
orrupt nodes).
There is another reason to view these adversaries as distint: we deal with the hallenges they
pose to orretness, throughput, and memory in dierent ways. Namely, aside from the onforming
ondition, the edge-sheduling adversary annot be ontrolled or eliminated. Edges themselves
are not inherently good or bad, so identifying an edge that has failed does not allow us to
forever refuse the protool to utilize this edge, as it may ome bak up at any time (and indeed
it ould form a ruial link on the path onneting the sender and reeiver that the onforming
assumption guarantees). In sum, we annot hope to ontrol or alter the behavior of the edge-
sheduling adversary, but must ome up with a protool that works well regardless of the behavior
of the ever-present (onforming) edge-sheduling adversary.
By ontrast, our protool will limit the amount of inuene the node-ontrolling adversary has
on orretness, throughput, and memory. Speially, we will show that if a node deviates from
the protool in a suiently destrutive manner (in a well-dened sense), then our protool will
be able to identify it as orrupted in a timely fashion. One a orrupt node has been identied,
it will be eliminated from the network. Namely, our protool will all for honest nodes to refuse
1
The separation into two separate adversaries is artiial: our protool is seure whether edge-sheduling and
orruption of nodes are performed by two separate adversaries that have dierent apabilities yet an oordinate
their ations with eah other, or this an be viewed as a single oordinated adversary.
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A more general denition of an edge-sheduling adversary would be to allow ompletely arbitrary edge failures,
with the exeption that in the limit there is no permanent ut between the sender and reeiver. However, this
denition (while more general) greatly ompliates the exposition, inluding the denition of throughput rate, and
we do not treat it here.
3
all ommuniation with nodes that have been identied as orrupt
3
. Thus, there is an inherent
dierene in how we handle the edge-sheduling adversary verses how we handle the node-ontrolling
adversary. We an restrit the inuene of the latter by eliminating the nodes it has orrupted,
while the former must be dealt with in a more ever-lasting manner.
1.1 Previous Work
To motivate the importane of the problem we onsider in this paper, and to emphasize the sig-
niane of our result, it will be useful to highlight reent works in related areas. To date, routing
protools that onsider adversarial networks have been of two main avors: End-to-End Com-
muniation protools that onsider dynami topologies (a notion aptured by our edge-sheduling
adversary), and Fault Detetion and Loalization protools, whih handle devious behavior of nodes
(as modeled by our node-ontrolling adversary).
End-to-End Communiation: One of the most relevant researh diretions to our paper is the
notion of End-to-End ommuniation in distributed networks, onsidered by Afek and Gafni [1℄,
Awerbuh, Mansour and Shavit [7℄, Afek, Awebuh, Gafni, Mansour, Rosen, and Shavit [2℄, and
Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky and Rosen [12℄ . Indeed, our starting point is the Slide protool
4
developed
in these works. It was designed to perform end-to-end ommuniation with bounded memory in a
model where (using our terminology) an edge-sheduling adversary ontrols the edges (subjet to the
onstraint that there is no permanent ut between the sender and reeiver). The Slide protool has
proven to be inredibly useful in a variety of settings, inluding multi-ommodity ow (Awerbuh
and Leigthon [6℄) and in developing routing protools that ompete well (in terms of paket loss)
against an online bursty adversary ([4℄). However, prior to our work there was no version of the
Slide protool that ould handle maliious behavior of the nodes. A omparison of various versions
of the Slide protool and our protool is featured in Figure 1 of Setion 1.2 below.
Fault Detetion and Loalization Protools: At the other end, there have been a number
of works that explore the possibility of a node-ontrolling adversary that an orrupt nodes. In
partiular, there is a reent line of work that onsiders a network onsisting of a single path from the
sender to the reeiver, ulminating in the reent work of Barak, Goldberg and Xiao [8℄ (for further
bakground on fault loalization see referenes therein). In this model, the adversary an orrupt
any node on the path (exept the sender and reeiver) in a dynami and maliious manner. Sine
orrupting any node on the path will sever the honest onnetion between S and R, the goal of a
protool in this model is not to guarantee that all messages sent to R are reeived. Instead, the
goal is to detet faults when they our and to loalize the fault to a single edge.
There have been many results that provide Fault Detetion (FD) and Fault Loalization (FL)
in this model. In Barak et. al. [8℄, they formalize the denitions in this model and the notion of a
seure FD/FL protool, as well as providing lower bounds in terms of ommuniation omplexity to
guarantee aurate fault detetion/loation in the presene of a node-ontrolling adversary. While
the Barak et. al. paper has a similar avor to our paper, we emphasize that their protool does not
seek to guarantee suessful or eient routing between the sender and reeiver. Instead, their proof
of seurity guarantees that if a paket is deleted, maliious nodes annot ollude to onvine S that
3
The onforming assumption guarantees that the sender and reeiver are inorruptible, and our protool plaes
the responsibility of identifying and eliminating orrupt nodes on these two nodes.
4
Also known in pratial works as gravitational ow routing.
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no fault ourred, nor an they persuade S into believing that the fault ourred on an honest edge.
Loalizing the fault in their paper relies on ryptographi tools, and in partiular the assumption
that one-way funtions exist. Although utilizing these tools (suh as MACs or Signature Shemes)
inreases ommuniation ost, it is shown by Goldberg, Xiao, Barak, and Redford [11℄ that the
existene of a protool that is able to seurely detet faults (in the presene of a node-ontrolling
adversary) implies the existene of one-way funtions, and it is shown in Barak et. al. [8℄ that any
protool that is able to seurely loalize faults neessarily requires the intermediate nodes to have
a trusted setup. The proofs of these results do not rely on the fat that there is a single path
between S and R, and we an therefore extend them to the more general network enountered in
our model to justify our use of ryptographi tools and a trusted setup assumption (i.e. PKI) to
identify maliious behavior.
Another paper that addresses routing in the Byzantine setting is the work of Awerbuh, Holmes,
Nina-Rotary and Rubens [5℄, though this paper does not have a fully formal treatment of seurity,
and indeed a ounter-example that hallenges its seurity is disussed in the appendix of [8℄.
Error-orretion in the ative setting: Due to spae onsiderations, we will not be able
to give a omprehensive aount of all the work in this area. Instead we highlight some of the most
relevant works and point out how they dier from our setting and results. For a lengthy treatment of
error-orreting odes against polynomially bounded adversaries, we refer to the work of Miali at.
al [13℄ and referenes therein. It is important to note that this work deals with a graph with a single
noisy edge, as modelled by an adversary who an partially ontrol and modify information that
rosses the edge. In partiular, it does not address throughput eieny or memory onsiderations
in a full ommuniation network, nor does it aount for maliious behavior at the verties. Also
of relevane is the work on Rajagopalan and Shulman on error-orreting network oding [14℄,
where they show how to orret noisy edges during distributed omputation. Their work does not
onsider atively maliious nodes, and thus is dierent from our setting. It should also be noted
that their work utilizes Shulman's tree-odes [17℄ that allow length-exible online error-orretion.
The important dierene between our work and that of Shulman is that in our network setting,
the amount of maliious ativity of orrupt nodes is not restrited.
1.2 Our Results
To date, there has not been a protool that has onsidered simultaneously a network suseptible
to faults ourring due to edge-failures and faults ourring due to maliious ativity of orrupt
nodes. The end-to-end ommuniation works are not seure when the nodes are allowed to beome
orrupted by a node-ontrolling adversary, and the fault detetion and loalization works fous on
a single path for some duration of time, and do not onsider a fully distributed routing protool
that utilizes the entire network and attempts to maximize throughput eieny while guaranteeing
orretness in the presene of edge-failures and orrupt nodes. Indeed, our work answers one of
the open questions posed in the Barak et. al. paper regarding fault loalization on multiple paths.
In this paper we bridge the gap between these two researh areas and obtain the rst routing
protool simultaneously seure against both an edge-sheduling adversary and a node-ontrolling
adversary, even if these two adversaries attak the network using an arbitrary oordinated poly-
time strategy. Furthermore, our protool ahieves omparable eieny standards in terms of
throughput and proessor memory as state-of-the-art protools that are not seure against a node-
ontrolling adversary and does so using loal-ontrol protools. An informal statement of our result
5
and omparison of our protool to existing protools an be found below. Although not inluded
in the table, we emphasize that the linear transmission rate that we ahieve (assuming at least n2
messages are sent) is asymptotially optimal, as any protool operating in a network with a single
path onneting sender and reeiver an do no better than one paket per round.
A ROUTING THEOREM FOR ADVERSARIAL NETWORKS (Informal): If one-way
funtions exist, then for any n-node graph and k suiently large, there exists a trusted-setup linear
throughput transmission protool that an send n2 messages in O(n2) rounds with O(n4(k + log n))
memory per proessor that is resilient against any poly-time onforming Edge-Sheduling Adversary and
any onforming poly-time Node-Controlling Adversary, with negligible (in k) probability of failure or
deoding error.
Seure Against Seure Against Proessor Throughput Rate
Edge-Shed. Ad? Node-Cntr. Ad? Memory x rounds→f(x) pakets
Slide Protool of [2℄ Y ES NO O(n2 log n) f(x) = O(x− n2)
Slide Protool of [12℄ Y ES NO O(n log n) f(x) = O(x/n− n2)
(folklore)
(Flooding + Signatures) Y ES Y ES O(1) f(x) = O(x/n− n2)
(folklore)
(Signatures + Sequene No.'s) Y ES Y ES unbounded f(x) = O(x− n2)
Our Protool Y ES Y ES O(n4(k+logn)) f(x) = O(x− n2)
Figure 1: Comparison of Our Protool to Related Existing Protools and Folklore.
2 Challenges and Naïve Solutions
Before proeeding, it will be useful to onsider a ouple of naïve solutions that ahieve the goal of
orretness (but perform poorly in terms of throughput), and help to illustrate some of the tehnial
hallenges that our theorem resolves. Consider the approah of having the sender ontinuously ood
a single signed paket into the network for n rounds. Sine the onforming assumption guarantees
that the network provides a path between the sender and reeiver through honest nodes at every
round, this paket will reah the reeiver within n rounds, regardless of adversarial interferene.
After n rounds, the sender an begin ooding the network with the next paket, and so forth5.
Notie that this solution will require eah proessor to store and ontinuously broadast a single
paket at any time, and hene this solution ahieves exellent eieny in terms of proessor memory.
However, notie that the throughput rate is sub-linear, namely after x rounds, only O(x/n) pakets
have been outputted by the reeiver.
5
An alternative approah would have the sender ontinue ooding the rst paket, and upon reeipt, the re-
eiver oods onrmation of reeipt. This alternative solution requires sequene numbers to aompany pak-
ets/onrmations, and the rule that internal nodes only keep and broadast the paket and onrmation with largest
sequene number. Although this alternative may potentially speed things up, in the worst-ase it will still take O(n)
rounds for a single paket/onrmation pair to be transmitted.
6
One idea to try to improve the throughput rate might be to have the sender streamline the
proess, sending pakets with ever-inreasing sequene numbers without waiting for n rounds to
pass (or signed aknowledgments from the reeiver) before sending the next paket. In partiular,
aross eah of his edges the sender will send every paket one, waiting only for the neighboring
node's onrmation of reeipt before sending the next paket aross that edge. The protool alls for
the internal nodes to at similarly. Analysis of this approah shows that not only has the attempt
to improve throughput failed (it is still O(x/n) in the worst-ase senario), but additionally this
modiation requires arbitrarily large (polynomial in n and k) proessor memory, sine ahieving
orretness in the dynami topology of the graph will fore the nodes to remember all of the pakets
they see until they have broadasted them aross all adjaent edges or seen onrmation of their
reeipt from the reeiver.
2.1 Challenges in Dealing with Node-Controlling Adversaries
In this setion, we disuss some potential strategies that the node-ontrolling and edge-sheduling
adversaries
6
may inorporate to disrupt network ommuniation. Although our theorem will work in
the presene of arbitrarymaliious ativity of the adversarial ontrolled nodes (exept with negligible
probability), it will be instrutive to list a few obvious forms of devious behavior that our protool
must protet against. It is important to stress that this list is not intended to be exhaustive. Indeed,
we do not laim to know all the spei ways an arbitrary polynomially bounded adversary may
fore nodes to deviate from a given protool, and in this paper we rigorously prove that our protool
is seure against all possible deviations.
• Paket Deletion/Modiation. Instead of forwarding a paket, a orrupt node drops it to the
oor (i.e. deletes it or eetively deletes it by forever storing it in memory), or modies the
paket before passing it on. Another manifestation of this is if the sender/reeiver requests
fault loalization information of the internal nodes, suh as providing doumentation of their
interations with neighbors. A orrupt node an then blok or modify information that passes
through it in attempt to hide maliious ativity or impliate an honest node.
• Introdution of Junk/Dupliate Pakets. The adversary an attempt to disrupt ommuniation
ow and jam the network by having orrupted nodes introdue junk pakets or re-broadast
old pakets. Notie that junk pakets an be handled by using ryptographi signatures to
prevent introdution of new pakets, but this does not ontrol the re-transmission of old,
orretly signed pakets.
• Disobediene of Transfer Rules. If the protool speies how nodes should make deisions on
where to send pakets, et., then orrupt nodes an disregard these rules. This inludes lying
to adjaent nodes about their urrent state.
• Coordination of Edge-Failures. The edge-sheduling adversary an attempt to disrupt ommu-
niation ow by sheduling edge-failures in any manner that is onsistent with the onforming
riterion. Coordinating edge failures an be used to impede orretness, memory, and through-
put in various ways: e.g. pakets may beome lost aross a failed edge, stuk at a suddenly
isolated node, or arrive at the reeiver out of order. A separate issue arises onerning fault
loalization: when the sender/reeiver requests doumentation from the internal nodes, the
edge-sheduling adversary an slow progress of this information, as well as attempt to protet
6
We give a formal denition of the adversary in Setion 3.2.
7
orrupt nodes by allowing them to play-dead (setting all of its adjaent edges to be down),
so that inriminating evidene annot reah the sender.
2.2 Highlights of Our Solution
Our starting point is the Slide protool [2℄, whih has enjoyed pratial suess in networks with
dynami topologies, but is not seure against nodes that are allowed to behave maliiously. We
provide a detailed desription of our version of the Slide protool in Setion 4, but highlight the
main ideas here. Begin by viewing the edges in the graph as onsisting of two direted edges, and
assoiate to eah end of a direted edge a stak data-struture able to hold 2n pakets and to be
maintained by the node at that end. The protool speies the following simple, loal ondition for
transferring a paket aross a direted edge: if there are more pakets in the stak at the originating
end than the terminating end, transfer a paket aross the edge. Similarly, within a node's loal
staks, pakets are shued to average out the stak heights along eah of its edges. Intuitively,
paket movement is analogous to the ow of water: high staks reate a pressure that fore pakets
to ow to neighboring lower staks. At the soure, the sender maintains the pressure by lling his
outgoing staks (as long as there is room) while the reeiver relieves pressure by onsuming pakets
and keeping his staks empty. Loosely speaking, pakets traveling to nodes near the sender will
therefore require a very large potential, pakets traveling to nodes near the reeiver will require
a small potential, and paket transfers near intermediate nodes will require pakages to have a
moderate potential. Assuming these potential requirements exist, pakets will pass from the sender
with a high potential, and then ow downwards aross nodes requiring less potential, all the way
to the reeiver.
Beause the Slide protool provides a fully distributed protool that works well against an edge-
sheduling adversary, our starting point was to try to extend the protool by using digital signatures
7
to provide resiliene against Byzantine attaks and arbitrary maliious behavior of orrupt nodes.
This proved to be a highly nontrivial task that required us to develop a lot of additional mahinery,
both in terms of additional protool ideas and novel tehniques for proving orretness. We give a
detailed explanation of our tehniques in Setion 8 and formal pseudo-ode in Setion 9, as well as
providing rigorous proofs of seurity in Setion 10. However, below we rst give a sample of some
of the key ideas we used in ensuring our additional mahinery would be provably seure against a
node-ontrolling adversary, and yet not signiantly aet throughput or memory, ompared to the
original Slide protool:
• Addressing the Coordination of Edge-Sheduling Issues. In the absene of a
node-ontrolling adversary, previous versions of the Slide protool (e.g. [2℄) are seure and
eient against an edge-sheduling adversary, and it will be useful to disuss how some of
the hallenges posed by a network with a dynami topology are handled. First, note that the
total apaity of the stak data-struture is bounded by 4n3. That is, eah of the n nodes an
hold at most 2n pakets in eah of their 2n staks (along eah direted edge) at any time.
7
In this paper we use publi-key operations to sign individual pakets with ontrol information. Clearly, this is too
expensive to do per-paket in pratie. There are methods of amortizing the ost of signatures by signing bathes of
pakets; using private-key initialization [8, 11℄, or using a ombination of private-key and publi key operations, suh
as on-line/o-line signatures [9, 16℄. For the sake of larity and sine the primary fous of our paper is theoretial
feasibility, we restrit our attention to the straight-forward publi-key setting without onsidering these additional
ost-saving tehniques.
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 To handle the loss of pakets due to an edge going down while transmitting a paket,
a node is required to maintain a opy of eah paket it transmits along an edge until it
reeives onrmation from the neighbor of suessful reeipt.
 To handle pakets beoming stuk in some internal node's stak due to edge failures,
error-orretion is utilized to allow the reeiver to deode a full message without needing
every paket. In partiular, if an error-orreting ode allowing a fration of λ faults is
utilized, then sine the apaity of the network is 4n3 pakets, if the sender is able to
pump 4n3/λ odeword pakets into the network and there is no maliious deletion or
modiation of pakets, then the reeiver will neessarily have reeived enough pakets
to deode the message.
 The Slide protool has a natural bound in terms of memory per proessor of O(n2 log n)
bits, where the bottlenek is the possibility of a node holding up to 2n2 pakets in its
staks, where eah paket requires O(log n) bits to desribe its position in the ode.
Of ourse, these tehniques are only valid if nodes are ating honestly, whih leads us to our
rst extension idea.
• Handling Paket Modifiation and Introdution of Junk Pakets. Before insert-
ing any pakets into the network, the sender will authentiate eah paket using his digital
signature, and intermediate nodes and the reeiver never aept or forward messages not ap-
propriately signed. This simultaneously prevents honest nodes beoming bogged down with
junk pakets, as well as ensuring that if the reeiver has obtained enough authentiated pakets
to deode, a node-ontrolling adversary annot impede the suessful deoding of the mes-
sage as the integrity of the odeword pakets is guaranteed by the inforgibility of the sender's
signature.
• Fault Detetion. In the absene of a node-ontrolling adversary, our protool looks almost
idential to the Slide protool of [2℄, with the addition of signatures that aompany all
interations between two nodes. First, the sender attempts to pump the 4n3/λ odeword
pakets of the rst message into the network, with paket movement exatly as in the original
Slide protool. We onsider all possible outomes:
1. The sender is able to insert all odeword pakets and the reeiver is able to deode. In this
ase, the message was transmitted suessfully, and our protool moves to transfer the
next message.
2. The sender is able to insert all odeword pakets, but the reeiver has not reeived enough to
deode. In this ase, the reeiver oods the network with a single-bit message indiating
paket deletion has ourred.
3. The sender is able to insert all odeword pakets, but the reeiver annot deode beause he
has reeived dupliated pakets. Although the sender's authentiating signature guarantees
the reeiver will not reeive junk or modied pakets, a orrupt node is able to dupliate
valid pakets. Therefore, the reeiver may reeive enough pakets to deode, but annot
beause he has reeived dupliates. In this ase, the reeiver oods the network with a
single message indiating the label of a dupliated paket.
4. After some amount of time, the sender still has not inserted all odeword pakets. In this
ase, the dupliation of old pakets is so severe that the network has beome jammed,
and the sender is prevented from inserting pakets even along the honest path that
9
the onforming assumption guarantees. If the sender believes the jamming annot be
aounted for by edge-failures alone, he will halt transmission and move to loalizing
a orrupt node
8
. One ontribution this paper makes is to prove a lower bound on the
insertion rate of the sender for the Slide protool in the absene of the node-ontrolling
adversary. This bound not only alerts the sender when the jamming he is experiening
exeeds what an be expeted in the absene of orrupt nodes, but it also provides a
mehanism for loalizing the oending node(s).
The above four ases exhaust all possibilities. Furthermore, if a transmission is not suessful,
the sender is not only able to detet the fat that maliious ativity has oured, but he is also
able to distinguish the form of the maliious ativity, i.e. whih ase 2-4 he is in. Meanwhile,
for the top ase, our protool enjoys (within a onstant fator) an equivalent throughput rate
as the original Slide protool.
• Fault Loalization. One a fault has been deteted, it remains to desribe how to loalize
the problem to the oending node. To this end, we use digital signatures to ahieve a new
mehanism we all Routing with Responsibility. By foring nodes to sign key parts of every
ommuniation with their neighbors during the transfer of pakets, they an later be held
aountable for their ations. In partiular, one the sender has identied the reason for
failure (ases 2-4 above), he will request all internal nodes to return status reports, whih
are signatures on the relevant parts of the ommuniation with their neighbors. We then
prove in eah ase that with the omplete status report from every node, the sender an with
overwhelming probability identify and eliminate a orrupt node. Of ourse, maliious nodes
may hoose not to send inriminating information. We handle this separately as explained
below.
• Proessor Memory. The signatures on the ommuniation a node has with its neighbors
for the purpose of fault loalization is a burden on the memory required of eah proessor
that is not enountered in the original Slide protool. One major hallenge was to redue
the amount of signed information eah node must maintain as muh as possible, while still
guaranteeing that eah node has maintained enough information to identify a orrupt node
in the ase of arbitrary maliious ativity leading to a failure of type 2-4 above. The ontent
of Theorem 8.2 in Setion 8 demonstrates that the extra memory required of our protool is
a fator of n2 higher than that of the original Slide protool.
• Inomplete Information. As already mentioned, we show that regardless of the reason of
failure 2-4 above, one the sender reeives the status reports from every node, a orrupt node
an be identied. However, this relies on the sender obtaining all of the relevant information;
the absene of even a single node's information an prevent the loalization of a fault. We
address this hallenge in the following ways:
1. We minimize the amount of information the sender requires of eah node. This way, a
node need not be onneted to the sender for very many rounds in order for the sender
8
We emphasize here the importane that the sender is able to distinguish the ase that the jamming is a result of
the edge-sheduling adversary's ontrolling of edges verses the ase that a orrupt node is dupliating pakets. After
all, in the ase of the former, there is no reward for loalizing the fault to an edge that has failed, as all edges
are ontrolled by the edge-sheduling adversary, and therefore no edge is inherently better than another. But in the
ase a node is dupliating pakets, if the sender an identify the node, it an eliminate it and eetively redue the
node-ontrolling adversary's ability to disrupt ommuniation in the future.
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to reeive its information. Speially, regardless of the reason for failure 2-4 above, a
status report onsists of only n piees of information from eah node, i.e. one paket for
eah of its edges.
2. If the sender does not have the n piees of information from a node, it annot aord to
wait indenitely. After all, the edge-sheduling adversary may keep the node disonneted
indenitely, or a orrupt node may simply refuse to respond. For this purpose, we reate
a blaklist for non-responding nodes, whih will disallow them from transferring odeword
pakets in the future. This way, anytime the reeiver fails to deode a odeword as in
ases 2-4 above, the sender an request the information he needs, blaklist nodes not
responding within some short amount of time, and then re-attempt to transmit the
odeword using only non-blaklisted nodes. Nodes should not transfer odeword pakets
to blaklisted nodes, but they do still ommuniate with them to transfer the information
the sender has requested. If a new transmission again fails, the sender will only need to
request information from nodes that were partiipating, i.e. he will not need to ollet
new information from blaklisted nodes (although the nodes will remain blaklisted until
the sender gets the original information he requested of them). Nodes will be removed
from the blaklist and re-allowed to route odeword pakets as soon as the sender reeives
their information.
• The Blaklist. Blaklisting nodes is a deliate matter; we want to plae maliious nodes
playing-dead on this list, while at the same time we don't want honest nodes that are tem-
porarily disonneted from being on this list for too long. We show in Theorem 8.1 and Lemma
10.9 that the oasional honest node that gets put on the blaklist won't signiantly hinder
paket transmission. Intuitively, this is true beause any honest node that is an important
link between the sender and reeiver will not remain on the blaklist for very long, as his
onnetion to the sender guarantees the sender will reeive all requested information from the
node in a timely manner.
Ultimately, the blaklist allows us to ontrol the amount of maliious ativity a single
orrupt node an ontribute to. Indeed, we show that eah failed message transmission (ases
2-4 above) an be loalized (eventually) to (at least) one orrupt node. More preisely, the
blaklist allows us to argue that maliious ativity an ause at most n failed transmissions
before a orrupt node an neessarily be identied and eliminated. Sine there are at most n
orrupt nodes, this bounds the number of failed transmissions at n2. The result of this is that
other than at most n2 failed message transmissions, our protool enjoys the same throughput
eieny of the old Slide protool. The formal statement of this fat an be found in Theorem
8.1 in Setion 8, and its proof an be found in Setion 10.
3 The Formal Model
It will be useful to desribe two models in this setion, one in the presene of an edge-sheduling
adversary (all nodes at honestly), and one in the presene of an adversary who may orrupt
some of the nodes in the network. In Setion 4 we present an eient protool (Slide) that works
well in the edge-sheduling adversarial model, and we then extend this protool in Setion 8 to work
in the additional presene of the node-ontrolling adversary.
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3.1 The Edge-Sheduling Adversarial Model
We model a ommuniation network by an undireted graph G = (V,E), where |V | = n.
Eah vertex (or node) represents a proessor that is apable of storing information (in its buers)
and passing information to other nodes along the edges. We distinguish two nodes, the sender,
denoted by S, and the reeiver, denoted by R. In our model, S has an input stream of messages
{m1,m2, . . . } of uniform size that he wishes to transmit through the network to R. As mentioned in
the Introdution, the three ommodities we are about are Corretness, Throughput, and Proessor
Memory.
We assume a synhronous network, so that there is a universal lok that eah node has aess
to
9
. The global time is divided into disrete hunks, alled rounds, during whih nodes ommuniate
with eah other and transfer pakets. Eah round onsists of two equal intervals of unit time alled
stages, so that all nodes are synhronized in terms of when eah stage begins and ends. We assume
that the edges have some xed apaity P in terms of the amount of information that an be
transmitted aross them per stage. The messages will be sub-divided into pakets of uniform size
P , so that exatly one paket an be transferred along an edge per stage10.
The sole purpose of the network is to transmit the messages from S to R, so S is the only
node that introdues new messages into the network, and R is the only node that removes them
from the network (although below we introdue a node-ontrolling adversary who may orrupt the
intermediate nodes and attempt to disrupt the network by illegally deleting/introduing messages).
Although the edges in our model are bi-diretional, it will be useful to onsider eah link as onsisting
of two direted edges. Exept for the onforming restrition (see below), we allow the edges of our
network to fail and resurret arbitrarily. We model this via an Edge-Sheduling Adversary, who
ontrols the status of eah edge of the network, and an alter the state of any edge at any time. We
say that an edge is ative during a given stage/round if the edge-sheduling adversary allows that
edge to remain up for the entirety of that stage/round. We impose one restrition on the failure
of edges:
Denition 3.1. An edge-sheduling adversary is onforming if for every round of the protool,
there exists at least one path between S and R onsisting of edges that ative for the entirety of
the round.
For a given round t, we will refer to the path guaranteed by the onforming assumption as the
ative path of round t. Notie that although the onforming assumption guarantees the existene of
an ative path for eah round, it is not assumed that any node (inluding S and R) is aware of what
that path is. Furthermore, this path may hange from one round to the next. The edge-sheduling
adversary annot aet the network in any way other than ontrolling the status of the edges. In
the next setion, we introdue a node-ontrolling adversary who an take ontrol of the nodes of
the network
11
.
9
Although synhronous networks are diult to realize in pratie, we an further relax the model to one in whih
there is a known upper-bound on the amount of time an ative edge an take to transfer a paket.
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Our protool for the node-ontrolling adversarial model will require the pakets to inlude signatures from a
ryptographi signature sheme. The seurity of suh shemes depend on the seurity parameter k, and the size of
the resulting signatures have size O(k). Additionally, error-orretion will require pakets to arry with them an
index of O(log n) bits. Therefore, we assume that P ≥ (k+ log n), so that in eah time step a omplete paket (with
signature and index) an be transferred.
11
The distintion between the two kinds of adversaries is made solely to emphasize the ontribution of this paper.
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3.2 The Node-Controlling + Edge-Sheduling Adversarial Model
This model begins with the edge-sheduling adversarial model desribed above, and adds a poly-
nomially bounded Node-Controlling Adversary that is apable of orrupting nodes in the network.
The node-ontrolling adversary is maliious, meaning that the adversary an take omplete ontrol
over the nodes he orrupts, and an therefore fore them to deviate from any protool in whatever
manner he likes. We further assume that the adversary is dynami, whih means that he an orrupt
nodes at any stage of the protool, deiding whih nodes to orrupt based on what he has observed
thus far
12
. For a thorough disussion of these notions, see [10℄ and referenes therein.
As in Multi-Party Computation (MPC) literature, we will need to speify an aess-struture
for the adversary.
Denition 3.2. A node-ontrolling adversary is onforming if he does not orrupt any nodes who
have been or will be a part of any round's ative path.
Apart from this restrition, the node-ontrolling adversary may orrupt whoever he likes (i.e. it
is not a threshold adversary). Note that the onforming assumption impliitly demands that S and
R are inorruptible, sine they are always a part of any ative path. Also, this restrition on the
adversary is really more a statement about when our results remain valid. This is similar to e.g.
threshold adversary models, where the results are only valid if the number of orrupted nodes does
not exeed some threshold value t. One orrupted, a node is forever onsidered to be a orrupt
node that the adversary has total ontrol over (although the adversary may hoose to have the node
at honestly).
Notie that beause orretness, throughput, and memory are the only ommodities that our
model values, an honest-but-urious adversary is ompletely benign, as privay does not need to be
proteted
13
(indeed, any intermediate node is presumed to be able to read any paket that is passed
through it). Our tehniques for preventing/deteting maliious behavior will be to inorporate a
digital signature sheme that will serve the dual purpose of validating information that is passed
between nodes, as well as holding nodes aountable for information that their signature ommitted
them to.
We assume that there is a Publi-Key Infrastruture (PKI) that allows digital signatures. In
partiular, before the protool begins we hoose a seurity parameter k suiently large and run a
key generation algorithm for a digital signature sheme, produing n = |G| (seret key, veriation
key) pairs (skN , vkN ). As output to the key generation, eah proessor N ∈ G is given its own
private signing key skN and a list of all n signature veriation keys vk bN for all nodes N̂ ∈ G. In
partiular, this allows the sender and reeiver to sign messages to eah other that annot be forged
(exept with negligible probability in the seurity parameter) by any other node in the system.
Edge-sheduling adversaries (as desribed above) are ommonly used to model edge failures in networks, while the
ontribution of our paper is in ontrolling a node-ontrolling adversary, whih has the ability to orrupt the nodes of
the network.
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Although the node-ontrolling adversary is dynami, he is still onstrained by the onforming assumption.
Namely, the adversary may not orrupt nodes that have been, or will be, part of any ative path onneting sender
and reeiver.
13
If desired, privay an be added trivially by enrypting all pakets.
13
4 Routing Protool in the Edge-Sheduling Adversarial Model
In this setion we formally desribe our edge-sheduling protool, whih is essentially the Slide
protool of [2℄.
4.1 Denitions and High-Level Ideas
The goal of the protool is to transmit a sequene of messages {m1,m2, . . . } of uniform size from
the sender S to the reeiver R (refer to Setion 3.1 for a omplete desription of the model). Eah
node will maintain a stak (i.e. FILO buers) along eah of its (direted) edges that an hold up to
2n pakets onurrently. To allow for pakets to beome stuk in the buers, we will utilize error-
orretion (see e.g. [10℄). Speially, the messages {m1,m2, . . . } are onverted into odewords
{c1, c2, . . . }, allowing the reeiver to deode a message provided he has reeived an appropriate
number (depending on the information rate and error-rate of the ode) of bits of the orresponding
odeword. In this paper, we assume the existene of a error-orreting ode with information rate
σ and error rate λ.
As part of the setup of our protool, we assume that the messages {m1,m2, . . . } have been
partitioned to have uniform size M = 6σPn
3
λ
(reall that P is the apaity of eah edge and σ and
λ are the parameters for the error-orretion ode). The messages are expanded into odewords,
whih will have size C = M
σ
= 6Pn
3
λ
. The odewords are then divided into
C
P
= 6n
3
λ
pakets of size
P . We emphasize this quantity for later use:
D :=
6n3
λ
= number of pakets per odeword. (1)
Note that the only noise in our network results from undelivered pakets or out-dated pakets (in
the edge-sheduling adversarial model, any paket that R reeives has not been altered). Therefore,
sine eah odeword onsists of D = 6n
3
λ
pakets, by denition of λ, if R reeives (1 − λ)D =
(1−λ)
(
6n3
λ
)
pakets orresponding to the same odeword, he will be able to deode. We emphasize
this fat:
Fat 1. If the reeiver has obtained D− 6n3 = (1− λ)
(
6n3
λ
)
pakets from any odeword, he
will be able to deode the odeword to obtain the orresponding message.
Beause our model allows for edges to go up/down, we fore eah node to keep inoming and
outgoing buers for every possible edge, even if that edge isn't part of the graph at the outset. We
introdue now the notion of height of a buer, whih will be used to determine when pakets are
transferred and how pakets are re-shued between the internal buers of a given node between
rounds.
Denition 4.1. The height of an inoming/outgoing buer is the number of pakets urrently
stored in that buer.
The presene of an edge-sheduling adversary that an fore edges to fail at any time ompliates
the interation between the nodes. Note that our model does not assume that the nodes are aware
of the status of any of its adjaent edges, so failed edges an only be deteted when information
that was supposed to be passed along the edge does not arrive. We handle potential edge failures
as follows. First, the inoming/outgoing buers at either end of an edge will be given a status
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(normal or problem). Also, to aount for a paket that may be lost due to edge failure during
transmission aross that edge, a node at the reeiving end of a failed edge may have to leave room
in its orresponding inoming buer. We refer to this gap as a ghost paket, but emphasize that
the height of an inoming buer is not aeted by ghost pakets (by denition, height only ounts
pakets that are present in the buer). Similarly, when a sending node sends a paket aross an
edge, it atually only sends a opy of the paket, leaving the original paket in its outgoing buer.
We will refer to the original opy left in the outgoing buer as a agged paket, and note that agged
pakets ontinue to ontribute to the height of an outgoing buer until they are deleted.
The odewords will be transferred sequentially, so that at any time, the sender is only inserting
pakets orresponding to a single odeword. We will refer to the rounds for whih the sender is
inserting odeword pakets orresponding to the ith odeword as the ith transmission. Lemma
6.15 below states that after the sender has inserted D − 2n3 pakets orresponding to the same
odeword, the reeiver an neessarily deode. Therefore, when the sender has inserted this many
pakets orresponding to odeword bi, he will lear his outgoing buers and begin distributing
pakets orresponding to the next odeword bi+1.
4.2 Detailed Desription of the Edge-Sheduling Protool
We desribe now the two main parts of the edge-sheduling adversarial routing protool: the
Setup and the Routing Phase. For a formal presentation of the pseudo-ode, see Setion 5.
Setup. Eah internal (i.e. not S or R) node has the following buers:
1. Inoming Buers. Reall that we view eah bi-diretional edge as onsisting of two direted
edges. Then for eah inoming edge, a node will have a buer that has the apaity to hold 2n
pakets at any given time. Additionally, eah inoming buer will be able to store a Status
bit, the label of the Last-Reeived paket, and the Round-Reeived index (the round in
whih this inoming buer last aepted a paket, see Denition 6.5 below). The way that this
additional information is used will be desribed in the Routing Rules for Reeiving Node
setion below.
2. Outgoing Buers. For eah outgoing edge, a node will have a buer that has the apaity to
hold 2n pakets at any given time. Like inoming buers, eah outgoing buer will also be
able to store a status bit, the index label of one paket (alled the Flagged paket), and a
Problem-Round index (index of the most reent round in whih the status bit swithed to
1).
The reeiver will only have inoming buers (with apaity of one) and a large Storage Buer that
an hold up to D pakets. Similarly, the sender has only outgoing buers (with apaity 2n) and
the input stream of messages {m1,m2, . . . } whih are enoded into the odewords and divided into
pakets, the latter then distributed to the sender's outgoing buers.
Also as part of the Setup, all nodes learn the relevant parameters (P , n, λ, and σ).
Routing Phase. As indiated in Setion 3.1, we assume a synhronous network, so that there are
well-dened rounds in whih information is passed between nodes. Eah round onsists of two units
of time, alled Stages. The formal treatment of the Routing Phase an be found in the pseudo-ode
of Setion 5. Informally, Figure 2 below onsiders a direted edge E(A,B) from A (inluding A = S)
to B (inluding B = R), and desribes what ommuniation eah node sends in eah stage.
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Stage A B
HA := Height of buer along E(A,B)
1 Height of agged p. (if there is one) −→
Round prev. paket was sent
←−
HB := Height of buer along E(A,B)
Round prev. paket was reeived
Send paket if:
2 • HA > HB OR −→
• B didn't re. prev. paket sent
Figure 2: Desription of ommuniation exhange along direted edge E(A,B) during the Routing
Phase of any round.
In addition to this ommuniation, eah node must update its internal state based on the
ommuniation it reeives. In partiular, from the ommuniation A reeives from B in Stage 1 of
any round, A an determine if B has reeived the most reent paket A sent. If so, A will delete
this paket and swith the status of the outgoing buer along this edge to normal. If not, A will
keep the paket as a agged paket, and swith the status of the outgoing buer along this edge
to problem. At the other end, if B does not reeive A's Stage 1 ommuniation or B does not
reeive a paket it was expeting from A in Stage 2, then B will leave a gap in its inoming buer
(termed a ghost paket) and will swith this buer's status to problem. On the other hand, if
B suessfully reeives a paket in Stage 2, it will swith the buer bak to normal status.
Re-Shue Rules. At the end of eah round, nodes will shue the pakets they are holding
aording to the following rules:
1. Take a paket from the fullest buer and shue it to the emptiest buer, provided the dier-
ene in height is at least two (respetively one) when the paket is moved between two buers
of the same type (respetively when the paket moves from an inoming buer to an outgoing
buer). Pakets will never be re-shued from an outgoing buer to an inoming buer. If
two (or more) buers are tied for having the most pakets, then a paket will preferentially
be hosen from inoming buers over outgoing buers (ties are broken in a round-robin fash-
ion). Conversely, if two (or more) buers are tied for the emptiest buer, then a paket will
preferentially be given to outgoing buers over inoming buers (again, ties are broken in a
round-robin fashion).
2. Repeat the above step until the dierene between the fullest buer and the emptiest buer
does not meet the riterion outlined in Step 1.
Reall that when a paket is shued loally between two buers, pakets travel in a FILO manner,
so that the top-most paket of one buer is shued to the top spot of the next buer. When an
outgoing buer has a agged paket or an inoming buer has a ghost paket, we use instead the
following modiations to the above re-shue rules. Reall that in terms of measuring a buer's
height, agged pakets are ounted but ghost pakets are not.
- Outgoing buers do not shue agged pakets. In partiular, if Rule 1 above selets to transfer
a paket from an outgoing buer, the top-most non-agged paket will be shued. This may
mean that a gap is reated between the agged paket and the next non-agged paket.
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- Inoming buers do not re-shue ghost pakets. In partiular, ghost pakets will remain in
the inoming buer that reated them, although we do allow ghost pakets to slide down
within its inoming buer during re-shuing. Also, pakets shued into an inoming buer
are not allowed to oupy the same slot as a ghost paket (they will take the rst non-oupied
slot)
14
.
The sender and reeiver have speial rules for re-shuing pakets. Namely, during the re-shue
phase the sender will ll eah of his outgoing buers (in an arbitrary order) with pakets orrespond-
ing to the urrent odeword. Meanwhile, the reeiver will empty all of its inoming buers into its
storage buer. If at any time R has reeived enough pakets to deode a odeword bi (Fat 1 says
this amount is at most D− 6n3), then R outputs message mi and deletes all pakets orresponding
to odeword bi from its storage buer that he reeives in later rounds.
4.3 Analysis of the Edge-Sheduling Adversarial Protool
We now evaluate our edge-sheduling protool in terms of our three measurements of perfor-
mane: orretness, throughput, and proessor memory. The throughput standard expressed in
Theorem 4.2 below will serve an additional purpose when we move to the node-ontrolling ad-
versary setting: The sender will know that maliious ativity has ourred when the throughput
standard of Theorem 4.2 is not observed. Both of the theorems below will be proved rigorously in
Setions 6 and 7, after presenting the pseudo-ode in Setion 5.
Theorem 4.2. Eah message mi takes at most 3D rounds to pass from the sender to the reeiver.
In partiular, after O(xD) rounds, R will have reeived at least O(x) messages. Sine eah message
has size M=6σ
λ
Pn3=O(n3) and D=6n
3
λ
=O(n3), after O(x) rounds, R has reeived O(x) bits of
information, and thus our edge-sheduling adversarial protool enjoys a linear throughput rate.
The above theorem impliitly states that our edge-sheduling protool is orret. For omplete-
ness, we also state the memory requirements of our edge-sheduling protool, whih is bottle-neked
by the O(n2) pakets that eah internal node has the apaity to store in its buers.
Theorem 4.3. The edge-sheduling protool desribed in Setion 4.2 (and formally in the pseudo-
ode of Setion 5) requires at most O(n2 log n) bits of memory of the internal proessors.
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Note that beause ghost pakets do not ount towards height, there appears to be a danger that the re-shue rules
may ditate a paket gets transferred into an inoming buer, and this paket either has no plae to go (beause the
ghost paket oupies the top slot) or the paket inreases in height (whih would violate Claim 6.4 below). However,
beause only inoming buers are allowed to re-shue pakets into other inoming buers, and the dierene in
height must be at least two when this happens, neither of these troublesome events an our.
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5 Pseudo-Code for the Edge-Sheduling Adversarial Protool
Setup
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES:
01 n := Number of nodes in G;
02 D := 6n
3
λ
;
03 T := Transmission index;
04 t := Stage/Round index;
05 P := Capaity of edge (in bits);
06 for every N ∈ G
07 for every outgoing edge E(N,B) ∈ G,B 6= S and N 6= R
08 OUT ∈ [2n]× {0, 1}P ; ## Outgoing Buer able to hold 2n pakets
09 p˜ ∈ {0, 1}P ∪ ⊥; ## Copy of paket to be sent
10 sb ∈ {0, 1}; ## Status bit
11 d ∈ {0, 1}; ## Bit indiating if a paket was sent in the previous round
12 FR ∈ [0..6D] ∪ ⊥; ## Flagged Round (index of round N rst tried to send p˜ to B)
13 H ∈ [0..2n]; ## Height of OUT. Also denoted HOUT when there's ambiguity
14 HFP ∈ [1..2n] ∪ ⊥; ## Height of Flagged Paket
15 RR ∈ [−1..6D] ∪ ⊥; ## Round Reeived index (from adjaent inoming buer)
16 HIN ∈ [0..2n] ∪ ⊥; ## Height of inoming buer of B
17 for every inoming edge E(A,N) ∈ G,A 6= R and N 6= S
18 IN ∈ [2n]× {0, 1}P ; ## Inoming Buer able to hold 2n pakets
19 p ∈ {0, 1}P ∪ ⊥; ## Paket just reeived
20 sb ∈ {0, 1}; ## Status bit
21 RR ∈ [−1..6D]; ## Round Reeived (index of round N last re'd a p. from A)
22 H ∈ [0..2n]; ## Height of IN. Also denoted HIN when there's ambiguity
23 HGP ∈ [1..2n] ∪ ⊥; ## Height of Ghost Paket
24 HOUT ∈ [0..2n] ∪ ⊥; ## Height of outgoing buer, or height of Flagged Paket of A
25 sbOUT ∈ {0, 1}; ## Status Bit of outgoing buer of A
26 FR ∈ [0..6D] ∪ ⊥; ## Flagged Round index (from adjaent outgoing buer)
INITIALIZATION OF VARIABLES:
27 for every N ∈ G
28 for every inoming edge E(A,N) ∈ G,A 6= R and N 6= S
29 Initialize IN; ## Set eah entry in IN to ⊥
30 p, FR,HGP = ⊥;
31 sb, sbOUT ,H,HOUT = 0; RR = −1;
32 for every outgoing edge E(N,B) ∈ G,B 6= S and N 6= R
33 Initialize OUT; ## Set eah entry in OUT to ⊥
34 p˜, HFP , RR,FR = ⊥;
35 sb, d,H,HIN = 0;
End Setup
Figure 3: Pseudo-Code for Internal Nodes' Setup for the Edge-Sheduling Adversarial Model
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Sender and Reeiver's Additional Setup
DEFINITION OF ADDITIONAL VARIABLES FOR SENDER:
36 M := {m1,m2, . . . } = Input Stream of Messages;
37 κ ∈ [0..D] = Number of pakets orresponding to urrent odeword the sender has knowingly inserted;
INITIALIZATION OF SENDER'S VARIABLES:
38 Distribute Pakets; ## See Figure 6
39 κ = 0;
DEFINITION OF ADDITIONAL VARIABLES FOR RECEIVER:
40 IR ∈ [D] × ({0, 1}
P ∪ ⊥) = Storage Buer to hold pakets orresponding to urrent odeword;
41 κ ∈ [0..D] := Number of pakets reeived orresponding to urrent odeword;
INITIALIZATION OF RECEIVER'S VARIABLES:
42 κ = 0;
43 Initialize IR; ## Sets eah element of IR to ⊥
End Sender and Reeiver's Additional Setup
Figure 4: Additional Code for Sender and Reeiver Setup
Transmission T
01 for every N ∈ G
02 for every t < 2 ∗ (3D) ## The fator of 2 is for the 2 stages per round
03 if t (mod 2) = 0 then: ## STAGE 1
04 for every outgoing edge E(N,B) ∈ G,N 6= R,B 6= S
05 if HFP = ⊥: send (H,⊥,⊥); else: send (H − 1, HFP , FR);
06 receive (HIN , RR);
07 Reset Outgoing Variables;
08 for every inoming edge E(A,N) ∈ G,N 6= S,A 6= R
09 send (H,RR);
10 sbOUT = 0; FR = ⊥;
11 receive (H,⊥,⊥) or (H,HFP , FR); ## If H = ⊥ or FR > RR, set sbOUT=1; and
## HOUT=HFP ; O.W. set HOUT=H ; sbOUT=0;
12 else if t (mod 2) = 1 then: ## STAGE 2
13 for every outgoing edge E(N,B) ∈ G,N 6= R,B 6= S
14 if HIN 6= ⊥ then: ## Reeived B's info.
15 Create Flagged Paket;
16 if (sb=1 or (sb=0 and HOUT > HIN)) then:
17 Send Paket;
18 for every inoming edge E(A,N) ∈ G,N 6= S,A 6= R
19 Reeive Paket;
20 if N /∈ {S,R} then: Re-Shue;
21 else if N = R then: Reeiver Re-Shue;
22 else if N = S then: Sender Re-Shue;
23 if t = 2(3D) − 1 then: End of Transmission Adjustments;
End Transmission T
Figure 5: Routing Rules I for Edge-Sheduling Adversarial Model
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24 Reset Outgoing Variables
25 if d = 1: ## N sent a paket previous round
26 d = 0;
27 if RR = ⊥ or ⊥ 6= FR > RR ## Didn't reeive onf. of paket reeipt
28 sb = 1;
29 if RR 6= ⊥:
30 if ⊥ 6= FR ≤ RR: ## B re'd most reently sent paket
31 if N = S then: κ = κ+ 1;
32 OUT[HFP ] = ⊥; Fill Gap; ## Remove p˜ from OUT, shifting
## down pakets on top of p˜ if neessary
33 FR, p˜,HFP = ⊥; sb = 0; H = H − 1;
34 if ⊥ 6= RR < FR and ⊥ 6= HFP < H : ## B did not reeive most reently sent paket
35 Elevate Flagged Paket; ## Swap OUT[H] and OUT[HFP ]; Set HFP = H;
36 Create Flagged Paket
37 if sb = 0 and H > HIN : ## Normal Status, will send top paket
38 p˜ = OUT[H ]; HFP = H ; FR = t;
39 Send Paket
40 d = 1;
41 send (p˜, FR);
42 Reeive Paket
43 receive (p, FR);
44 if HOUT = ⊥: ## Didn't Re. A's height info.
45 sb = 1;
46 if HGP > H or (HGP = ⊥ and H < 2n): HGP = H + 1;
47 else if sbOUT = 1 or HOUT > H : ## A paket should've been sent
48 if p = ⊥: ## Paket wasn't re'd
49 sb = 1;
50 if HGP > H or (HGP = ⊥ and H < 2n): HGP = H + 1;
51 else if RR < FR: ## Paket was re'd and should keep it
52 if HGP = ⊥: HGP = H + 1; ## If no slot is saved for p, put it on top
53 sb = 0; IN[HGP ] = p; H = H + 1; HGP = ⊥; RR = t;
54 else: ## Paket was re'd, but already had it
55 sb = 0; Fill Gap; HGP = ⊥; ## See omment about Fill Gap on line 57 below
56 else: ## A paket should NOT have been sent
57 sb = 0; Fill Gap; HGP = ⊥; ## If pakets oupied slots above the
## Ghost Paket, then Fill Gap will Slide
## those pakets down one slot
58 End of Transmission Adjustments
59 for every outgoing edge E(N,B) ∈ G, N 6= R, B 6= S:
60 if HFP 6= ⊥:
61 OUT [HFP ] = ⊥; Fill Gap; ## Remove any agged paket p˜ from OUT, shifting
## down pakets on top of p˜ if neessary
62 d, sb = 0; FR,HFP , p˜ = ⊥; H = H − 1;
63 for every inoming edge E(A,N) ∈ G, N 6= S, A 6= R:
64 HGP = ⊥; sb = 0; RR = −1; Fill Gap;
65 if N = S then: Distribute Pakets;
Figure 6: Routing Rules for Edge-Sheduling Adversarial Model (ontinued)
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71 Re-Shue
72 (M,BF ) = Find Maximum Buer ## Node N nds its fullest buer BF with height M ,
## breaking ties by 1) seleting inoming buers over
## outgoing buers, then 2) Round-Robin
73 (m,BT ) = Find Minimum Buer ## Node N nds its emptiest buer BT with height m,
## breaking ties by 1) seleting outgoing buers over
## inoming buers, then 2) Round-Robin
74 if Paket Should Be Re-Shued: ## A paket should be re-shued if M −m > 1 or
## M −m = 1 and

BF is an In. Buer
BT is an Out. Buer
ff
75 Adjust Heights ## Adjust M , m to aount for Ghost, Flagged pakets.
76 SIGN,N = SIGN,N + (M −m− 1); ## Only used for (node-ontr. + edge-shed.) protool
77 Shue Paket
78 Re-Shue
79 Adjust Heights
80 if BF is an Out. Buer and HFP ≥ HOUT : ## HFP and HOUT refer to BF 's info. If true,
81 M =M − 1; ## then a Flagged paket is top-most non-null paket
82 if BF is an In. Buer and IN[HIN + 1] 6= ⊥: ## IN and HIN refer to BF 's info. If true,
83 M =M + 1; ## then there is a Ghost Paket reating a gap
84 if BT is an Out. Buer and OUT[HOUT ] = ⊥: ## OUT and HOUT refer to BT 's info. If true,
85 m = m− 1; ## then there is a Flagged paket reating a gap
86 if BT is an In. Buer and HGP 6= ⊥: ## HGP and HIN refer to BT 's info. If true,
87 m = m+ 1; ## then there is a Ghost Paket reating a gap
88 Shue Paket
89 BT [m+ 1] = BF [M ];
90 BF [M ] = ⊥;
91 HBT = HBT + 1; ## HBT is the height of BT
92 HBF = HBF − 1; ## HBF is the height of BF
93 if BF is an In. Buer and ⊥ 6= HGP > HIN , then: ## HGP and HIN refer to BF 's info. Sine BF lost a
94 HGP = HIN + 1; ## paket, slide Ghost Paket down into top slot
95 Sender Re-Shue
96 Fill Pakets; ## Fills eah outgoing buer with odeword pakets not
## yet distributed, adjusting eah HOUT appropriately
97 Reeiver Re-Shue
98 for every inoming edge E(A,R) ∈ G: ## Reset R's In. Buer to be open
99 if HIN > 0: ## R re'd a paket along this edge this round
100 if IN [1] is a paket for urrent odeword: ## Also, see omments on 104 below
101 IR[κ] = IN [1]; κ = κ+ 1;
102 HIN = 0; IN [1] = ⊥; HGP = ⊥;
103 if κ ≥ D − 3n3 then: ## R an deode by Fat 1
104 Deode and output message; ## Also, only keep odeword pakets orresponding
## to next message in future rounds
Figure 7: Re-Shue Rules for both Edge-Sheduling and (Node-Controlling + Edge-Sheduling)
Protools
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6 Edge-Sheduling Adversary Model:
Proofs of Lemmas and Theorems
Before proving the main two theorems for the edge-sheduling adversarial protool (Theorems
4.2 and 4.3), we will rst state and prove a sequene of laims that follow immediately from the
Routing and Re-Shue Rules of Setion 4.1. We have inluded pseudo-ode in Setion 5, and when
appropriate the proofs will refer to spei line numbers in the pseudo-ode. In partiular, we will
referene a line in pseudo-ode by writing (X.YY), where X refers to the Figure and YY to the line
number. We pushed the laims and proofs that rely heavily on the pseudo-ode (but are unlikely
to add insight) to Setion 7 so as not to distrat the reader with the gory details of these proofs.
Logially, these laims need to be proven rst as the laims and proofs below will rely on them
(even though Setion 7 appears below, the proofs there do not rely on proofs here, so there is no
danger of irularity).
We state and prove here the laims that will lead to Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3.
Claim 6.1. The apaity of the internal buers of the network (not ounting S or R's buers) is
4n(n− 2)2.
Proof. Eah node has (n − 2) outgoing buers (one to eah node exept itself and S, 3.07) and
(n−2) inoming buers (one from eah node exept itself and R, 3.17), and thus a total of 2(n−2)
buers. Eah of these buers has apaity 2n (Lemma 7.1, parts 5, 6, and 9), and there are n − 2
internal nodes, so the internal buer apaity of the network is 4n(n− 2)2. 
Claim 6.2. The maximum amount of potential
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in the internal buers of the network at any time
is 2n(2n+ 1)(n − 2)2.
Proof. A buer ontributes the most to network potential when it is full, in whih ase it ontributes∑2n
i=1 i = n(2n + 1). Sine there are 2(n − 2) buers per internal node, and n − 2 internal nodes,
the maximum amount of potential in the internal buers is as laimed. 
We dene the height of a paket in an inoming/outgoing buer to be the spot it oupies in that
buer.
Claim 6.3. After re-shuing, (and hene at the very end/beginning of eah round), all of the buers
of eah node are balaned. In partiular, there are no inoming buers that have height stritly
bigger than any outgoing buers, and the dierene in height between any two buers is at most
one.
Proof of Claim 6.3. We prove this using indution (on the round index), noting that all buers
are balaned at the outset of the protool (lines (3.29) and (3.33)). Consider any node N in the
network, and assume that its buers are all balaned at the end of some round t. We need to show
the buers of N will remain balaned at the end of the next round t + 1. Let B1 and B2 denote
any two buers of N , and let h1 be the variable denoting the height of B1 and h2 the height of B2.
Suppose for the sake of ontradition that h1 ≥ h2+2 at the end of round t+1 (after re-shuing).
Let H denote the height of the maximum buer in N at the end of t+1, so H ≥ h1 ≥ h2+2. Also
15
See Denition 6.10.
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let h denote the height of the minimum buer in N at the end of t + 1, so h ≤ h2 ≤ H − 2. But
then Re-Shue Rules ditate that N should've kept re-shuing (7.72-74), a ontradition.
Similarly, assume for ontradition that there exists an inoming buer whose height h2 is bigger
than that of some outgoing buer that has height h1. Let H and h be as dened above, so we have
that h ≤ h1 < h2 ≤ H. In the ase that h2 = H, Re-Shue Rules (7.72) guarantee that an
inoming buer will be seleted to take a paket from. Also, if h = h1, then Re-Shue Rules (7.73)
guarantee that an outgoing buer will be hosen to give a paket to. Therefore, in this ase a paket
should have been re-shued (7.74), and hene we have ontradited the fat that we are at the end
of the Re-Shue phase of round t. On the other hand, if h 6= h1 or H 6= h2, then H − h ≥ 2, and
again Re-Shuing should not have terminated (7.74). 
The following observation is the formalization of the onept of pakets owing downhill that was
introdued in Setion 4.1.
Claim 6.4. Every paket is inserted into one of the sender's outgoing buers at some initial height.
When (a opy of) the paket goes between any two buers B1 6= B2 (either aross an edge or loally
during re-shuing), its height in B2 is less than or equal to the height it had in B1. If B1 = B2,
the statement remains true EXCEPT for on line (6.35).
Proof. See Setion 7, where we restate and prove this in Lemma 7.11. 
Denition 6.5. We will say that a paket is aepted by a buer B in round t if B reeives and
stores that paket in round t, either due to a paket transfer or re-shuing (as on (6.53) or (7.89)).
Denition 6.6. We say that the sender inserts a paket into the network in round t if any internal
node (or R) aepts the paket (as in Denition 6.5) in round t. Note that this denition does not
require that S reeives the veriation of reeipt (i.e. that S reeives the ommuniation on (5.06)
indiating RR ≥ FR), so S may not be aware that a paket was inserted.
Notie that in terms of transferring pakets, the above denition distinguishes between the ase that
a paket is aepted by B in round t (as dened above) and the ase that a paket arrives at B in
round t but is deleted by B (by failing the onditional statement on line (6.51)). As emphasized in
the Introdution, orretness and throughput rate are two of the three ommodities with whih we
will evaluate a given routing protool. In our protool, we will need to show that pakets are not
lost en route from S to R to ensure orretness, and meanwhile we will want to show that pakets
are not (overly) dupliated (sine transferred pakets are atually opies of the original, some paket
dupliation is neessary) to allow a fast throughput rate. The following two laims guarantee that
paket dupliation won't beome problemati while simultaneously guaranteeing that pakets are
never deleted ompletely (exept by R).
Claim 6.7. Before the end of transmission T, any paket that was inserted into the network during
transmission T is either in some buer (perhaps as a agged paket) or has been reeived by R.
Proof. See Setion 7, where we restate and prove this in Lemma 7.12. 
Claim 6.8. Not ounting agged pakets, there is at most one opy of any paket in the network at
any time (not inluding pakets in the sender or reeiver's buers). Looking at all opies (agged
and un-agged) of any given paket present in the network at any time, at most one opy will ever
be aepted (as in Denition 6.5) by another node.
23
Proof. See Setion 7, where we restate and prove this in Lemma 7.13. 
The following laim won't be needed until we introdue the protool for the (Node-Controlling
+ Edge-Sheduling) adversarial model, but follows from the Routing Rules outlined in Setion 4.1.
Claim 6.9. At any time, an outgoing buer has at most one agged paket.
Proof. See Setion 7, where we restate and prove this in Corollary 7.8. 
The following denition formalizes the notion of potential, and will be neessary to prove
throughput performane bounds.
Denition 6.10. For any buer
16 B 6= S,R that has height h at time t, dene the potential of B
at time t, denoted by ΦBt , to be:
ΦBt :=
h∑
i=1
i =
h(h + 1)
2
.
For any internal node N ∈ P \ {R,S}, dene the node's potential ΦNt to be the sum of its buer's
potentials:
ΦNt :=
∑
Buers B of N
ΦBt
Dene the network potential Φt at time t to be the sum of all the internal buers' potentials:
Φt :=
∑
ΦNt
N∈P\{R,S}
It will be useful to break an internal node's potential into two parts. The rst part, whih we will
term paket dupliation potential, will be the sum of the heights of the agged pakets in the node's
outgoing buers that have already been aepted by the neighboring node (as in Denition 6.5).
Reall that a agged paket is a paket that was sent along an outgoing edge, but the sending node
is maintaining a opy of the paket until it gets onrmation of reeipt. Therefore, the ontribution
of paket dupliation potential to overall network potential is the extraneous potential; it represents
the over-ounting of dupliated pakets. We emphasize that not all agged pakets ount towards
paket-dupliation potential, sine pakets are agged as soon as the sending node determines a
paket should be sent (see line 6.38), but the agged paket's height does not ount towards paket
dupliation potential until the reeiving node has aepted the paket as on line (6.53) (whih may
happen in a later round or not at all). The other part of network potential will be termed non-
dupliated potential, and is the sum of the heights of all non-agged pakets together with agged
pakets that have not yet been aepted. Note that the separation of potential into these two parts
is purely for analysis of our protool, indeed the nodes are not able to determine if a given agged
paket ontributes to paket dupliation or non-dupliated potential. For onveniene, we will often
refer to (network) non-dupliated potential simply as (network) potential (the meaning should be
lear from ontext).
Notie that when a node aepts a paket, its own (non-dupliated) potential instantaneously
inreases by the height that this paket assumes in the orresponding inoming buer. Meanwhile,
the sending node's non-dupliated potential drops by the height that the paket oupied in its
16
Pakets in one of the sender or reeiver's buers do not ount towards potential.
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outgoing buer, and there is a simultaneous and equivalent inrease in this sending node's paket
dupliation potential. Separating overall network potential into these two ategories will be neessary
to state and prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 6.11. Every hange in network potential omes from one of the following 3 events:
1. S inserts a paket into the network.
2. R reeives a paket.
3. A paket that was sent from one internal node to another is aepted; the veriation of paket
reeipt is reeived by the sending node; a paket is shued between buers of the same node;
or a paket is moved within a buer.
Furthermore, hanges in network potential due to item 1) are stritly non-negative and hanges due
to item 2) are stritly non-positive. Also, hanges in network non-dupliated potential due to
item 3) are stritly non-positive. Finally, at all times, network paket dupliation potential is
bounded between zero and 2n3 − 8n2 + 8n.
Proof. Sine network potential ounts the heights of the internal nodes' buers, it only hanges
when these heights hange, whih in turn happens exlusively when there is paket movement. By
reviewing the pseudo-ode, we see that this happens only on lines (6.32), (6.35), (6.53), (6.55),
(6.57), (6.61), (6.64), and (7.89-90). Eah of these falls under one of the three items listed in
the Lemma, thus proving the rst statement in the Lemma. That network potential hanges due
to paket insertion by S are stritly non-negative is obvious (either the reeiving node's potential
inreases by the height the paket assumed, as on (6.53), or the reeiving node is R and the
paket does not ontribute to potential). Similarly, that potential hange upon paket reeipt by
R is stritly non-positive is lear, sine pakets at R do not ount towards potential (see Denition
6.10). Also, sine only agged pakets (but not neessarily all of them) ontribute to network paket
dupliation potential, the biggest it an be is the maximal number of agged pakets that an exist
in the network at any given time, times the maximum height eah agged paket an have. By
Claim 6.9, there are at most (n−2)2 agged pakets in the network at any given time, and eah one
has maximal height 2n (Lemma 7.1, part 9), so network paket dupliation potential is bounded by
2n3 − 8n2 + 8n.
It remains to prove that hanges in network non-dupliated potential due to item 3) are stritly
non-positive. To do this, we look at all lines on whih there is paket movement, and argue eah
will result in a non-positive hange to non-dupliated potential. Clearly potential hanges on lines
(6.32), (6.55), (6.57), (6.61), and (6.64) are non-positive. Also, if (6.35) is reahed, if R has
already aepted the paket, then that paket's potential will ount towards dupliated potential
within the outgoing buer, and so the hange in potential as on (6.35) will not aet non-dupliated
potential. If on the other hand R has not already aepted the paket, then the agged paket still
ounts towards non-dupliation potential in the outgoing buer. Sine the result of (6.35) is simply
to swap the agged paket with the top paket in the buer, the net hange in non-dupliation
potential is zero. That hanges in potential due to re-shuing pakets (7.89-90) are stritly non-
positive follows from Claim 6.4. It remains to hek the ases that a paket that was transferred
between two internal nodes is aepted (6.53). Notie that upon reeipt there are two hanges to
network non-dupliated potential: it inreases by the height the paket assumes in the inoming
buer it arrived at (6.53), and it dereases by the height the paket had in the orresponding
outgoing buer (this derease is beause the agged paket in the outgoing buer will ount towards
paket dupliation potential instead of non-dupliated potential the instant the paket is aepted).
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The derease outweighs the inrease sine the paket's height in the inoming buer is less than or
equal to the height it had in the orresponding outgoing buer (Claim 6.4). 
The following Lemma will be useful in bounding the number of rounds in whih no pakets are
inserted. We begin with the following denition:
Denition 6.12. The sender is bloked from inserting any pakets in some round t if the sender is
not able to insert any pakets in t (see Denition 6.6). Let βT denote the number of rounds in a
transmission T that the sender was bloked.
Lemma 6.13. If at any point in any transmission T, the number of bloked rounds is βT, then there
has been a derease in the network's non-dupliated potential by at least
17 nβT.
The intuition of the proof is to argue that eah bloked round reates a drop in non-dupliated
potential of at least n as follows. If the sender is bloked from inserting a paket, the node N
adjaent to the sender (along the ative honest path) will neessarily have a full inoming buer
along its edge to the sender. By the fat that buers are balaned (Lemma 6.3), this implies that
all of N 's outgoing buers are also full. Meanwhile, at the opposite end of the ative honest path,
the node adjaent to the reeiver will neessarily send a paket to the reeiver if there is anything
in its outgoing buer along this edge, and this will result in a drop of potential of whatever height
the paket had in the outgoing buer. Therefore, at the start of the ative honest path, the buers
are full, while at the end of the path, a paket will be transferred to height zero (in the reeiver's
buer). Intuitively, it therefore seems that traking all paket movements along the ative honest
path should result in a drop of potential of at least 2n. As the ounter-example in the footnote
shows, this argument does not work exatly (we are only guaranteed a drop of n), but the struture
of the proof is guided by this intuition. We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 6.14. Let C = N1N2 . . . Nl be a path onsisting of l nodes, suh that R = Nl and S /∈ C.
Suppose that in round t, all edges E(Ni, Ni+1), 1 ≤ i < l are ative for the entire round. Let φ
denote the hange in the network's non-dupliated potential aused by:
1. (For 1 ≤ i < l) Paket transfers aross E(Ni, Ni+1) in round t,
2. (For 1 < i < l) Re-shuing pakets into Ni's outgoing buers during t,
Then if ON1,N2 denotes N1's outgoing buer along E(N1, N2) and O denotes its height at the outset
of t, we have:
- If ON1,N2 has a agged paket that has already been aepted by N2 before round t, then:
φ ≤ −O + l − 1 (2)
- Otherwise,
φ ≤ −O + l − 2 (3)
17
An initial guess that the minimal potential drop equals 2n for eah bloked round is inorret. Consider the
ase where the ative path onsists of all n − 2 intermediate nodes with the following urrent state: the rst two
nodes' buers all have height 2n, the next pair's buers all have height 2n− 1, and so forth, down to the last pair of
internal nodes, whose buers all have height n+ 2. Then the drop in the network's non-dupliated potential is only
n+ 2 for this round.
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Proof. The proof of this lemma is rather involved and relies heavily on the pseduo-ode, so we have
pushed its proof to Setion 7, where it is restated and proved as Lemma 7.15. 
We an prove Lemma 6.13 as a Corollary.
Proof of Lemma 6.13. For every bloked round t, by the onforming assumption there exists a
hain Ct onneting the sender and reeiver that satises the hypothesis of Lemma 6.14. Letting N1
denote the rst node on this hain (not inluding the sender), the fat that the round was bloked
means that N1's inoming buer was full, and then by Lemma 6.3, so was N1's outgoing buer
along E(N1, N2). Sine the length of the hain l is neessarily less than or equal to n, Lemma 6.14
says that the hange in non-dupliated potential ontributions of φ (see notation there) satisfy:
φ ≤ −ON1,N2 + l − 1 ≤ −2n+ n− 1 < −n (4)
Sine φ only reords some of the hanges to non-dupliated potential, we use Statement 3 of Lemma
6.11 to argue that the ontributions not ounted will only help the bound sine they are stritly
non-positive. Sine we are not double ounting anywhere, eah bloked round will orrespond to a
drop in non-dupliated potential of at least −n, whih then yields the lemma. 
The following Lemma will bound the number of rounds that S needs to insert pakets orre-
sponding to the same odeword.
Lemma 6.15. If at any time D−2n3 distint pakets orresponding to some odeword bi have been
inserted into the network, then R an neessarily deode message mi.
Proof. Every paket that has been inserted into the network has either reahed R or is in the
inoming/outgoing buer of an internal node (Claim 6.7). Sine the maximum number of pakets
that are in the latter ategory is less than 4n3 (Claim 6.1), if D−2n3 distint pakets orresponding
to bi have been inserted, then R has neessarily reeived D − 6n
3 = (1− λ)
(
6n3
λ
)
of these, and so
by Fat 1 R an deode message mi. 
We an now (restate and) prove the two main theorems of Setion 4.3.
Theorem 4.2. Eah message mi takes at most 3D rounds to pass from the sender to the reeiver.
In partiular, after O(xD) rounds, R will have reeived at least O(x) messages. Sine eah message
has size M=6σ
λ
Pn3=O(n3) and D=6n
3
λ
=O(n3), after O(x) rounds, R has reeived O(x) bits of
information, and thus our edge-sheduling adversarial protool enjoys a linear throughput rate.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let t denote the round that S rst tries to insert pakets orresponding to a
new odeword bi into the network. In eah round between t and t+3D, either S is able to insert a
paket or he isn't. By the pigeonhole priniple, either D rounds pass in whih S an insert a paket,
or 2D rounds pass in whih no pakets are inserted. In the former ase, R an deode by Lemma 6.15.
It remains to prove the theorem in the latter ase. Lemma 6.13 says that the network non-dupliated
potential drops by at least n in eah of the 2D rounds in whih no pakets are inserted, a total drop
of 2nD. Meanwhile, Lemma 6.11 guarantees that the inrease to network potential between t and
t + 3D aused by dupliated potential is at most by 2n3 − 8n2 + 8n. Combining these two fats,
we have that (not ounting hanges in potential aused by paket insertions) the network potential
drops by at least 2nD−2n3+8n2−8n between t and t+3D. Sine network potential an never be
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negative, we must aount for this (non-dupliated) potential drop with positive ontributions to
potential hange. The potential already in the network at the start of t adds to the potential at most
4n4−14n3+8n2+8n (Claim 6.2). Therefore, paket insertions must aount for the remaining hange
in potential of (2nD−2n3+8n2−8n)−(4n4−14n3+8n2+8n) = 2nD−4n4+(12n3−16n) ≥ 2nD−4n4
(where the last inequality assumes n ≥ 3). Lemma 6.11 states that the only way network potential
an inrease (other than the ontribution of paket dupliation potential whih has already been
aounted for) is when S inserts a paket (a maximum inrease of 2n per paket), so it must be
that S inserted at least (2nD−4n4)/2n = D−2n3 pakets into the network between t and t+3D,
and again R an deode by Lemma 6.15. 
Theorem 4.3. The edge-sheduling protool desribed in Setion 4.2 (and formally in the pseudo-
ode of Setion 5) requires at most O(n2 log n) bits of memory of the internal proessors.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Pakets have size log n to allow the pakets to be indexed. Sine eah internal
node needs to hold at most O(n2) pakets at any time (it has 2(n− 2) buers, eah able to hold 2n
pakets), the theorem follows. 
7 Edge-Sheduling Protool:
Pseudo-Code Intensive Claims and Proofs
In this setion we prove that our pseudo-ode is onsistent with the laimed properties that our
protool enjoys.
The following lemma is the rst attempt to link the pseudo-ode with the high-level desription
of what our protool is doing. Reall that a buer is in normal (respetively problem) status
whenever its status bit sb is zero (respetively one). Also, an outgoing buer is said to have a
agged paket if HFP 6= ⊥, and the agged paket is the paket in the outgoing buer at height
HFP . Notie that beause the pseudo-ode is written sequentially, things that oneptually happen
simultaneously appear in the pseudo-ode as ourring onseutively. In partiular, when pakets
are moved between buers, updating the buers' ontents and updating the height variables does
not happen simultaneously in the ode, whih explains the wording of the rst sentene in the
following lemma.
Lemma 7.1. At all times (i.e. all lines of ode in Figures 5, 6, and 7) EXCEPT when pakets
travel between buers ((6.32-33), (6.52-53), and (7.89-90)), along any (direted) edge E(A,B)
for any pair of internal nodes (A,B), we have that:
1. If HGP > HIN or HGP = ⊥, then HGP = HIN + 1 or HGP = ⊥ and IN[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HIN ]
and IN[i] = ⊥ ∀i ∈ [HIN + 1..2n].
2. If HGP ≤ HIN , then IN[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HGP − 1] and ∀i ∈ [HGP + 1..HIN + 1], and
IN[i] = ⊥ ∀i ∈ [HIN + 2..2n] and IN[HGP ] = ⊥.
3. If HFP > HOUT , then sb = 1 and OUT[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HOUT − 1] and OUT[HFP ] 6= ⊥.
4. If HFP = ⊥ or HFP ≤ HOUT , then OUT[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HOUT ].
5. The height of IN, as dened by the number of pakets (i.e. non-null entries) of IN, is equal to
the value of HIN .
6. The height of OUT, as dened by the number of pakets (i.e. non-null entries) of OUT, is
equal to the value of HOUT .
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7. Whenever (6.53) is reahed, HGP ∈ [1..2n] and HIN ∈ [0..2n − 1].
8. Whenever (6.32) is reahed, HFP 6= ⊥ and HOUT ∈ [1..2n].
9. At all times (even those listed in the hypothesis above), HIN ,HOUT ∈ [0..2n] and HGP ,HFP ∈
⊥ ∪ [1..2n] (so the domains of these variables are well-dened).
Additionally, during any all to Re-Shue:
10. Whenever the onditional statement on line (7.74) is satised, one paket will pass between
buers. In partiular, there will be a buer that was storing the paket before the all to Re-
Shue that will not be storing (that instane of) the paket after the reshue. Similarly, there
will be another buer that has lled a vaant slot with (an instane of) the paket in question.
11. Flagged pakets do not move. More preisely, if HFP 6= ⊥ just before any all to Re-Shue,
then HFP and OUT[HFP ] will not hange during that all to Re-Shue.
12. Either HGP does not hange during re-shuing or HGP has dereased to equal HIN + 1.
Also, if HGP 6= ⊥, then IN[HGP ] does not get lled at any point during re-shuing.
13. If HIN < 2n before Re-Shuing, then HIN < 2n after Re-Shuing.
Proof of Lemma 7.1. We prove eah Statement of the Lemma above simultaneously by using
indution on the round and line number as follows. We rst prove the Lemma holds at the outset
of the protool (base ase). We then notie that the above variables only hange their value in the
lines exluded from the Lemma and lines (6.35), (6.38), (6.46), (6.50), (6.55), (6.57), (6.61-62),
(6.64), and (7.91-94). In partiular, we use the indution hypothesis to argue that as long as
the statement of the Lemma is true going into eah set of exluded lines and lines (6.35), (6.38),
(6.46), (6.50), (6.55), (6.57), (6.61-62), (6.64), and (7.91-94), then it will remain true when the
protool leaves eah of those lines. Using this tehnique, we now prove eah Statement listed above.
Base Case. At the outset of the protool, HGP and HFP = ⊥, HIN and HOUT = 0, and all entries
of IN and OUT are ⊥ (3.29-31 and 3.33-35) so Statements 1-6 and 9 are true.
Indution Step. We now prove that eah of the above Statements hold after leaving lines (6.32-
33), (6.35), (6.38), (6.46), (6.50), (6.52-53), (6.55), (6.57), (6.61-62), (6.64), (7.89-90), and
(7.91-94), provided they held upon entering these lines.
Lines (6.32-33). The variables in Statements 1, 2, 5, 7, do not hange in these lines, and hene
these Statements remain valid by the indution hypothesis. Statement 3 is vauously true, sine
HFP is set to ⊥ at the end of line (6.33). Also, Statement 9 will remain valid as long as Statement
8 does, as HFP is set to ⊥ on line (6.33), and HOUT ∈ [0..2n] would follow from Statement 8
sine upon entering these lines, HOUT ∈ [1..2n] (Statement 8), and so subtrating 1 from H on line
(6.33) ensures that HOUT will remain in [0..2n − 1] ⊆ [0..2n]. The rst part of Statement 8, that
HFP 6= ⊥ when (6.32) is reahed, follows immediately from Claim 7.4 below together with the fat
that (6.30) must have been satised to reah (6.32).
We next prove Statement 6. Anytime lines (6.32-33) are reahed, the derease of one by
HOUT on (6.33) represents the fat that OUT should be deleting a paket on these lines. Sine
the indution hypothesis (applied to Statement 6) guarantees that HOUT mathes the number of
pakets (non-bottom entries) of OUT before lines (6.32-33), the hanges to HOUT and the height
of OUT on these lines will exatly math/anel provided OUT does atually derease in height by
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1 (i.e. provided OUT[HFP ] 6= ⊥). Sine HFP is hanged (6.33) after deleting a paket (6.32), we
may apply the indution hypothesis to Statements 3 and 4 to argue that OUT[HFP ] 6= ⊥ as long
as the value of HFP was not ⊥ when line (6.32) was reahed. This was proven above for the rst
part of Statement 8.
Statement 4 follows from the argument above as follows. Upon leaving (6.33), HFP = ⊥, so we
must show OUT[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HOUT ]. As was argued above, HFP 6= ⊥ when (6.32) is reahed. If
HFP > HOUT when (6.32) is reahed, then by the indution hypothesis applied to Statement 3, on
that same line OUT[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HOUT − 1] and OUT[HFP ] 6= ⊥. The paket at height HFP will
be deleted on (6.32), so that OUT[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HOUT − 1], but OUT[i] = ⊥ for all i ≥ HOUT .
Then when HOUT is redued by one on (6.33), we will have that OUT[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HOUT ], as
required.
If on the other hand HFP ≤ HOUT when (6.32) is reahed, then by the indution hypothesis
applied to Statement 4, on that same line OUT[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HOUT ]. The paket at height HFP
will be deleted on (6.32) and the pakets on top of it shifted down one if neessary, so that after
(6.32) but before (6.33), we will have that OUT[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HOUT − 1], but OUT[i] = ⊥ for
all i ≥ HOUT . Then when HOUT is redued by one on (6.33), we will have that OUT[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈
[1..HOUT ], as required.
The seond part of Statement 8 also follows from the arguments above as follows. First, it was
shown in the proof of Statement 6 that OUT[HFP ] 6= ⊥ when (6.32) is reahed. In partiular,
the height of OUT is at least one going into (6.32), and then the indution hypothesis applied to
Statement 6 implies that HOUT ≥ 1 when (6.32) is reahed, and the indution hypothesis applied
to Statement 9 implies that HOUT ≤ 2n when (6.32) is reahed.
Line (6.35). Sine only HFP and OUT are modied on (6.35), we need only verify Statements 3,
4, 6, and 9 remain true after leaving (6.35). Sine HFP is gets the value max(HOUT ,HFP ) on
(6.35), Statement 9 will be true by the indution hypothesis (applied to Statement 9). Also, the
height of OUT does not hange, as (6.35) only swaps the loation of two pakets already in OUT,
so Statement 6 will remain true.
Statement 3 is only relevant if HFP > HOUT before reahing (6.35), sine otherwise HFP =
HOUT upon leaving (6.35), and Statement 3 will be vauously true. On the other hand, if HFP >
HOUT , then line (6.35) is not reahed sine (6.34) will be false.
In order to reah (6.35), HFP 6= ⊥ on (6.34), and so both HOUT and HFP are not equal to ⊥
when (6.35) is entered (Claim 7.4), and hene HFP 6= ⊥ upon leaving (6.35). Also, sine (6.35)
is only reahed if HFP < HOUT (6.34), we use the indution hypothesis (applied to Statement 4)
to argue that before reahing (6.35), we had that OUT[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HOUT ]. In partiular, both
OUT[HFP ] and OUT[HOUT ] are storing a paket, and the all to Elevate Flagged Paket simply
swaps these pakets, so that after the swap, it is still the ase that OUT[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HOUT ].
Sine in this ase HFP = HOUT after line (6.35), Statement 4 will remain true.
Line (6.38). HFP is the only relevant value hanged on (6.38), so it remains to prove the relevant
parts of Statements 3, 4 and 9. We will show that whenever (6.38) is reahed, HOUT ∈ [1..2n] and
OUT[HOUT ] 6= ⊥. If we an show these two things, we will be done, sine when HFP is set to HOUT
on (6.38), Statement 9 will be true, Statement 4 will follow from the indution hypothesis applied to
either Statement 3 or 4, and Statement 3 will not be relevant. By the indution hypothesis (applied
to Statement 9), HOUT ∈ [0..2n] when (6.38) is reahed. The fat that (6.38) was reahed means
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that the onditional statement on the line before (6.37) was satised, and thus OUT is in normal
status (sb = 0) and HOUT ∈ [1..2n]. By the indution hypothesis (applied to Statement 3), the
fat that sb = 0 going into (6.37) implies that HFP = ⊥ or HFP ≤ HOUT going into (6.37), and
then the indution hypothesis (applied to Statement 4) says that OUT[HOUT ] 6= ⊥ when (6.38) is
entered.
Lines (6.46) and (6.50). The parts of Statements 1, 2, and 9 involving hanges to HGP are the
only Statements that are aeted by these lines. If the onditional statement on these lines are
not satised, then no values hange, and there is nothing to prove. We therefore onsider the ase
that the onditional statement is satised. Then HGP is set to HIN + 1 on these lines, and hene
Statement 2 is vauously satised. Sine we are assuming HGP hanges value on (6.46) or (6.50),
the onditional statement says that HGP = ⊥ or HGP > HIN going into (6.46) (respetively
(6.50)). By the indution hypothesis (applied to Statement 1), IN[i] 6= ⊥ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ HIN ,
and IN[i] = ⊥ for all i > HIN . Therefore, sine IN and HIN do not hange on (6.46) or (6.50),
Statement 1 will remain true upon leaving these lines. Finally, for Statement 9, we need only show
HGP ∈ [1..2n] upon leaving line (6.46) (respetively line (6.50)). If HGP > HIN going into line
(6.46) (respetively line (6.50)), then the hange to HGP is non-positive, and so the indution
hypothesis applied to Statements 1 and 9 guarantee HGP will be in [1..2n] upon leaving these lines.
On the other hand, if HGP = ⊥ going into either of these lines, then HIN < 2n, and the indution
hypothesis applied to Statement 9 indiates that HIN ∈ [0..2n−1] going into these lines, and hene
HGP ∈ [1..2n] upon leaving either line.
Lines (6.52-53). Notie that HGP neessarily equals ⊥ when leaving (6.53), so Statement 2 above
is vauously satised. Also, neither HOUT , HFP , nor OUT is modied in these lines, so Statements
3, 4, 6, 8, and the parts of Statement 9 onerning these variables will remain valid by the indution
hypothesis.
We prove Statement 1 rst. Reall that the height of an inoming buer refers to the number of
(non-ghost) pakets the buer urrently holds. Sine HGP will neessarily equal ⊥ when leaving line
(6.53), we must show that IN[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HIN ] and IN[i] = ⊥ ∀i ∈ [HIN + 1..2n] upon leaving
line (6.53). Both of these follow immediately from the indution hypothesis applied to Statements
1 and 2, as follows. By the indution hypothesis applied to Statements 1, 2, and 9, either HGP = ⊥,
1 ≤ HGP ≤ HIN , or HGP = HIN + 1 ≤ 2n when line (6.52) is reahed. We onsider eah ase:
• If HGP = HIN + 1 when we reah line (6.52), then by the indution hypothesis (applied to
Statement 1) it will also be true that IN[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HIN ] and IN[i] = ⊥ ∀i ∈ [HIN +1..2n]
when this line is reahed. While on line (6.53), rst IN[HGP ] = IN[HIN + 1] is lled with a
paket, and then HIN is inreased by one, and so Statement 1 will remain true by the end of
line (6.53).
• If 1 ≤ HGP ≤ HIN when the protool reahes (6.52), then also when this line is reahed we
have that (by the indution hypothesis applied to Statement 2) IN[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HGP − 1]
and ∀i ∈ [HGP + 1..HIN + 1], and IN[i] = ⊥ ∀i ∈ [HIN + 2..2n] and IN[HGP ] = ⊥. When a
paket is inserted into slot HGP and HIN is inreased by one on line (6.53), we will therefore
have that all slots between 1 and (the new value of) HIN will have a paket, and all other
slots will be ⊥, and thus Statement 1 will hold.
• If HGP = ⊥ going into line (6.52), then HGP will be set to HIN + 1 on this line, and then
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we an repeat the argument of the top bullet point, provided HIN + 1 ≤ 2n. If sbOUT = 1,
then Statement 4 of Lemma 7.10 states that HGP 6= ⊥ when (6.52) is reahed, ontraditing
the fat we are in the ase HGP = ⊥. So we may assume sbOUT = 0, and then the fat that
(6.52) was reahed means that (6.47) must have been satised beause HOUT > HIN . Sine
both of these variables live in [0..2n] by the indution hypothesis applied to Statement 9, we
onlude HIN < 2n on (6.47), and it annot hange value between then and (6.52).
The rst part of Statement 7 is proven in the above three bullet points. For the seond part, if
sbOUT = 0 when (6.47) was evaluated earlier in the round, then the fat that (6.53) was reahed
means HOUT > HIN , and then the seond part of Statement 7 follows from the indution hypothesis
applied to Statement 9. If on the other hand sbOUT = 1 when (6.47) was evaluated, then the seond
part of Statement 7 follows from Statement 5 of Lemma 7.10.
We now prove Statement 5. There are two relevant hanges made on line (6.53) that aet
Statement 5: a paket is added to IN[HGP ] and HIN is inreased by one. The argument in the
preeding paragraph showed that when (6.53) is reahed, HGP ∈ [1..2n] and IN[HGP ] = ⊥, and
therefore the net eet of (6.53) is to inrease the number of pakets stored in IN by one and to
inrease HIN by one. Therefore, sine Statement 5 was true going into line (6.53) by the indution
hypothesis, it will remain true upon leaving (6.53).
It remains to prove the parts of Statement 9 not yet proven, namely that at all times HIN ∈
[0..2n] and HGP ∈ ⊥ ∪ [1..2n]. As was proven in the third bullet point above, if (6.52) is satised,
then HIN < 2n, and hene the hange there does not threaten the domain of HGP . Also, (6.53)
sets HGP to ⊥, whih is again in the valid domain. Meanwhile, on (6.53) HIN is hanged to
HIN + 1 ≤ 2n, where the inequality follows from the indution hypothesis applied to Statement 7.
Line (6.55), (6.57), and (6.64). Sine IN and HGP are the only relevant quantities that hange
value on these lines, only the relevant parts of Statements 1, 2, and 9 must be proven. Sine HGP
is set to ⊥ on these lines, Statement 9 is immediate and Statement 2 is vauously true. It remains
to prove Statement 1. If HGP = ⊥ going into (6.55), (6.57), or (6.64), then HGP and IN will not
hange, and the indutive hypothesis (applied to Statement 1) will ensure that Statement 1 will
ontinue to be true upon exiting any of these lines. If 1 ≤ HGP ≤ HIN when (6.55), (6.57), or
(6.64) is entered, then we may apply the indution hypothesis to Statement 2 to onlude that
IN[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HGP − 1] and ∀i ∈ [HGP + 1..HIN + 1], and IN[i] = ⊥ ∀i ∈ [HIN + 2..2n] and
IN[HGP ] = ⊥. In partiular, there is a gap in IN storing a ghost paket, and this gap will be lled
when Fill Gap is alled on (6.55), (6.57) or (6.64). Namely, this will shift all the pakets from
height HGP+1 through H+1 down one spot, so that after Fill Gap is alled, IN[i] 6= ⊥ ∀i ∈ [1..HIN ]
and IN[i] = ⊥ ∀i ∈ [HIN+1..2n], whih is Statement 1. Finally, if HGP > HIN when (6.55), (6.57)
or (6.64) is entered, then Fill Gap will not do anything, and so IN will not hange. Sine Statement
1 was true going into these lines (by our indution hypothesis), it will remain true upon exiting
these lines.
Line (6.61-62). The only relevant variables to hange values on these lines are sbOUT , HOUT , HFP ,
and OUT, so we need only verify Statements 3, 4, 6, and 9 remain true after leaving (6.61-62).
First note that HFP 6= ⊥ upon reahing (6.61) (sine (6.60) must be satised to reah (6.61-62)),
so the indution hypothesis (applied to Statements 3 and 4) implies that OUT[HFP ] 6= ⊥ when
(6.61) is reahed. Therefore, HOUT ≥ 1 when (6.61) is reahed, and hene HOUT ∈ [1..2n] upon
reahing (6.61) by the indution hypothesis (applied to Statement 9). In partiular, when HOUT is
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redued by one on (6.62), we will have that HOUT ∈ [0..2n − 1] upon leaving (6.62), as required.
Also, HFP will be set to ⊥ upon leaving (6.62), so Statement 9 remains true.
Statement 6 also follows from the fat that OUT[HFP ] 6= ⊥ when (6.61) is reahed, as follows.
Sine (by indution) Statement 6 was true upon reahing (6.61), the paket deleted from OUT on
(6.61) is aounted for by the drop in HOUT on (6.62).
Statement 3 is vauously true upon leaving (6.62), so it remains to prove Statement 4. This
argument is idential to the one used to prove Statement 4 in lines (6.32-33) above.
Lines (7.89-94). We rst prove Statements 10-13, and then address Statements 1-9. We rst prove
Statement 10, i.e. that before Shue Paket is alled on (7.77), we have that BF [M ] 6= ⊥ and
BT [m+ 1] = ⊥.
• If BF is an outgoing buer and HFP = ⊥ or HFP < HBF , then M = HBF (the onditional
statement on line (7.80) will fail), and then BF [M ] 6= ⊥ by the indution hypothesis applied
to Statement 4.
• If BF is an outgoing buer and HFP ≥ HBF , thenM = HBF −1 (the onditional statement on
line (7.80) will pass), and then BF [M ] 6= ⊥ by the indution hypothesis applied to Statement
3 or 4 (that M = HBF − 1 is greater than zero follows from the fat that HFP 6= ⊥ implies
FP 6=⊥ (Claim 7.4), and then the indution hypothesis applied to Statement 6 says HBF > 0).
• If BF is an inoming buer and BF [M+1] 6= ⊥, then (7.82) is satised andM is set toM+1
on line (7.82), and then by onstrution BF [M ] 6= ⊥ after line (7.83).
• Suppose BF is an inoming buer and BF [M +1] = ⊥. Notie that the indution hypothesis
applied to Statement 2 and the fat that BF [M + 1] = ⊥ imply that HGP > HIN = M .
Therefore, the indution hypothesis applied to Statement 1 implies that BF [M ] 6= ⊥.
• If BT is an outgoing buer and BT [m] = ⊥, then the onditional statement on line (7.84)
will be satised, and hene m is set to m− 1. Thus after line (7.85), BT [m+ 1] = ⊥.
• If BT is an outgoing buer and BT [m] 6= ⊥, then the indution hypothesis applied to State-
ments 3, 4, and 6 imply that BT [m+ 1] = ⊥.
• If BT is an inoming buer and HGP = ⊥, then the value of m is not hanged on line (7.86),
and so m+ 1 = HIN + 1. The indution hypothesis applied to Statement 1 then implies that
BT [m+ 1] = ⊥.
• If BT is an inoming buer and HGP 6= ⊥, then BT [HIN+2] = ⊥ by the indution hypothesis
applied to Statements 1 and 2, and thus after m is hanged to m+1 on (7.87), we have that
BT [m+ 1] = BT [HIN + 2] = ⊥, as required.
For Statements 11-13, we need to hange notation slightly, sine Re-Shuing an our between
two buers of any types (exept outgoing to inoming). To prove these statements, we therefore
treat 4 ases: 1) BF is an outgoing buer, 2) BF is an inoming buer, 3) BT is an outgoing buer,
4) BT is an inoming buer. We then prove the neessary Statements in eah ase.
Case 1. The value of BF [M ] = OUT[M ] is hanged on line (7.90), and hene Statement 11
will hold provided M 6= HFP . The top two bullet points above guarantee that this is indeed
the ase. Statements 12 and 13 are not relevant unless BT is an inoming buer, whih will
be handled in ase 4 below.
Case 2. For Statement 13, the only relevant hange to HIN is on line (7.92), where HIN
dereases in value, and hene Statement 13 will remain true. For the rst part of Statement
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12, the only plae HGP an hange is line (7.94). But if HGP does hange value here, then the
onditional statement on the previous line guarantees that that HGP dereases to HIN + 1.
Statement 11 and the seond part of Statement 12 are not relevant to this ase.
Case 3. The value of BT [m + 1] = OUT[m + 1] is hanged on line (7.89), and hene
Statement 11 will hold provided m + 1 6= HFP . But we have already shown Statement 10
remains true, and in partiular the slot that is lled on line (7.89) was vaant. If HFP 6= ⊥,
then by the indution hypothesis applied to Statements 3 and 4, OUT[HFP ] 6= ⊥, and hene
OUT[m + 1] = ⊥ implies that m+ 1 6= HFP . Statements 12 and 13 are not relevant to this
ase.
Case 4. Sine BT is an inoming buer, the ondition on line (7.74) implies that the value
of m (whih is the height of BT ) on line (7.73) must be at most 2n − 2 (M − m > 1 and
M,m ∈ [0..2n] by indution hypothesis applied to Statement 9). Therefore, when the height
of BT is inreased by one on line (7.91), it will be at most 2n − 1, and so Statement 13 will
remain true. For the seond part of Statement 12, we must show that the value of m+ 1 on
line (7.89) is not equal to HGP . In the ase that HGP 6= ⊥ on line (7.86), the value of m will
hange to HIN + 1 on line (7.87), and then the indution hypothesis applied to Statement 1
implies that HGP ≤ HIN +1 = m and so HGP 6= m+1 on line (7.89). Statement 11 and the
rst part of Statement 12 are not relevant for this ase.
It remains to verify Statements 1-9. There are two parts to proving Statements 1 and 2; we must
show they hold when BF is an inoming buer and also when BT is an inoming buer. For the
latter part, Statements 1 and 2 will be true if we an show that anytime an inoming buer's slot
is lled as on line (7.89), the slot was either slot HIN + 1 (in the ase that HGP = ⊥) or HIN + 2
(in the ase that HGP 6= ⊥). These fats follow immediately from the denition of m on line
(7.73) and lines (7.86-87) and (7.89). For the former part, Statements 1 and 2 will remain true
provided the paket taken from BF on line (7.89) is the top-most paket in BF . Looking at the
onditional statement on line (7.82), if IN[HIN + 1] 6= ⊥, then by the indution hypothesis applied
to Statements 1 and 2, we must have that IN[HIN + 1] is the top-most non-null paket, whih is
the paket that will be taken from BF on line (7.89) (sine in this ase M = HIN is hanged to
HIN +1 on line (7.83)). On the other hand, if IN[HIN + 1] = ⊥ on line (7.82), then the indution
hypothesis applied to statements 1 and 2 imply that IN[HIN ] is the top-most non-null paket, whih
is exatly the paket taken on line (7.89) (sine the onditional statement on line (7.82) won't be
satised, and hene the value of M won't be hange on line (7.83)).
Similarly, there are two parts to proving Statements 3 and 4; we must show they hold when BF
is an outgoing buer and also when BT is an outgoing buer. The former part will be true provided
the paket taken from BF on line (7.79) is the top-most non-agged paket. If HFP = ⊥, then
there is no agged paket, and hene the paket taken from BF should be the top paket, i.e. the
paket in index BF [HOUT ]. Investigating the denition of M on line (7.72) and lines (7.80-81)
and (7.89) shows that this will be the ase if HFP = ⊥. If HFP 6= ⊥ and HFP < HOUT , then
investigating those same lines also shows the top paket will be taken from BF (whih is not agged
sine HFP < HOUT by assumption). If HFP ≥ HOUT , then line (7.80) will be satised, shifting the
value of M to HOUT − 1 on line (7.81). By the indution hypothesis applied to Statement 3, this
new value of M orresponds to the top-most non-agged paket of BF . The latter part will be true
provided the paket given to BT takes the rst free slot in BT (in partiular, the paket will not
over-write a agged paket's spot). If BT [HOUT ] 6= ⊥ on line (7.84), then the indution hypothesis
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applied to Statements 3, 4, and 6 imply that all slots of BT between [1..HOUT ] are non-⊥, and all
spots above HOUT are ⊥. Therefore, (sine in this ase the onditional statement on line (7.84) fails
and hene the value of m does not hange on the next line) the denition of m on line (7.73) and
line (7.89) show that the rst free slot of BT will be lled. On the other hand, if BT [HOUT ] = ⊥ on
line (7.84), then by the indution hypothesis, we must have that BT [HOUT ] is the rst free slot of
BT , and by investigating lines (7.73), (7.84-85), and (7.89), this is exatly the spot that is lled.
Statements 5 and 6 remain true by the fat that Statement 10 was proven true and lines (7.91)
and (7.92). To satisfy the ondition on line (7.74), it must be that HBF = M ≥ 1 and HBT = m <
2n, and hene the hanges made to HBF and HBT on lines (7.91) and (7.92) will guarantee the
parts of Statement 9 regarding HOUT and HIN remain true. Also, HGP remains in the appropriate
demain by indution applied to Statements 9, 12, and 13. Statements 7, 8, are not relevant. 
Lemma 7.2. The domains of all of the variables in Figures 3 and 4 are appropriate. In other
words, the protool never alls for more information to be stored in a node's variable (buer, paket,
et.) than the variable has room for.
Proof. Below we x a node N ∈ G and trak hanges to eah of its variables.
Outgoing Buers OUT (3.08). Eah entry of OUT is initialized to ⊥ on (3.33). After this
point, Statement 6 of Lemma 7.1 above guarantees OUT will need to hold at most HOUT
pakets, and sine HOUT is always between 0 and 2n (by Statement 9 of Lemma 7.1) and
pakets have size P , the domain for OUT is as indiated.
Copy of Paket to be Sent p˜ (3.09). This is initialized to ⊥ on (3.34), and is only modied
afterwards on (6.38), (6.33), and (6.62). By Statements 3, 4, and 9 of Lemma 7.1, OUT [H] 6=
⊥ when p˜ is set on (6.38), and the hanges on (6.33) and (6.62) reset p˜ to ⊥. Therefore, the
domain of p˜ is as indiated.
Outgoing Status Bit sb (3.10). This is initialized to 0 on (3.35), and is only modied afterwards
on lines (6.33), (6.28), and (6.62), all of whih hange sb to 0 or 1, as required.
Paket Sent Bit d (3.11). This is initialized to 0 on (3.35), and is only modied afterwards
on lines (6.26), (6.40), and (6.62), eah of whih hange d to 0 or 1, as required.
Flagged Round Index FR (3.12). This is initialized to ⊥ on (3.34), and is only modied
afterwards on lines (6.38), (6.33), and (6.62). The latter two lines reset FR to ⊥, while
(6.38) sets FR to the index of the urrent stage and round t, and sine there are 3D rounds
per transmission and 2 stages per round (5.02), so when FR is set to t on (6.38), it will be
in [0..6D], as required.
Height of Outgoing Buer H (3.13). This is initialized to 0 on (3.35). After this point,
Statement 9 of Lemma 7.1 above guarantees H ∈ [0..2n], as required.
Height of Flagged Paket HFP (3.14). Statement 9 of Lemma 7.1 guarantees that HFP will
lie in the appropriate domain at all times.
Round Adjaent Node Last Reeived a Paket RR (3.15). This is initialized to ⊥ on (3.34),
and is only modied afterwards when it is reeived on (5.06), where it is either set to the
reeived value or ⊥ if nothing was reeived. As disussed below, the inoming buer's value
35
for RR always lies in the appropriate domain domain, and hene so will the value reeived on
(5.06).
Outgoing Buer's Value for Adjaent Node's Inoming Buer Height HIN (3.16). This is ini-
tialized to 0 on (3.35), and is only modied afterwards on line (5.06), where it is set to the
value sent on (5.09) by the adjaent node, or ⊥ in ase no value was reeived. Sine the value
sent on (5.09) will always be between 0 and 2n (by Statement 9 of Lemma 7.1), HIN has the
required domain.
Inoming Buers IN (3.18). Eah entry of IN is initialized to ⊥ on (3.29). After this point,
Statement 5 of Lemma 7.1 above guarantees IN will need to hold at most HIN pakets, and
sine HIN is always between 0 and 2n (by Statement 9 of Lemma 7.1) and pakets have size
P , the domain for IN is as indiated.
Paket Just Reeived p (3.19). This is initialized to ⊥ on (3.30), and is only modied after-
wards on (6.43), where it either is set to the value sent on (6.41) or ⊥ in the ase no value
was reeived. Sine the value sent on (6.41) has the appropriate domain (i.e. the size of a
paket, P ), in either ase p has the appropriate domain.
Inoming Status Bit sb (3.20). This is initialized to 0 on (3.31), and is only modied afterwards
on lines (6.45), (6.49), (6.53), (6.55), (6.57), and (6.64), all of whih hange sb to 0 or 1
as required.
Round Reeived Index RR (3.21). This is initialized to −1 on (3.31), and is only modied
afterwards on lines (6.53) and (6.64). The former sets RR to the index of the urrent stage
and round t, and sine there are 3D rounds per transmission and 2 stages per round (5.02),
setting RR = t as on (6.53) will put RR in [0..6D] as required. Meanwhile, (6.64) resets RR
to −1. Thus, at all times RR ∈ {0, 1}6D , as required.
Height of Inoming Buer H (3.22). This is initialized to 0 on (3.31). After this point,
Statement 9 of Lemma 7.1 above guarantees H ∈ [0..2n], as required.
Height of Ghost Paket HGP (3.23). Statement 9 of Lemma 7.1 guarantees that HGP will lie
in the appropriate domain at all times.
Inoming Buer's Value for Adjaent Node's Outgoing Buer Height HOUT (3.24). This is
initialized to 0 on (3.31), and is only modied afterwards on line (5.11), where it is set to
be one of the values sent on (5.05) by the adjaent node, or ⊥ in ase no value was reeived.
Sine the value sent on (5.05) (either HOUT or HFP ) will always be ⊥ or a number between 1
and 2n (see domain argument above for an outgoing buer's height of agged paket variable
HFP ), HOUT has the required domain.
Inoming Buer's Value for Adjaent Node's Status Bit sbOUT (3.25). This is initialized to 0
on (3.31), and is only modied afterwards on lines (5.10) and (5.11). Both hanges assign
sbOUT to `0' or `1', as required.
Inoming Buer's Value for Adjaent Node's Flagged Round Index FR (3.26). This is initialized
to ⊥ on (3.30), and is only modied afterwards on lines (5.10-11) and (6.43). Eah of these
times, FR is either set to the value sent by the adjaent node, or ⊥ in the ase nothing was
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reeived. Sine the values sent on (5.05) and (6.45) live in [0..6D] ∪ ⊥ (see argument above
for an outgoing buer's variable FR living in the appropriate domain), so does FR.
Sender's Count of Pakets Inserted κ (4.37). We want to argue that at all times, κ orre-
sponds to the number of pakets (orresponding to the urrent odeword) that the sender
has knowingly inserted. Lines (4.39) and (6.68) guarantee that κ = 0 at the outset of any
transmission. The only other plae κ is modied is (6.31) where it is inremented by one,
so we must argue that (6.31) is reahed exatly one for every paket the sender knowingly
inserts. By knowingly inserting a paket, we means that the sender has reeived veriation
that the adjaent node has reeived and stored the paket, and hene the sender an delete
the paket.
Suppose that in some round t, the sender sends a paket p as on (6.41). By Claim 7.7
below, the sender will ontinue to try and send this paket to its neighbor until he reeives
onrmation of reeipt. There are two things to show: 1) If the sender does not reeive
onrmation of reeipt, then κ is never inremented as on (6.31), and 2) If the sender does
reeive onrmation of reeipt, then κ is inremented exatly one. By reeiveing onrmation
of reeipt, we mean that line (6.30) is satised in some round t
′
when the sender's value for
p˜ equals the paket p sent in round t (see Denition 7.6 below). Clearly, 1) will be true sine
(6.31) will never be reahed if (6.30) is never satised. For 2), suppose that in some later
round t
′ > t the sender gets onrmation of reeipt for p. Clearly line (6.31) is reahed this
round, and κ is inremented by one there. We must show κ will not be inremented due to
p ever again. However, p will be deleted on line (6.32) of round t′, and therefore this paket
an ause the sender to reah (6.31) at most one. Thus, at all times κ orresponds to the
number of pakets (orresponding to the urrent odeword) that the sender has knowingly
inserted, as desired. Sine eah odeword has D pakets, the domain for κ is as required.
Reeiver's Storage Buer IR (4.40). Eah entry of IR is initialized to ⊥ on (4.43), after whih
it is only modied on lines (7.101) and (6.66). The latter resets IR, while the former sets
entry κ of IR to the paket in IN [1]. We show below that κ will always aurately represent
the number of urrent odeword pakets the reeiver has reeived, and hene will be a value
between 0 and D. It remains to show that IN [1] will always hold a paket when (7.101)
is reahed. We use Claim 7.3 below whih states that for the reeiver, anytime HIN > 0,
HGP = ⊥. Therefore, whenever (7.99) is satised, Statement 1 of Lemma 7.1 (together with
the argument that IN has the appropriate domain) state that IN [1] will hold a paket, as
required.
Reeiver's Number of Pakets Reeived κ (4.41). We want to show that κ always equals the
number of pakets orresponding to the urrent odeword the reeiver has reeived so far.
Lines (4.42) and (6.66) guarantee that κ = 0 at the outset of any transmission. The only
other plae κ is modied is (7.101) where it is inremented by one, so we must argue that
(7.101) is reahed exatly one for every paket (orresponding to the urrent odeword) that
the reeiver reeives. By Statement 1 of Lemma 7.1 and Claim 7.3 below, anytime (7.101) is
reahed, IN[1] neessarily stores a paket. This paket is added to IR on (7.101) and then is
promptly deleted from IN on (7.102). By Claim 6.8, the reeiver will never enter (7.100) twie
due to the same paket, and hene (7.101) is reahed exatly one for every distint paket
orresponding to the urrent odeword (see omments on 7.100 and 7.104). Therefore, κ
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always equals the number of pakets orresponding to the urrent odeword the reeiver has
reeived so far, as desired. Sine there are D pakets per odeword, κ ∈ [0..D], as required.
Claim 7.3. For any of the reeiver's buers IN , HIN = 0 at the start of every round. Also,
anytime HIN > 0, HGP = ⊥.
Proof. H = HIN is set to 0 at the outset of the protool (3.31). The rst statement follows
immediately from line (7.102), where eah of the reeiver's inoming buers IN have HIN reset
to zero during the re-shue phase of every round. For the seond statement, we will show that
whenever H hanges value from 0 in any round t, that HGP will be set to ⊥ at the same time, and
neither will hange value until the end of the round when H will be reset to zero during re-shuing.
In partiular, the only plae H an hange from zero is on (6.53). Suppose (6.53) is reahed in
some round t, hanging H from zero to 1, and also hanging HGP to ⊥. Looking at the pseudo-ode,
neither H nor HGP an hange value until line (7.102), where H is reset to zero. Therefore, H an
only be non-zero between lines (6.53) and (5.21) (when Reeiver Re-Shue is alled) of a given
round, and at these times HGP is always equal to ⊥. 
Claim 7.4. Let OUT be any outgoing buer, and HFP , FR, and sb denote the height of it agged
paket, round the paket was agged, and status bit, respetively (see (3.10, 3.12, 3.14)). Then
HFP = ⊥ ⇔ FR = ⊥. Also, anytime OUT has no agged pakets (i.e. HFP = ⊥), OUT has
normal status (i.e. sb = 0).
Proof. The rst statement is true at the outset of the protool (3.34), so it will be enough to make
sure that anytime HFP or FR hanges value from ⊥ to non-⊥ (or vie-versa), the other one also
hanges. Examining the pseudo-ode, these hanges our only on lines (6.33), (6.38), and (6.62),
where it is lear HFP takes on a non-⊥ (respetively ⊥) value if and only if FR does.
The seond statement is true at the outset of the protool (3.34-35). So it is enough to show:
1) anytime HFP is set to ⊥, sb is equal to zero, and 2) anytime sb hanges to one, HFP 6= ⊥.
The former is true sine anytime HFP hanges to ⊥, sb is set to zero on the same line ((6.33) and
(6.62)), while the latter is true sine sb only hanges to one on (6.28), whih an only be reahed
if FR 6= ⊥ (6.27), whih by the rst statement of this laim implies HFP 6= ⊥. 
Claim 7.5.
1. Anytime sbOUT is equal to 1 when Create Flagged Paket is alled on line (5.15), HFP 6= ⊥.
2. Anytime Send Paket is alled on line (5.17), the agged paket has height at least one (i.e.
HFP is at least one anytime Send Paket is alled).
Proof. We prove the 2
nd
statement by separating the proof into the following two ases.
Case 1: sbOUT = 0 at the start of Stage 2. Sine Send Paket is alled, the onditional statement
on line (5.16) was satised. Therefore, sine we are in the ase sbOUT = 0 on that line, then
HOUT > HIN . Traing HIN bakwards, it was reeived on line (5.06) and represents the value
of HIN that was sent on line (5.09). Using the indution hypothesis applied to Statement 9
of Lemma 7.1, HIN ≥ 0 and hene the value of HOUT on (5.16) must be at least one. Sine
HOUT and HIN annot hange between lines (5.15) and (5.16) of any round, when Create
Flagged Paket was alled, it was still true that sbOUT = 0 and HOUT > HIN ≥ 0. Therefore,
line (6.37) will be satised and (6.38) will set HFP = HOUT ≥ 1 as required.
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Case 2: sbOUT = 1 at the start of Stage 2. Let t denote some round where sbOUT = 1 at the
start of Stage 2. Our strategy will be to nd the most reent round that sbOUT swithed from
0 to 1, and argue that the value that HFP aquired in that round has not hanged. So let
t0 + 1 denote the most reent round that sbOUT had the value 0 at any stage of the round.
We argue that sbOUT = 1 by the end of t0+1, and sbOUT = 0 at the start of Stage 2 of round
t0 (the round before t0 + 1) as follows:
 If sbOUT equals 0 by the end of round t0 + 1, then it will at the start of round t0 + 2,
ontraditing the hoie of t0 + 1.
 If sbOUT = 1 at the start of Stage 2 of round t0, then sbOUT must have hanged its value
to 0 sometime between Stage 2 of round t0 and the end of round t0+1 (sine sbOUT = 0
at some point of round t0+1 by denition). This an only happen on line (6.33) inside
the Reset Outgoing Variables funtion of round t0 +1 (this is the only plae that sbOUT
an be set to zero). However, sine sbOUT annot hange between the time that Reset
Outgoing Variables is alled on line (5.07) and the end of the round, it must be that
sbOUT was equal to zero at the start of round t0 + 2, ontraditing the hoie of t0 + 1.
Now sine sbOUT = 0 at the start of round t0 + 1 (it annot hange between Stage 2 of t0
and the start of t0 + 1), and sbOUT = 1 by the end of mathttt0 + 1, it must have hanged
on line (6.28) of round t0 + 1 (this is the only line that sets sbOUT to 1). In partiular, the
onditional statements on lines (6.25) and (6.27) must have been satised, and so d was equal
to 1 on line (6.25) of round t0 + 1. Sine d is reset to zero during Stage 1 of every round
(6.26), it must be that d was swithed from 0 to 1 on line (6.40) of round t0 (this is the only
plae d is set to one). Thus, we have that Send Paket was alled on line (5.17) of round t0.
We are now bak in Case 1 above (but for round t0 instead of t), and thus HFP was set to a
value of at least 1 on line (6.38) of round t0. It remains to argue that HFP does not derease
in value between round t0 and line (5.17) of round t. But HFP an only hange value on
lines (6.33), (6.35), and (6.38). For round t0, the former two of these lines have both passed
when the latter is alled (setting HFP ≥ 1 as in Case 1). Meanwhile, between t0 + 1 and t,
we know that (6.33) and (6.38) annot be reahed, as this would imply the value of sbOUT is
zero sometime after t0 + 1, ontraditing the hoie of t0 + 1. The only other plae HFP an
hange is (6.35), whih an only inrease HFP . Thus in any ase, ⊥ 6= HFP ≥ 1 when Send
Paket is alled on (5.17) of round t.
The proof of the 1
st
statement follows from the proof given in Case 2 above. 
Denition 7.6. We will say that an outgoing buer gets onrmation of reeipt for a paket p
that it sent aross its adjaent edge whenever line (6.30) (alternatively line (12.46) for the node-
ontrolling + edge-ontrolling protool of Setions 8-11) is reahed and satised and the paket
subsequently deleted on (6.32) (respetively (12.50)) is (a opy of) p.
Claim 7.7. Suppose (an instane of) a paket p is aepted by node B in round t (using the
denition of aepted from Denition 6.5). Then:
1. Let t
′
be the rst round after
18
t in whih B attempts to send (a opy of) this paket aross
any outgoing edge. Then the orresponding outgoing buer OUT of B will neessarily have
normal status at the start of Stage 2 of t
′
.
18
The Claim remains valid even if t
′
is a round in a dierent transmission than t.
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2. If B fails to get onrmation of reeipt for the paket in the following round (i.e. either RR
is not reeived on (5.06) of round t
′ + 1, or it is reeived but RR < FR), then OUT enters
problem status as on (6.28) of round t
′+1. OUT will remain in problem status until the end
of the transmission or until the round in whih it gets onrmation of reeipt (i.e. until RR
is reeived as on (5.06) with RR ≥ t′).
3. From the time p is rst agged as on (6.38) of round t′ through the time B does get onr-
mation of reeipt (or through the end of the transmission, whihever omes rst), B will not
have any other agged pakets, i.e. p˜,OUT[HFP ] = p and FR = t
′
.
Proof. We prove Statement 1 by ontradition. Let t
′
denote the rst round after t in whih B
attempts to send (a opy of) p aross an edge E(B,C), i.e. t′ is the rst round after t that Send
Paket is alled by B's outgoing buer OUT suh that the p˜ that appears on line (6.38) of that
round orresponds to p. For the sake of ontradition, assume that sbOUT = 1 at the start of Stage
2 of round t
′
. Sine sbOUT annot hange between the start of Stage 2 and the time that Create
Flagged Paket is alled on line (5.15), we must have that sbOUT = 1 on line (6.37) of round t
′
, and
hene (6.38) is not reahed that round. In partiular, when Send Paket is alled on line (5.17) (as
it must be by the fat that p was sent during round t′), the paket p˜ that is sent (whih is p) was set
in some previous round. Let t˜ denote the most reent round for whih p˜ was set to p as on (6.38)
(this is the only line whih sets p˜). Then by assumption t˜ < t′, and OUT had normal status at the
start of Stage 2 of round t˜ (in order for (6.38) to be reahed). Sine OUT had normal status at the
start of Stage 2 of round t˜, but by assumption OUT had problem status at the start of Stage 2 of
round t
′
, let t̂ denote the rst round suh that t˜ < t̂ ≤ t′ and suh that OUT had problem status
at the start of Stage 2 of t̂. Sine the only plae OUT swithes status from normal to problem is
on (6.28), this line must have been reahed in round t̂. In partiular, this implies that (6.25) was
satised in round t̂, whih in turn implies that Send Paket was alled in round t̂ − 1 (sine d is
re-set to zero at the end of Stage 1 of every round as on (6.26)). But this is a ontradition, sine
t˜ ≤ t̂− 1 < t′, and so p = p˜ was sent in a round before t′, ontraditing the hoie of t′.
For Statement 2, sine B sent p in round t′ and OUT had normal status at the Start of Stage
2 of this round, we have that HOUT > HIN on line (5.16) (so that Send Paket ould be alled).
Sine sbOUT ,HOUT , and HIN annot hange between (5.15) and (5.17) of any round, FR is set to
t
′
on (6.38) of round t
′
. Also, d = 1 after the all to Send Paket of round t′ (6.40). Notie that
neither FR nor d an hange value between the all to Create Flagged Paket in round t′ and the
all to Reset Outgoing Variables in the following round. Therefore, if B does not reeive RR or if
RR < FR = t′ when Reset Outgoing Variables is alled in round t′ + 1, then (6.25) and (6.27)
will be satised, and hene OUT will enter problem status in round t′ + 1. That OUT remains
in problem status until the end of the transmission or until the round in whih RR is reeived on
(5.06) with RR ≥ t′ now follows from the following sublaim. (Warning: the following sublaim
swithes notation. In partiular, to apply the sublaim here, replae (t, t0) of the sublaim with
(t′ + 1, t′).)
Sublaim. Suppose that at the start of Stage 2 of some round t, an outgoing buer OUT
has problem status and ⊥ 6= FR = t0. Then OUT will remain in problem status until the
end of the transmission or until the round in whih RR is reeived on (5.06) with RR ≥ t0.
Proof. OUT will ertainly return to normal status by the end of the transmission (6.62), in
whih ase there is nothing to show. So suppose that t
′ > t is suh that OUT rst returns to
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normal status (in the same transmission as t) as on (6.33) of round t
′
. In partiular, lines
(6.29) and (6.30) were both satised, so OUT must have reeived RR on (5.06) earlier in
round t
′
, with RR ≥ FR. If the value of FR on line (6.30) equals t0, then the proof is
omplete. So we show by ontradition that this must be the ase.
Assume for the sake of ontradition that FR 6= t0 on line (6.30) of round t
′
. Sine FR was
equal to t0 at the start of Stage 2 of round t by hypothesis, FR must have hanged at some
point between Stage 2 of round t and round t
′
. Notie that between these rounds, FR an
only hange values on lines (6.33) and (6.38). Let t
′′
denote the rst round between t and
t
′
suh that one of these two lines is reahed. Note that t
′′ > t, sine (6.33) already passed
by the start of Stage 2 (whih is when the sublaim asserts FR = t0), and (6.38) annot
be reahed in round t sine OUT has problem status when (6.37) of round t is reahed (by
hypothesis).
• Suppose FR is rst hanged from FR = t0 on (6.33) of round t
′′
. First note that
beause (6.33) is the rst time FR hanges its value from t0, it must be the ase that
FR was still equal to t0 on (6.30) earlier in round t
′′
. Also, sine (6.33) is reahed in
round t
′′
, OUT returns to normal status. Sine t′ was dened to be the rst round after
t for whih this happens, we must have that t
′′ ≥ t′. But by onstrution t′′ ≤ t′, so
we must have that t
′′ = t′. However, this is a ontradition, beause our assumption is
that FR 6= t0 on line (6.30) of round t
′ = t′′, but as noted in the seond sentene of
this paragraph, we are in the ase that FR = t0 on line (6.30) of round t
′′
.
• Suppose FR is rst hanged from FR = t0 on (6.38) of round t
′′
. Then (6.37) must
have been satised, and thus OUT had normal status when Create Flagged Paket was
alled in round t
′′
. Sine OUT had problem status at the start of Stage 2 of round t (by
hypothesis), the status must have swithed to normal at some point between t and t
′′
,
whih an only happen on (6.33). But if (6.33) is reahed, then FR will be set to ⊥ on
this line, whih ontradits the fat that FR was rst hanged from FR = t0 on (6.38)
of round t
′′
.
This ompletes the proof of the sublaim.
For the third Statement, rst note that OUT[HFP ] = p as of line (6.38) of round t
′
. This is the ase
sine sbOUT = 0 on line (5.12) (by Statement 1 of this laim), and then the fat that Send Paket
is alled in round t
′
means HOUT > HIN on (5.16), and therefore sine none of these values hange
between (5.12) and (5.16), (6.37) will be satised in round t
′
. Therefore, we will trak all hanges
to OUT and HFP from Stage 2 of round t
′
through the time p is deleted from OUT as on (6.32-33)
of some later round
19
, and show that none of these hanges will alter the fat that OUT[HFP ] = p.
Notie that (before the end of the transmission) HFP only hanges value on lines (6.33), (6.35),
and (6.38); while OUT only hanges values on lines (6.32), (6.35), and (7.89-90). Clearly the
hanges to eah value on (6.35) will preserve OUT[HFP ] = p, so it is enough to hek the other
hanges. Notie that (6.32) is reahed if and only if (6.33) is reahed, whih by Statement 2 of
this laim does not happen until OUT gets onrmation of reeipt that p was suessfully reeived
by B's neighbor, and therefore these hanges also do not threaten the validity of Statement 3. The
hange to HFP as on (6.38) an only our if (6.37) is satised, i.e. only if OUT has normal status,
19
Or through the end of the transmission, whihever ours rst.
41
and thus again Statement 2 of this laim says this annot happen until OUT gets onrmation
of reeipt that p was suessfully reeived by B's neighbor. Finally, lines (7.89-90) will preserve
OUT[HFP ] = p by Statement 11 of Lemma 7.1.
That FR = t′ from (6.38) of t′ through the time B gets onrmation of reeipt for p was proven
in the sublaim above. Also, p˜ an only hange on (6.33) or (6.38), whih we already proved (in
the proof of the sublaim above) are not reahed. 
Corollary 7.8. At any time, an outgoing buer has at most one agged paket.
Proof. This follows immediately from Statement 3 of Lemma 7.7. 
Claim 7.9. For any outgoing buer OUT, if at any time its Flagged Round value FR is equal to
t, then OUT neessarily alled Send Paket on line (5.17) of round t.
Proof. Suppose that at some point in time, FR is set to t. Notie that the only plae FR assumes
non-⊥ values is on (6.38), and therefore line (6.37) must have been satised in round t. Sine the
values for sbOUT ,HOUT , and HIN annot hange between lines (5.15) and (5.16), the statement
on (5.16) will also be satised in round t, and onsequently Send Paket will be reahed in t. 
Lemma 7.10. Suppose that sbOUT = 1 when line (6.47) is reahed in round t on an edge linking
buers OUT and IN. Further suppose that IN does reeive the ommuniation (p, FR) from OUT
on line (6.43) of t. Also, let t0 denote the round desribed by FR, let h denote the height of the
paket in OUT in round t0, and let h
′
denote the height of IN at the start of round t0. Then the
following are true:
1. t0 is well-dened (i.e. FR 6= ⊥ and FR ≤ t).
2. h > h′.
3. OUT sent p to IN on line (6.41) of round t0. Furthermore, the height of p in OUT when it is
sent on line (6.41) of round t is greater than or equal to h.
4. If the ondition statement on line (6.51) of round t is satised, then the value of HGP when
this line is entered, whih orresponds to the height in IN that p assumes when it is inserted,
satises: ⊥ 6= HGP ≤ h
′ + 1 ≤ 2n.
5. If the ondition statement on line (6.51) of round t is satised, then HIN was less than 2n
at the start of all rounds between t0 and t.
Proof of Lemma 7.10. We make a series of Sublaims to prove the 5 statements of the Lemma.
Sublaim 1. The value of FR that is sent on (6.41) of round t is not ⊥.
Proof. Sine (6.41) is reahed, Send Paket was alled on (5.17). By Statement 2 of Claim
7.5, we have that HFP ≥ 1 when Send Paket is alled, and in partiular HFP 6= ⊥ on line
(5.17). Sine HFP annot hange between (5.17) and (6.41), we have that HFP 6= ⊥ on
(6.41), and hene FR 6= ⊥ on this line (Claim 7.4).
Sublaim 2. t0 is well-dened (i.e. ⊥ 6= t0 ≤ t).
Proof. By the denition of t0 and Sublaim 1, t0 6= ⊥. Also, by looking at the three plaes
that FR hanges values ((6.33), (6.38), and (6.62)), it is lear that FR will always be less
than or equal to the urrent round index.
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Sublaim 3. t > t0.
Proof. That t ≥ t0 is immediate (FR is reset to ⊥ at the start of every transmission (3.34)
and (6.62), after whih time the FR an never attain a value bigger than the urrent round
(6.38)). Therefore, we only have to show t 6= t0. For the sake of ontradition, suppose
t = t0. By hypothesis, sbOUT = 1 when line (6.47) of round t = t0 is reahed. Notie that
sbOUT is reset to 0 on (5.10) of round t = t0, so the only way it an be `1' on (6.47) later that
round is if it is set to one on (5.11). This an only happen if HOUT = ⊥ or FR > RR. Sine
(6.47) is reahed, (6.44) must have failed, and sine HOUT does not hange values between
the time it is reeived on (5.11) and (6.44), we have that HOUT 6= ⊥ on (5.11). Therefore,
we must have that FR > RR on (5.11) of round t = t0.
Notie the value for FR here omes from the value sent by OUT on (5.05), and this
happens before line (6.38) has been reahed in round t = t0. Therefore, the value of FR
reeived on (5.11) obeys FR < t = t0 (as noted above, FR an never attain a value bigger
than the urrent round). Sine RR < FR, line (6.30) annot have been satised sine the
time FR was set to its urrent value (within a transmission, the values RR assumes are stritly
inreasing, see (3.34), (6.53), and (6.64)). Therefore, we may apply Claim 7.9 and Claim
7.7 to argue that FR will not be hanged on (6.38) of round t = t0 (sine OUT will have
problem status), and onsequently FR will still be stritly smaller than t = t0 when line
(6.41) is reahed of round t0. This ontradits the denition of t0 as the value reeived on
line (6.43) of round t.
Sublaim 4. OUT had normal status at the start of Stage 2 of round t0. For every round
between Stage 2 of t0 + 1 through t− 1, OUT had problem status and FR = t0.
Proof. By denition of t0, it equals the value of FR that was reeived in round t on line
(6.43), whih in turn orresponds to the value of FR that was sent on line (6.41). Traing
the values of FR bakwards, we see that the only time/plae FR is set to a non-⊥ value (as
we know it has by Sublaim 1) is on line (6.38), and this must have happened in round t0
sine FR = t0 by denition of t0. Therefore, in round t0, line (6.38) must have been reahed
when Create Flagged Paket was alled on line (5.15); so in partiular sbOUT must have been
zero on line (6.37) to have entered the onditional statement. Sine sbOUT annot hange
between the start of Stage 2 and line (5.15) (where Create Flagged Paket is alled), it must
have been zero at the start of Stage 2. This proves the rst part of the sublaim. Now suppose
there is a round t
′
between Stage 2 of t0 + 1 and t − 1 suh that sbOUT = 0 at any time in
that round (without loss of generality, let t
′
be the rst suh round). Sine sbOUT an only
swith to zero on (6.33) inside the all to Reset Outgoing Variables, it must be that this line
is reahed in t
′
, and hene FR is also set to ⊥ on this line. Sine FR is only assigned non-⊥
values on (6.38), FR an only assume values at least t′ > t0 after this point. Thus, FR
will not ever be able to return to the value of t0, ontraditing the fat that FR = t0 during
round t. By the same reasoning, FR an never hange value from t0 between the rounds t0
and t.
Sublaim 5. OUT attempted to send p in round t0.
Proof. By denition, t0 denotes the value of FR during round t. Sine FR an only be set to
t0 on (6.38) of round t0, this line must have been reahed in t0. In partiular, line (6.37) was
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satised during the all to Create Flagged Paket of round t0, and hene sb = 0 and H > HIN
at that time. Therefore, (5.16) will be satised when it is reahed in round t0, whih implies
Send Paket will be alled on the following line. The fat that it was the same paket p that
was sent in t0 as in t follows from Statement 3 of Lemma 7.7.
Sublaim 6. The height of p in OUT when it is transferred in round t is greater than or
equal to h.
Proof. Sublaim 5 stated that OUT attempted to send p in round t0, and Sublaim 4 stated
that OUT had normal status at the start of t0. Therefore, the paket whih was sent in round
t0 (whih is p) was initialized inside the all to Create Flagged Paket on line (6.38). By
observing the ode there, we see that p is set to OUT[H], i.e. p has height H in round t0, and
HFP is set to equal H on this same line. By Statement 3 of Claim 7.7, p = p˜ will remain the
agged paket through the start of round t, and OUT[HFP ] = p. By Statement 11 of Lemma
7.1, HFP will not hange during any all to re-shue. Indeed, sine Sublaim 4 ensures that
line (6.38) is never reahed from t0+1 through the start of t, the only plae HFP an hange
value is on (6.33) or (6.35). We know the former annot happen between t0+1 and the start
of t, sine this would imply sbOUT is re-set to zero on (6.33) of that round, ontraditing
Sublaim 4. Therefore, HFP an only hange values between t0 + 1 and the start of t as on
(6.35), whih an only inrease HFP . Hene, from the time HFP is set to equal the height of
OUT in round t0 as on (6.38) (whih by denition is h), HFP an only inrease through the
start of round t.
Sublaim 7. h > h′.
Proof. This follows immediately from Sublaims 4 and 5 as follows. Beause OUT tried
to send the paket in round t0 (Sublaim 5) and beause OUT had normal status in this
round (Sublaim 4), it must be that the onditional statement on line (5.16) of round t0 was
satised, and in partiular that the expression H > HIN was true. Sine h is dened to be the
value of H,HFP as of line (6.38) of round t0 (Statement 6 of Lemma 7.1), this sublaim will
follow if h′ equals the value of HIN as of line (6.38) of round t0. But this is true by Statement
5 of Lemma 7.1, sine the value of HIN on line (5.16) omes from the value reeived on line
(5.06), whih in turn orresponds to the value of HIN sent on line (5.09).
Sublaim 8. If the onditional statement on line (6.51) is satised in round t, then OUT's
attempt to send p in round t0 failed (i.e. IN did not store p in t0), and furthermore IN did
not store p in any round between t0 and t.
Proof. We prove this by ontradition. Suppose there is some round t˜ ∈ [t0..t − 1] in whih
IN stored p. This would mean that line (6.51) was satised in round t˜, and in partiular RR
is set to t˜ ≥ t0 on (6.53). But as already noted in the proof of Sublaim 2, for the remainder
of the transmission, FR an never assume the value of a round before t0. Similarly, one RR
hanges to t˜ ≥ t0 ≥ FR on (6.53) of round t˜, it an never assume a smaller (non-⊥) value
for the rest of the transmission (RR an only hange to a non-⊥ value on line (6.53)). But
this ontradits the fat that RR < FR on (6.51) of round t.
Sublaim 9. If the onditional statement on line (6.51) is satised in round t, then RR < t0
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between the start of t0 through line (6.51) of round t. In partiular, lines (6.47) and (6.51)
will be satised for any round between t0 and t for whih they are reahed.
Proof. RR is set to −1 at the start of any transmission ((3.31) and (6.64)). Sine the only
other plae RR hanges value is (6.53), it is always the ase that the value of RR is less than
or equal to the index of the urrent round. Thus, RR an only assume a value greater than
(or equal to) t0 in a round after (or during) t0. But this would mean there was some round
between t0 and t − 1 (inlusive) suh that (6.53) was reahed, whih ontradits Sublaim
8. The fat that (6.51) will be satised whenever it is reahed now follows immediately from
Statement 3 of Claim 7.7, sine in order to reah (6.51), line (6.48) must have failed, whih
means the ommuniation on line (6.43) was reeived. The fat that (6.47) will be satised
whenever it is reahed follows from the fat that sbOUT will always be set to one on (5.11) of
eah round between t0 and t (the rst part of this sublaim says RR < t0, and Sublaim 4
says that if FR is reeived on (5.11), then FR = t0).
Sublaim 10. If the onditional statement on line (6.51) is satised in round t, then there
was no round between t0 + 1 and t− 1 (inlusive) in whih IN reeived both HOUT and p.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of ontradition that there is suh a round, t˜. Notie that
line (6.51) of round t˜ will neessarily be reahed (sine the onditional statement of line
(6.44) will fail by assumption, (6.47) will be satised by Sublaim 4, and (6.48) will fail by
assumption). However, line (6.53) annot be reahed in round t˜ (Sublaim 8 above), and
therefore the onditional statement on line (6.51) must fail. This ontradits Sublaim 9.
Sublaim 11. If the onditional statement on line (6.51) is satised in round t, then IN was
in problem status at the end of round t0, and remained in problem status until line (6.53) of
round t.
Proof. We rst show that sbIN will be set to one on line (6.45) or (6.49) of round t0. To
see this, we note that if (6.44) fails in round t0, then neessarily (6.47) and (6.48) will both
be satised. Afterall, (6.47) is satised (Sublaim 7), and if (6.48) failed, then (6.51) would
be reahed and subsequently satised (Sublaim 9), whih would ontradit Sublaim 8. For
every round between t0 + 1 and t, we will show that either the onditional statement on line
(6.44) will be satised, or the onditional statements on lines (6.47) and (6.48) will both be
satised, and hene sbIN an never be reset to zero sine lines (6.53), (6.55), and (6.57) will
never be reahed. To see this, let t
′ ∈ [t0 + 1..t − 1]. If (6.44) is satised for t
′
, then we are
done. So assume (6.44) is not satised for t
′
, and hene IN did not reeive the ommuniation
on (6.43) (Sublaim 10). This means (6.48) will be satised. The fat that (6.47) is also
satised follows from Sublaim 9.
Sublaim 12. If the onditional statement on line (6.51) is satised in round t, then between
the end of round t0 and the time Reeive Paket is alled in round t, we have that HGP 6= ⊥
and HGP ≤ h
′ + 1 ≤ 2n.
Proof. As in the proof of Sublaim 11, either line (6.46) or (6.50) will be reahed in round
t0 (sine either line (6.45) or (6.49) is reahed). The value of HIN at the start of round
t0 is h
′
by denition. Sine h′ < h ≤ 2n (the rst inequality is Sublaim 7, the seond is
Statements 6 and 9 of Lemma 7.1), and sine HIN annot hange value between the start of
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t0 and the time Reeive Paket is alled, we have that the value of HIN < 2n when either line
(6.46) or (6.50) is reahed. Therefore, these lines guarantee that ⊥ 6= HGP ≤ h
′ + 1 ≤ 2n
after these lines. After this, there are ve plaes HGP an hange its value: (6.46), (6.50),
(6.53), (6.55), and (6.57). As in the proof of Sublaim 11, lines (6.55) and (6.57) will not
be reahed at any point between t0 and t, nor will line (6.53) by Sublaim 8. The other two
lines that hange HGP an only derease it (but they annot set HGP to ⊥).
Sublaim 13. If the ondition statement on line (6.51) of round t is satised, then the value
of HGP when this line is entered, whih orresponds to the height in IN that p assumes when
it is inserted, satises: HGP 6= ⊥ and HGP ≤ h
′ + 1 ≤ 2n.
Proof. This follows immediately from Sublaim 12 sine p is inserted into IN at height HGP
(6.53).
Sublaim 14. If the ondition statement on line (6.51) of round t is satised, then HIN was
less than 2n at the start of all rounds between t0 and t.
Proof. Sublaim 12 implies that h′ < 2n (so HIN had height stritly smaller than 2n at the
start of round t0). Searhing through the pseudo-ode, we see that HIN is only modied
on lines (6.53), and during Re-Shuing (7.91-92). Between rounds t0 and t, line (6.53) is
never reahed (Sublaim 8), and hene all hanges to HIN must ome from Re-Shuing. But
beause HIN was less than 2n when it entered the Re-Shue phase in round t0, Statement
13 of Lemma 7.1 guarantees that HIN will still be less than 2n at the start of round t.
All Statements of the Lemma have now been proven. 
Claim 7.11. Every paket is inserted into one of the sender's outgoing buers at some initial height.
When (a opy of) the paket goes between any two buers B1 6= B2 (either aross an edge or loally
during re-shuing), its height in B2 is less than or equal to the height it had in B1. If B1 = B2,
the statement remains true EXCEPT for on line (6.35).
Proof. We separate the proof into ases, based on the nature of the paket movement. The only
times pakets are aepted by a new buer or re-shued within the same buer ours on lines
(6.32), (6.35), (6.53), (6.55), (6.57), (6.61), (6.64), (7.89-90), and (7.101-102). Of these,
(6.35) is exluded from the laim, and the paket movement on lines (6.32), (6.55), (6.57), (6.61),
(6.64), and (7.101-102) are all learly stritly downwards. It remains to onsider lines (6.53) and
(7.89-90).
Case 1: The paket moved during Re-Shuffling as on (7.89-90). By investigating
the ode on these lines, we must show thatm+1 ≤M . This was ertainly true as of line (7.74),
but we need to make sure this didn't hange when Adjust Heights was alled. The hanges
made to M and m on (7.83) and (7.85) will only serve to help the inequality m+1 ≤M , so
we need only argue the ases for when (7.81) and/or (7.87) is reahed. Notie that if either
line is reahed, by (7.74) we must have (before adjusting M and m) that M −m ≥ 2, and
therefore modifying only M = M −1 or m = m+1 won't threaten the inequality m+1 ≤M .
It remains to argue that both (7.81) and (7.87) annot happen simultaneously (i.e. annot
both happen within the same all to Re-Shue). If both of these were to happen, then it
46
must be that during this all to Re-Shue, there was an outgoing buer B1 that had height
2 or more higher than an inoming buer B2 (see lines (7.72-74) and (7.80) and (7.86)).
We argue that this annot ever happen. By Claim 6.3, at the end of the previous round, we
had that the height of B1 was at most one bigger than the height of B2. During routing, B2
an only get bigger and B1 an only get smaller ((6.53) and (6.33) are the only plaes these
heights hange). Therefore, after Routing but before any Re-Shuing, we have again that
the height of B1 was at most one bigger than the height of B2. Therefore, in order for B1
to get at least 2 bigger than B2, either a paket must be shued into B1, or a paket must
be shued out of B2, and this must happen when B1 is already one bigger than B2. But
analyzing (7.72) and (7.73) shows that this an never happen.
Case 2: The paket moved during Routing as on (6.53). In order to reah (6.53),
the onditional statements on lines (6.47), (6.48), and (6.51) all must be satised, so p 6= ⊥,
RR < FR, and either sbOUT = 1 orHOUT > H (or both). We investigate eah ase separately:
Case A: sbOUT = 1 on line (6.47). Then Statements 2-4 of Lemma 7.10 imply that
the height of the paket in B1 is greater than or equal to the height it will be stored into
in B2, as desired.
Case B: sbOUT = 0 and HOUT > HIN on line (6.47). For notational onveniene,
denote the urrent round (when the hypotheses of Case B hold) by t. First note that
Statements 1 and 2 of Lemma 7.1 imply that the height the paket assumes in B2 (HGP )
is less than or equal to HIN+1. Meanwhile, sine sbOUT = 0 (it is set on (5.11) of round
t), the value reeived for HOUT on (5.11) is not ⊥, and the value for FR reeived on
(5.11) is either ⊥ or satises FR ≤ RR. Notie that the ase FR ≤ RR is not possible,
sine then (6.53) would not be reahed ((6.51) would fail). Therefore, FR = ⊥ but
HOUT 6= ⊥, and so B2 reeived the ommuniation sent by B1 on (5.05) of round t,
whih had the rst of the two possible forms. In partiular, HFP = ⊥ at the outset of t,
and sine HFP annot hange between the start of a round a line (6.38) of the previous
round, we must have that (6.37) failed in round t − 1. By this fat and Claim 7.4, B1
had normal status when (5.16) was reahed in round t− 1, and this will not be able to
hange in the all to Reset Outgoing Variables of round t beause d = 0 (6.25) (sine
d is reset to zero every round on (6.26), it an only have non-zero values between line
(6.40) of one round and line (6.26) of the following round IF a paket was sent the earlier
round. However, as already noted this did not happen, as the fat that OUT had normal
status and yet (6.37) failed in round t − 1 implies that (5.16) will also fail in round
t−1). Therefore, B1 has normal status when Create Flagged Paket is alled in round t,
and in partiular, HFP is set to HOUT on (6.38), i.e. the agged paket to be transferred
during t has height HOUT in B1. Putting this all together, the paket has height HOUT
in B1 and assumes height HGP in B2. But as argued above, HOUT ≥ HIN + 1 ≥ HGP ,
as desired. 
Claim 7.12. Before End of Transmission Adjustments is alled in any transmission T (6.61),
any paket that was inserted into the network during transmission T is either in some buer (perhaps
as a agged paket) or has been reeived by R.
Proof. As pakets travel between nodes, the sending node maintains a opy of the paket until it
has obtained veriation from the reeiving node that the paket was aepted. This way, pakets
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that are lost due to edge failure are baked-up. This is the high-level idea of why the laim is true,
we now go through rigorous detail.
First notie that the statement only onerns pakets orresponding to the urrent odeword
transmission, and pakets deleted as on (6.61) do not threaten the validity of the Claim. We onsider
a spei paket p that has been inserted into the network and show that p is never removed from
a buer B until another buer B′ has taken p from B. We do this by onsidering every line of ode
that a buer ould possible remove p, and argue that whenever this happens, p has neessarily been
aepted from B by some other buer B′. Notie that the only lines that a buer ould possibly
remove p (before line (6.61) of T is reahed) are: (6.32), (6.53), and (6.89-90).
Line (6.53). This line is handled by Lemma 7.1, Statements 1 and 2, whih say that whenever
a slot of an inoming buer is lled as on line (6.53), it lls an empty slot, and therefore annot
orrespond to removing (over-writing) p.
Lines (7.89-90). These lines are handled by Lemma 7.1, Statement 10.
Line (6.32). This is the interesting ase, where p is removed from an outgoing buer after
a paket transfer. We must show that any time p is removed here, it has been aepted by
some inoming buer B′. For notation, we will let t denote the round that p is deleted from
B (i.e. when line (6.32) is reahed), and t0 denote the round that B rst tried to send the
paket to B′ as on (6.41). By Statement 3 of Claim 7.7, t0 is the round that p˜ was most
reently set to p as on line (6.38) (note that t0 ≤ t). Sine line (6.32) was reahed in round
t, the onditional statements on lines (6.29) and (6.30) were satised, and so ⊥ 6= RR ≥ FR
when those lines were reahed. By Statement 3 of Claim 7.7, FR will equal t0 when (6.30)
is satised. Sine in any round t
′
, the only non-⊥ value that RR an ever be set to is t′
(6.53), and sine RR ≥ t0 = FR (6.30), it must be that (6.53) was reahed in some round
t
′ ∈ [t0, t]. In partiular, B
′
stored a paket as on (6.53) of round t
′
, whih by Statement 3
of Claim 7.7 was neessarily p. 
Claim 7.13. Not ounting agged pakets, there is at most one opy of any paket in the network
at any time (not inluding pakets in the sender or reeiver's buers). Looking at all opies (agged
and un-agged) of any given paket present in the network at any time, at most one opy of that
paket will ever be aepted (as in Denition 6.5) by another node.
Proof. For any paket p, let Np denote the opies of p (both agged and not) present in the network
(in an internal node's buer) at a given time. We begin the proof via a sequene of observations:
Observation 1. The only time Np an ever inrease is on line (6.53).
Proof. The only way for Np to inrease is if (a opy of) p is stored by a new buer. Looking
at the pseudo-ode, the only plae a buer slot an be assigned a new opy of p is on lines
(6.32), (6.35), (6.53), (6.55), (6.57), (6.61), (6.64), and (7.89). Of these, only (6.53) and
(7.89) ould possibly inrease Np, as the others simply shift pakets within a buer and/or
delete pakets. In the latter ase, Np does not hange by Statement 10 of Lemma 7.1.
Observation 2. Suppose A (inluding A = S) rst sends a (opy of a) paket p to B as on
(6.41) of round t0. Then:
(a) The opy of p in A's outgoing buer along E(A,B) (for whih there was a opy made
and sent on (6.41) of round t0) will never be transferred to any of A's other buers.
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(b) The opy of p will remain in A's outgoing buer along E(A,B) as a agged paket until it
is deleted either when A gets onrmation of reeipt (see Denition 7.6) in some round t
(6.32), or by the end of the transmission as on (6.61). In the latter ase, dene t := 3D
(the last round of the transmission) for Statement () below.
() Between t0 and line (5.07) of round t, B will aept (a opy of) p from A as on (6.53)
at most one. Furthermore, the opy of p in A's buer annot move to any other buer
or generate any other opies other than the one (possibly) reeived by B as on (6.53).
Proof. Statement (a) follows from Statement 3 of Claim 7.7 and Statement 11 of Lemma 7.1,
together with the fat that lines (6.32) and (6.61, 6.69) imply that the relevant opy of A
will be deleted when it does get onrmation of reeipt as in Denition 7.6 (or the end of the
transmission). By Statement 3 of Claim 7.7, this opy of p will be (the unique) agged paket
in A's outgoing buer to B until onrmation of reeipt (or the end of the transmission),
whih proves Statement (b). For Statement (), suppose that B aepts a opy of p as on
(6.53) during some round t
′ ∈ [t0, t]. Then RR will be set to t
′
on (6.53) of round t
′
, and
RR annot obtain a smaller index until the next transmission (6.53). By Statement 3 of
Claim 7.7, FR will remain equal to t0 from line (6.38) of round t0 through the time (6.33)
of round t is reahed. Therefore, between t
′ ≥ t0 and line (6.33) of round t, we have that
FR = t0 ≤ t
′ ≤ RR, and hene line (6.51) an never be satised during these times, whih
implies (6.53) an never be reahed again after t
′
. This proves the rst part of Statement ().
The seond part follows by looking at all possible plaes (opies of) pakets an move or be
reated: (6.32), (6.35), (6.53), (6.55), (6.57), (6.61), (6.64), and (7.89-90). Of these, only
(6.53) and (7.89-90) threaten to move p or reate a new opy of p. However, the rst part
of Observation 2() says that (6.53) an happen at most one (and is aounted for), while
Statement 11 of Lemma 7.1 rules out the ase that the paket is re-shued as on (7.89-90).
Observation 3. No paket will ever be inserted (see Denition 6.6) into the network more
than one. In partiular, for any paket p, Np = 0 until the sender inserts it (i.e. some node
aepts the paket from the sender as on (6.53)), at whih point Np = 1. After this point,
the only way Np an beome larger than one is if (6.53) is reahed, where neither the sending
node nor the reeiving node is S or R.
Proof. Sine the pakets of S are distributed to his outgoing buers before being inserted into
the network (4.38), (6.65), and (6.67-70), and sine S never reeives a paket he has already
inserted (S has no inoming buers (3.17)) nor shues pakets between buers ((5.22) and
(7.95-96)), a given paket p an only be insereted along one edge adjaent to the sender. The
fat the sender an insert at most one (opy of a) paket p along an adjaent edge now follows
from Observation 2 above for A = S. This proves the rst part of Observation 3.
By Observation 1, the only plae Np an inrease is on (6.53). Whenever this line is reahed,
the opy stored omes from the one reeived on (6.43), whih in turn was sent by another
node on (6.41). The opy sent on (6.41) in turn an only be set on (6.38) (perhaps in an
earlier round), so in partiular a opy of the paket must have already existed in an outgoing
buer of the sending node. This proves that when Np goes from zero to one, it an only
happen when a paket is inserted for the rst time by the sender. The rest of Observation 3
now follows from Observation 1, the rst part of Observation 3, the fat that opies reahing
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R do not inrease Np (by denition of Np), and the fat R never sends a opy of a paket
(3.07) and S never aepts pakets (3.17).
Dene a opy of a paket p in the network to be dead if that opy will never leave the buer it is
urrently in, nor will it ever generate any new opies. A opy of a paket that is not dead will be
alive.
Observation 4. If a (opy of a) paket is ever agged and dead, it will forever remain both
agged and dead, until it is deleted.
Proof. By denition of being dead, one a (opy of a) paket beomes dead it an never
beome alive again. Also, opies of a paket that are agged remain agged until they are
deleted by Observation 2(b).
The Claim now follows immediately from the following sublaim:
Sublaim. Fix any paket p that is ever inserted into the network. Then at any time, there
is at most one alive opy of p in the network at any time. Also at any time, if there is one
alive opy of p, then all dead opies of p are agged pakets. If there are no alive opies, then
there is at most one dead opy of p that is not a agged paket.
Proof. Before p is inserted into the network, Np = 0, and there is nothing to show. Suppose p
is inserted into the network in round t0, so that Np = 1 by the end of the round (Observation
3). Sine Np = 1, the validity of the sublaim is not threatened. Also, if this paket is
dead, then the proof is omplete, as by Observation 3 and the denition of deadness, no other
(opies) of p will ever be reated, and hene the sublaim will forever be true for p. So suppose
p is alive when it is inserted. We will show that a (opy of an) alive paket an reate at most
one new (opy of a) paket, and the instant it does so, the original opy is neessarily both
agged and dead (the new opy may be either alive or dead), from whih the sublaim follows
from Observation 4. So suppose an alive opy of p reates a new opy (inreasing Np) of itself
in round t. Notie that the only time new opies of any paket an be reated is on (6.53)
(see e.g. proof of Observation 2). Fix notation, so that the alive opy of p was in node A's
outgoing buer to node B, and hene it was B's orresponding buer that entered (6.53)
in round t. The fat that the alive opy of p in A's outgoing buer is agged and dead the
instant B aepts it on (6.53) of round t follows immediately from Observation 2. 
Lemma 7.14. Suppose that in round t, B aepts (as in Denition 6.5) a paket from A. Let
OA,B denote A's outgoing buer along E(A,B), and let O denote the height the paket had in OA,B
when Send Paket was alled in round t (5.17). Also let IB,A denote B's inoming buer along
E(A,B), and let I denote the height of IB,A at the start of t. Then the hange in non-dupliated
potential aused by this paket transfer is less than or equal to:
−O + I + 1 OR −O (if B = R) (5)
Furthermore, after the paket transfer but before re-shuing, IB,A will have height I + 1.
Proof. By denition, B aepts the paket in round t means that (6.53) was reahed by B's
inoming buer along E(A,B) in round t. Sine the paket is stored at height HGP (6.53), B's
non-dupliated potential will inrease by HGP due to this paket transfer (if B = R, then by
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denition of non-dupliated potential, pakets in R do not ontribute anything, so there will be
no hange). By Statements 1 and 2 of Lemma 7.1, HGP ≤ I + 1, and hene B's inrease in non-
dupliated potential aused by the paket transfer is at most I + 1 (or zero in the ase B = R).
Also, sine B had height I at the start of the round, and B aepts a paket on (6.53) of round t,
B will have I + 1 pakets in I when the re-shuing phase of round t begins, whih is the seond
statement of the lemma.
Meanwhile, the paket transferred along E(A,B) in round t still has a opy in OA,B (until
A reeives onrmation of reeipt from B, see Denition 7.6), but by denition of non-dupliated
potential (see the paragraph between Claim 6.9 and Lemma 6.11), this (agged) paket will no
longer ount towards non-dupliated potential the instant B aepts it as on (6.53) of round t.
Therefore, A's non-dupliated potential will drop by the value HFP has when B aepts the paket
on (6.53) (Statement 3 of Claim 7.7), whih equals O sine HFP annot hange between the time
Send Paket is alled on (5.17) and the time the paket is aepted on (6.53). Therefore, ounting
only hanges in non-dupliated potential due to the paket transfer, the hange in potential is:
−O +HGP ≤ −O + I + 1 (or −O in the ase B = R), as desired. 
We now re-state and prove Lemma 6.14.
Lemma 7.15. Let C = N1N2 . . . Nl be a path onsisting of l nodes, suh that R = Nl and S /∈ C.
Suppose that in round t, all edges E(Ni, Ni+1), 1 ≤ i < l are ative for the entire round. Let φ
denote the hange in the network's non-dupliated potential aused by:
1. (For 1 ≤ i < l) Paket transfers aross E(Ni, Ni+1) in round t,
2. (For 1 < i < l) Re-shuing pakets into Ni's outgoing buers during t,
Then if ON1,N2 denotes N1's outgoing buer along E(N1, N2) and O denotes its height at the start
of t, we have:
- If ON1,N2 has a agged paket that has already been aepted by N2 before round t, then:
φ ≤ −O + l − 1 (6)
- Otherwise,
φ ≤ −O + l − 2 (7)
Proof. (Indution on l).
Base Case: l = 2. So C = N1R.
Case 1: ON1,R had a agged paket at the start of t that was already aepted by N2. Our aim
for this ase is to prove (6) for l = 2. If O < 2, then −O+ l−1 ≥ −1+2−1 = 0, and then (6)
will be true by Statement 3 of Lemma 6.11. So assume O ≥ 2. Sine E(N1, R) is ative during
t and R had already aepted the paket in some previous round t˜ < t, we have that RR ≥ t˜
(6.53), and N1 will reeive this value for RR in R's stage one ommuniation (5.06), (5.09).
By Statment 3 of Claim 7.7, FR ≤ t˜ ≤ RR, and thus lines (6.29-30) will be satised in round
t, deleting the agged paket on (6.32) and setting sb = 0. When Create Flagged Paket is
alled on (5.15), a new paket will be agged, with HFP = HOUT = O − 1 and FR = t
(sine O ≥ 2, there will be at least one paket left in ON1,R of height O − 1 > 0 by Lemma
7.1). Letting I denote the height of the reeiver's inoming buer along E(N1, R), we have
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that I = 0 (Claim 7.3). Therefore, HOUT > HIN , and so the agged paket will be sent as on
(5.17). Sine R will reeive and store this paket (sine the edge is ative and RR < t = FR,
lines (6.44) and (6.48) will fail, while lines (6.47) and (6.51) will be satised), we apply
Lemma 7.14 to argue there will be a hange in non-dupliation potential that is less than or
equal to −(O − 1), whih is (6) (for l = 2).
Case 2: Either ON1,R has no agged paket at the start of t, or if so, it has not yet been aepted
by R. Our aim for this ase is to prove (6) for l = 2. If O = 0, then −O+ l− 2 = 0, and (7) is
true by Statement 3 of Lemma 6.11. So assume O ≥ 1. Then neessarily a paket will be sent
during round t ((5.16) is neessarily satised sine by assumption E(N1, R) is ative during
t, HOUT ≥ 1 by Lemma 7.1 and HIN = 0 by Claim 7.3). We rst show that the height of
the paket in ON1,R that will be transferred in round t (whih will be the value held by HFP
when Send Paket is alled in round t) is greater than or equal to O (whether or not it was
agged before round t):
• If ON1,R did not have any agged pakets at the outset of t, then HFP = ⊥ at the start
of t, and so sb = 0 and FR = ⊥ at the start of t by Claim 7.4. Sine HFP annot
hange between the all to Send Paket in the previous round and the all to Reset
Outgoing Variables in the urrent round, Statement 2 of Claim 7.5 implies no paket was
sent the previous round, and hene d = 0 at the start of t (d was neessarily zero as of
(6.26) of round t − 1, and as argued did not hange to `1' on (6.40) later that round).
Consequently, sb will remain zero from the start of t through the time Create Flagged
Paket is alled in round t, and beause HOUT = O > 0 = I = HIN , (6.38) will be
reahed in round t, setting HFP to O.
• Alternatively, if ON1,R does have a agged paket at the outset of t, we argue that it will
have height at least O when Send Paket is alled in round t as follows. Let t0 < t
denote the round ON1,R rst sent (a opy of) the paket to R. We rst show that N1
will not get onrmation of reeipt from R (as in Denition 7.6) for the paket at any
point between rounds t0 and t − 1 (inlusive). To see this, note that sine we are Case
2, R has not aepted the agged paket by the start of t. This means that at all times
between t0 and the start of t, RR < t0
20
. Meanwhile, by Statement 3 of Lemma 7.7,
FR = t0 and HFP 6= ⊥ at the start of t. Sine these do not hange values before Reset
Outgoing Variables is alled in round t, line (6.34) guarantees that if HFP < O, then
line (6.35) will be reahed, and thus in either ase HFP ≥ O after the all to Reset
Outgoing Variables.
Therefore, sine R will neessarily reeive and aept the agged paket sent (by the same
argument used in Case 1), we may apply Lemma 7.14 to argue that φ ≤ −O, whih is (7) (for
l = 2).
Indution Step. Assume the lemma is true for any hain of length less that or equal to l− 1, and
let C be a hain of length l (l > 2). Sine we will be applying the indution hypothesis, we extend and
20
By Statement 3 of Claim 7.7, the paket agged in t0 is the only paket ON1,R an send to R between t0 +1 and
the time R reeives this agged paket. Sine we know R has still not aepted this agged paket by the outset of t,
this means that between t0 and t− 1, RR annot be hanged as on (6.53). Sine RR begins eah transmission equal
to −1 ((3.31) and (6.64)) and an only be hanged after this on (6.53), neessarily RR < t0 through the start of t.
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hange our notation as follows: Let ONi,Nj (respetively INi,Nj ) denote the height of Ni's outgoing
(respetively inoming) buer along edge E(Ni, Nj) at the start of round t (before, the notation
referred to the buer, now it will refer to the buer's height). Notie that if ON1,N2 ≤ IN2,N1 , then:
φ ≤ −ON2,N3 + (l − 1)− 1 ≤ −IN2,N1 + l − 2 ≤ −ON1,N2 + l − 2 (8)
where the rst inequality is from the indution hypothesis applied to the hain N2 . . . R, the seond
follows from Lemma 6.3, and the third follows from the fat we are assuming ON1,N2 ≤ IN2,N1 .
Therefore, both (6) and (7) are satised. We may therefore assume in both ases below:
ON1,N2 > IN2,N1 (9)
Case 1: ON1,N2 had a agged paket at the start of t that was already aepted by N2. If
ON1,N2 = IN2,N1 + 1, then by the same string of inequalities as in (8), we would have φ ≤
−ON1,N2 + l − 1, whih is (6). Therefore, it remains to onsider the ase:
ON1,N2 ≥ IN2,N1 + 2 (10)
By an analogous argument to the one made in the Base Case, a paket will be transfered and
aepted aross E(N1, N2) in round t that will ause the non-dupliated potential to hange
by an amount less than or equal to:
(−ON1,N2 + 1) + IN2,N1 + 1 (11)
Also, when the reeiving node N2 aepts this paket as on (6.53), the height of the orre-
sponding buer inreases by one on this line. We emphasize this fat for use below:
Fat: After the Routing Phase but before the all to Re-Shue in round t, N2's inoming
buer along E(N1, N2) has height IN2,N1 + 1.
Meanwhile, we may apply the indution hypothesis to the hain C′ := N2 . . . R, so that the
hange in non-dupliated potential due to ontributions 1 and 2 (in the hypothesis of the
Lemma) on C′ is less than or equal to:
(a) −ON2,N3 + (l − 1)− 1, if ON2,N3 had a agged paket at the start of t that was already
aepted by N3.
(b) −ON2,N3 + (l − 1)− 2, otherwise.
Adding these ontributions to (11), we have that:
φ ≤ ((−ON1,N2 + 1) + IN2,N1 + 1) + (−ON2,N3 + (l − 1)− x)
= (−ON1,N2 + l − 1) + (−ON2,N3 + IN2,N1) + (2− x), (12)
where x = 1 or 2, depending on whether we are in ase (a) or (b) above. By Lemma 6.3,
−ON2,N3 + IN2,N1 is either 0 or -1. If −ON2,N3 + IN2,N1 = −1, then (−ON2,N3 + IN2,N1) +
(2 − x) ≤ 0, regardless whether x = 1 or 2, and hene (12) implies (6). Also, if x = 2, then
(−ON2,N3+IN2,N1)+(2−x) ≤ 0 (by Lemma 6.3), and hene hene (12) implies (6). It remains
to onsider the ase x = 1 and −ON2,N3 + IN2,N1 = 0, in whih ase (12) beomes:
φ ≤ (−ON1,N2 + l − 1) + 1 (13)
In order to obtain (6) from (13), we therefore need to aount for a drop of at least one more to
φ. We will obtain this by the seond ontribution to φ (see statement of Lemma) by arguing:
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(a) After the Routing Phase of round t but before the all to Re-Shuing, the fullest buer
of N2 has height ON2,N3 +1, and there is at least one inoming buer of N2 that has this
height. In partiular, during the all to Re-Shue in round t, the rst buer hosen to
transfer a paket from will be an inoming buer of height ON2,N3 + 1.
(b) After the Routing Phase of round t but before the all to Re-Shuing, the emptiest
buer of N2 has height ON2,N3 − 1, and there is at least one outgoing buer of N2 that
has this height. In partiular, during the all to Re-Shue in round t, the rst buer
hosen to transfer a paket to will be an outgoing buer of height ON2,N3 − 1.
Notie that if I an show these two things, this ase will be done, as during the rst all to
Re-Shue in round t, we will have M −m ≥ (ON2,N3 + 1) − (ON2,N3 − 1) ≥ 2 (the all to
Adjust Heights an only help this inequality sine the seletion proess on (7.72-73) and the
two items above guarantee (7.80) and (7.86) will both fail if reahed), and onsequently the
re-shue on (7.89-90) will ause a drop of at least one to φ.
We rst argue (a). As noted at the beginning of Case 1 of the Indution Step, Fat 1
implies that there will exist an inoming buer of the required height (sine we are assuming
ON2,N3 = IN2,N1). Also, at the start of t, sine N2 has an outgoing buer of height ON2,N3
(namely, the outgoing buer along E(N2, N3)), Lemma 6.3 guarantees that all ofN2's inoming
buers have hieght at most ON2,N3 at the start of t; and also that all of N2's outgoing buers
have height at most ON2,N3 + 1 at the start of t. During the Routing Phase but before the
Re-Shue Phase of t, outgoing buers annot inrease in height (6.33) and inoming buers
annot inrease in height by more than one (6.53). Therefore, after transferring pakets but
before Re-Shuing in round t, the fullest buer in N2 has height at most ON2,N3 + 1, and as
already argued, at least one inoming buer has this height. The last part of (a) is immediate
from the seletion rules in (7.72).
We now argue (b). Sine x = 1, we are in the ase the outgoing buer along E(N2, N3) had a
agged paket at the start of t that had already been aepted by N3 in some round t0 < t.
By a similar argument that was used in Case 1 of the Base Case, the outgoing buer along
E(N2, N3) will reah lines (6.32-33) in round t. In partiular, the height of the outgoing
buer along E(N2, N3) will drop by one on (6.33), and thus this buer has height ON2,N3 − 1
after the all to Reset Outgoing Variables. Sine this height annot hange before the all to
Re-Shue, this outgoing buer has height ON2,N3−1 after the Routing Phase (but before the
all to Re-Shue) in round t. Also, ON2,N3 − 1 is a lower bound for the emptiest buer in N2
just before the all to Re-Shue in round t, argued as follows. At the start of t, sine N2 has
an inoming buer of height IN2,N1 = ON2,N3 (namely, the inoming buer along E(N1, N2)),
Lemma 6.3 guarantees that all of N2's inoming buers have hieght at least ON2,N3 − 1 at the
start of t; and also that all of N2's outgoing buers have hieght at least ON2,N3 at the start of
t. During the Routing Phase but before the Re-Shue Phase of t, inoming buers annot
derease in height (6.53) and outgoing buers an derease in height by at most one (6.33).
Therefore, after transferring pakets but before Re-Shuing in round t, the emptiest buer
in N2 has height at least ON2,N3 − 1, and as already argued, at least one outgoing buer has
this height. The last part of (b) is immediate from the seletion rules in (7.73).
Case 2: Either ON1,N2 has no agged paket at the start of t, or if so, it has not yet been
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aepted by N2. By the same argument
21
used in Case 2 of the Base Case, there will be
a paket transferred aross E(N1, N2) and aepted by N2 in round t, and this paket will
have height at least ON1,N2 in N1's outgoing buer. Therefore, by Lemma 7.14, the hange in
non-dupliated potential due to this paket transfer is less than or equal to:
−ON1,N2 + IN2,N1 + 1 (14)
Meanwhile, we may apply the indution hypothesis to the hain C′ := N2 . . . R, so that the
hange in non-dupliated potential due to ontributions 1 and 2 (in the hypothesis of the
Lemma) on C′ is less than or equal to:
(a) −ON2,N3 + (l − 1)− 1, if ON2,N3 had a agged paket at the start of t that was already
aepted by N3.
(b) −ON2,N3 + (l − 1)− 2, otherwise.
Adding these ontributions to (14), we have that:
φ ≤ (−ON1,N2 + IN2,N1 + 1) + (−ON2,N3 + (l − 1)− x)
= (−ON1,N2 + l − 2) + (−ON2,N3 + IN2,N1) + (2− x), (15)
where x = 1 or 2, depending on whether we are in ase (a) or (b) above. Sine the rst term
of (15) mathes (7) and the latter two terms math the latter two terms of (12), we follow
the argument of Case 1 above to onlude the proof.

8 Routing Against a (Node-Controlling+Edge-Sheduling) Adversary
8.1 Denitions and High-Level Desription of the Protool
In this setion, we dene the variables that appear in the next setion and desribe how they
will be used.
As in the protool for the edge-sheduling adversary model, the sender rst onverts the input
stream of messages into odewords, and then transmits a single odeword at a time. The sender will
allow (at most) 4D rounds for this odeword to reah the reeiver (for the edge-sheduling protool,
we only allowed 3D rounds; the extra D rounds will be motivated below). We will all eah attempt
to transfer a odeword a transmission, usually denoted by T. At the end of eah transmission,
the reeiver will broadast an end of transmission message, indiating whether it ould suessfully
deode the odeword. In the ase that the reeiver annot deode, we will say that the transmission
failed, and otherwise the transmission was suessful.
As mentioned in Setion 2.2, in the absene of a node-ontrolling adversary, the only dierene
between the present protool and the one presented in Setion 4 is that digital signatures are used
to authentiate the sender's pakets and also aompany paket transfers for later use to identify
orrupt nodes. In the ase a transmission fails, the sender will determine the reason for failure
(ases 2-4 from Setion 2.2, and also F2-F4 below), and request nodes to return status reports that
21
For the argument in the Base Case, we used the fat that the reeiver's inoming buer had height zero in
order to onlude HOUT > HIN (and thus a paket would be sent). Here, we use instead (9) to ome to the same
onlusion.
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orrespond to a partiular piee of signed ommuniation between eah node and its neighbors. We
will refer to status report pakets as parels to larify disussion in distinguishing them from the
odeword pakets.
We give now a brief desription of how we handle transmission failures in eah of the three ases:
F2. The reeiver ould not deode, and the sender has inserted less than D pakets
F3. The reeiver ould not deode, the sender has inserted D pakets, and the reeiver has not
reeived any dupliated pakets orresponding to the urrent odeword
F4. The reeiver ould not deode and ases F2 and F3 do not happen
Below is a short desription of the spei kind of information nodes will be required to sign and
store when ommuniating with their neighbors, and how this information will be used to identify
orrupt nodes in eah ase F2-F4.
Case F2. Anytime a paket at height h in an outgoing buer of A is transferred to an inoming
buer of B at height h′, A's potential will drop by h and B's potential will inrease by h′.
So for direted edge E(A,B), A and B will eah need to keep two values, the umulative
derease in A's potential from pakets leaving A, and the umulative inrease in B's potential
from those pakets entering B. These quantities are updated every time a paket is transferred
aross the edge, along with a tag indiating the round index and a signature from the neighbor
validating the quantities and round index. Loosely speaking, ase F2 orresponds to paket
dupliation. If a orrupt node attempts to slow transmission by dupliating pakets, that
node will have introdued extra potential in the network that annot be aounted for, and
the signing of potential hanges will allow us to identify suh a node.
Case F3. A and B will keep trak of the net number of pakets that have travelled aross edge
E(A,B). This number is updated anytime a paket is passed aross the edge, and the updated
quantity, tagged with the round index, is signed by both nodes, who need only store the most
reent quantity. Loosely speaking, ase F3 orresponds to paket deletion. In partiular, the
information signed here will be used to nd a node who input more pakets than it output, and
suh that the node's apaity to store pakets in its buers annot aount for the dierene.
Case F4. For eah paket p orresponding to the urrent odeword, A and B will keep trak
of the net number of times the paket p has travelled aross edge E(A,B). This quantity
is updated every time p ows aross the edge, and the updated quantity, tagged with the
round index, is signed by both nodes, who for eah paket p need only store the most reent
quantity. We will show in Setion 10 that whenever ase F4 ours, the reeiver will have
neessarily reeived a dupliated paket (orresponding to the urrent odeword). Therefore,
the information signed here will allow the sender to trak this dupliated paket, looking for
a node that outputted the paket more times than it inputted the paket.
We will prove that whenever ases F2-F4 our, if the sender has all of the relevant quantities
speied above, then he will neessarily be able to identify a orrupt node. Notie that eah ase
of failure requires eah node to transfer bak only one signed quantity for eah of its edges, and so
the sender only needs n status report pakets from eah node.
We will show that the maximum number of failed transmissions that an our before a orrupt
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node is neessarily identied and eliminated is n.22 Beause there are fewer than n nodes that an
be orrupted by the adversary, the umulative number of failed transmissions is bounded by n2.
This provides us with our main theorem regarding eieny, stated preisely in Theorem 8.1 in
Setion 8.3 (note that the additive term that appears there omes from the n2 failed transmissions).
8.2 Detailed Desription of the Node-Controlling + Edge-Sheduling Protool
In this setion we give a more thorough desription of our routing protool for the node-
ontrolling adversary model. Formal pseudo-ode an be found in Setion 9.
Setup. As in the edge-sheduling protool, the sender has a sequene of messages {m1,m2, . . . }
that he will divide into odewords {b1, b2, . . . }. However, we demand eah message has size M
′ =
6σ(P−2k)n3
λ
, so that odewords have size C ′ = M
′
σ
, and these are then divided into pakets of size
P ′ = P − 2k, whih will allow pakets to have enough room23 to hold two signatures of size k.
Notie that the number of pakets per odeword is D = C
′
P ′
= 6(P−2k)n
3
(P−2k)λ =
6n3
λ
, whih mathes the
value of D for the edge-sheduling protool. One of the signatures that pakets will arry with them
omes from the sender, who will authentiate every paket by signing it, and the pakets will arry
this signature until they are removed from the network by the reeiver. We re-emphasize Fat 1
from the edge-sheduling protool, whih remains true with these new values:
Fat 1
′
. If the reeiver has obtained D− 6n3 = (1−λ)
(
6n3
λ
)
distint and un-altered pakets
from any odeword, he will be able to deode the odeword to obtain the orresponding
message.
The primary dierene between the protool we present here and that presented in Setion 4 is the
need to maintain and transmit information that will allow the sender to identify orrupt nodes. To
this end, as part of the Setup, eah node will have additional buers:
3. Signature Buers. Eah node has a signature buer along eah edge to keep trak of (outgo-
ing/inoming) information exhanged with its neighbor along that edge. The signature buers
will hold information orresponding to hanges in the following values for a single transmis-
sion. The following onsiders A's signature buer along direted edge E(A,B): 1) The net
number of pakets passed aross E(A,B); 2) B's umulative hange in potential due to paket
transfers aross E(A,B). Additionally, for odeword pakets orresponding to the urrent
transmission only, the signature buers will hold: 3) For eah paket p that A has seen, the
net number of times p has passed aross E(A,B) during the urrent transmission.
Eah of the three items above, together with the urrent round index and transmission
index, ahve been signed by B. Sine only a single (value, signature) pair is required for items
1)-2), while item 3) requires a (value, signature) pair for eah paket, eah signature buer
will need to hold at most 2 +D (value, signature) pairs.
22
As mentioned in Setion 2.2, the sender an eliminate a orrupt node as soon as he has reeived the status reports
from every non-blaklisted node. The reason we require up to n transmissions to guarantee the identiation of a
orrupt node is that it may take this long for the sender to have the omplete information he needs.
23
The network is equipped with some minimal bandwidth, by whih we mean the the number of bits that an
be transferred by an edge in a single round. We will divide odewords into bloks of this size and denote the size
by P , whih therefore simultaneously denotes the size of any paket and also the network bandwidth. As in the
edge-sheduling protool, we assume P > O(k + log n), so that P ′ is well-dened.
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4. Broadast Buer. This is where nodes will temporarily store their neighbor's (and their own)
state information that the sender will need to identify maliious ativity. A node A's broadast
buer will be able to hold the following (signed) information: 1) One end of transmission
parel (desribed below); 2) Up to n dierent start of transmission parels (desribed below);
3) A list of blaklisted nodes and the transmission they were blaklisted or removed from the
blaklist; 4) For eah B ∈ G, a list of nodes for whih B has laimed knowledge of their status
report; and 5) For eah B ∈ G (inluding B = A), A's broadast buer an hold the ontent
of up to n slots of B's signature buer. Additionally, the broadast buer will also keep trak
of the edges aross whih it has already passed broadasted information.
5. Data Buer. This keeps a list of 1) All nodes that have been identied as orrupt and
eliminated from the network by the sender; 2) Currently blaklisted nodes; and 3) Eah node
A ∈ G will keep trak of all pairs (N1, N2) suh that N2 is on the blaklist, and N1 laims to
know N2's omplete status report.
The sender's buers are the same as in the edge-sheduling protool's Setup, with the addition of
four more buers:
- Data Buer. Stores all neessary information from the status reports, as well as additional
information it will need to identify orrupt nodes. Speially, the buer is able to hold: 1) Up
to n status report parels from eah node; 2) For up to n transmissions, the reason for failure,
inluding the label of a dupliated paket (if relevant); 3) For up to n failed transmissions, a
partiipating list of up to n nodes that were not on the blaklist for at least one round of the
failed transmission; 4) A list of eliminated nodes and of blaklisted nodes and the transmission
they were blaklisted; 5) The same as items 1)-3) of an internal node's Signature Buer; and
6) The same as item 3) of an internal node's data buer.
- Broadast Buer. Holds up to 2n start of transmission parels and the labels of up to n − 1
nodes that should be removed from the blaklist.
- Copy of Current Pakets Buer. Maintains a opy of all the pakets that are being sent in
the urrent transmission (to be used any time a transmission fails and needs to be repeated).
The reeiver's buers are as in the Edge-Sheduling protool's Setup, with the addition of a Broad-
ast Buer, Data Buer, and Signature Buers whih are idential to those of an internal node.
The rest of the Setup is as in the edge-sheduling model, with the added assumption that eah
node reeives a private key from a trusted third party for signing, and eah node reeives publi
information that allows them to verify the signature of every other node in the network.
Routing Phase. As in the edge-sheduling protool, rounds onsist of two stages followed by
re-shuing pakets loally. The main dierene between the two protools will be the addition of
signatures to all information, as well as the need to transmit the broadast information, namely the
status reports and start and end of transmission broadasts, whih inform the nodes of blaklisted
and eliminated nodes and request status reports in the ase a transmission fails. The two stages
of a round are divided as they were for the edge-sheduling protool, with the same treatment of
routing odeword pakets (with the addition of signatures). However, we will also require that eah
round allows all edges the opportunity to transmit broadast information (e.g. status report parels).
Therefore, for every direted edge and every round of a transmission, there are four main paket
58
transfers, two in eah diretion: odeword pakets, broadast parels, and signatures onrming
reeipt of eah of these. The order of transmitting these is suintly expressed below in Figure 8.
At the start of any transmission T, the sender will determine whih odeword is to be sent (the
next one in the ase the previous transmission was suessful, or the same one again in the ase the
previous transmission failed). He will ll his Copy Of Current Pakets Buer with a opy of all of
the odeword pakets (to be used in ase the transmission fails), and then ll his outgoing buers
with pakets orresponding to this odeword. All odeword pakets are signed by the sender, and
these signatures will remain with the pakets as they travel through the network to the reeiver.
Stage A B
HA := Height of buer along E(A,B)
1
Height of agged p. (if there is one)
Round prev. paket was sent
−→
Conrmation of re. of broadast info.
←−
HB:=Height of buer along E(A,B)
Round prev. paket was reeived
Sig's on values for edge E(A,B)
Send p. and Sig's on values for E(A,B) if: Reeive paket if:
• Enough bdst info has passed E(A,B), AND • Enough bdst info has passed E(A,B)
2 •B is not on A's blaklist/eliminated, AND −→ AND
− HA > HB OR •A is not on B's blaklist/eliminated
− B didn't re. prev. paket sent
←− Broadast Information
Figure 8: Desription of Communiation Exhange Along Direted Edge E(A,B) During the Routing
Phase of Some Round.
To ompliment Figure 8 above, we provide a breif desription of the information that should
be passed aross direted edge E(A,B) (B 6= S and A 6= R, and A,B ∈ G, i.e. not eliminated)
during some transmission T. The preise and omplete desription an be found in the pseudo-
ode of Setion 9. We state one and for all that if a node ever reeives inaurate or mis-signed
information, it will at as if no information was reeived at all (e.g. as if the edge had failed for that
stage).
Stage 1. A will send the same information to B as in the edge-sheduling protool (height,
height of agged paket, round paket was agged). Also, if A reeived a valid broadast
buer from B in Stage 2 of the previous round, then A will send B onrmation of this fat.
Also, if A knows that B has ruial broadast information A needs, A speies the type of
broadast information he wants from B. Meanwhile, A should reeive the seven items that B
signed and sent (see below), updating his internal variables as in the edge-sheduling protool
and updating its signature buer, provided B has given a valid24 signature.
At the other end, B will send the following seven items to A: 1) the transmission index;
2) index of the urrent round; 3) urrent height; 4) index of the round B last reeived a
24
Here, valid means that A agrees with all the values sent by B, and B's signature is veried.
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paket from A; 5) the net hange in paket transfers so far aross E(A,B) for the urrent
transmission; 6) B's umulative inrease in potential due to paket transfers aross E(A,B) in
the urrent transmission; and 7) if a paket p was sent and reeived in Stage 2, the net number
of times p has been transferred aross E(A,B) for the urrent transmission. Meanwhile, B
will also reeive the information A sent.
Stage 2. A will send a paket to B under the same onditions as in the edge-sheduling
protool, with the additional onditions: 1) A has reeived the sender's start of transmission
broadast (see below), and this information has passed aross E(A,B) or E(B,A); 2) A and
B are not on (A's version of) the blaklist; 3) A does not have any end of transmission
information not yet passed aross E(A,B) or E(B,A); and 4) A does not have any hanges
to blaklist information yet to pass aross E(A,B) or E(B,A). We emphasize these last two
points: if A (inluding A = S) has any start of transmission, end of transmission, or hanges
to blaklist information in its broadast buer that it has not yet passed along edge E(A,B),
then it will not send a paket along this edge.
If A does send a paket, the paket A sends inludes a signature on the following seven
items
25
: 1) transmission index; 2) index of the urrent round; 3) the paket itself with sender's
signature; 4) index of the round A rst tried to send this paket to B; 5) One plus the net
hange in paket transfers so far aross E(A,B) for the urrent transmission; 6) A's umula-
tive derease in potential due to paket transfers aross E(A,B) in the urrent transmission
inluding the potential drop due to the urrent paket being transferred; and 7) One plus the net
number of times the paket urrently being transferred has been transferred aross E(A,B)
for the urrent transmission.
Also, A should reeive broadast information (if B has something in its broadast buer
not yet passed along E(A,B)) and update its broadast buer as desribed by the Update
Broadast Buer Rules below.
At the other end, B will reeive and store the paket sent by A as in the edge-sheduling
protool, updating his signature buer appropriately, with the added onditions: 1) B has
reeived the sender's start of transmission broadast, and this information has been passed
aross E(A,B) or E(B,A); 2) The paket has a valid signature from S; 3) A and B are not on
(B's version of) the blaklist; 4) B does not have any end of transmission information not yet
passed aross E(A,B) or E(B,A); 5) B does not have any hanges to blaklist information
yet to pass aross E(A,B) or E(B,A); and 6) The signatures on the seven items inluded
with the paket from A is valid.24 Additionally, if there is anything in B's broadast buer
that has not been transferred along E(A,B) yet, then B will send one parel of broadast
information hosen aording to the priorities: 1) The reeiver's end of transmission parel;
2) One of the sender's start of transmission parels; 3) Changes to the blaklist or a node to
permanently eliminate; 4) The identity of a node N on B's blaklist for whih B has omplete
knowledge of N 's status report; 5) The most reent status report parel A requested in Stage
1 of an earlier round; and 6) Arbitrary status report parels.
25
Reall that pakets have room to hold two signatures. The rst will be the sender's signature that aompanies
the paket until the paket is removed by the reeiver. The seond signature is the one indiated here, and this
signature will be replaed/overwritten by the sending node every time the paket is passed aross an edge.
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For any edge E(A,S) or E(R,B), only broadast information is passed along these direted edges,
and this is done as in the rules above, with the exeptions mentioned below in the Update Broadast
Buer Rules for S and R. Additionally, any round in whih the sender is unable to insert any
pakets, he will inrease the number of bloked rounds in his data buer. The sender will also keep
trak of the total number of pakets inserted in the urrent transmission in his data buer.
Re-Shue Rules. The Re-Shue rules are exatly as in the edge-sheduling protool, with the
exeption that node's reord the hanges in non-dupliated potential aused by re-shuing pakets
loally.
Update Broadast Buer Rules for Internal Nodes. Looking at Stage 2 of the Routing
Rules above, we have that in every round and for every edge E(A,B), eah node B will have
the opportunity to send and reeive exatly one parel of broadast information in addition to a
single odeword paket. The order in whih a node's broadast buer information is transmitted is
desribed above in the Routing Rules.
For any node A ∈ P \ {R,S}, we now desribe the rules for updating their broadast buer
when they reeive broadast information. Assume that A has reeived broadast information along
one of its edges E(A,B), and has veried that it has a valid signature. We desribe how A will
update its Broadast Buer, depending on the nature of the new information:
The reeived information is the reeiver's end of transmission broadast (see below). In this ase,
A will rst make sure the transmission index is for the urrent transmission, and if so, the
information is added to A's broadast buer, and edge E(A,B) is marked as having already
transmitted this information.
The reeived information is the sender's start of transmission broadast (see below). This broad-
ast onsists of a single parel ontaining information about the previous transmission, followed
by up to 2n − 2 additional parels (desribing blaklisted/eliminated nodes and labels of up
to n previous transmissions that have failed). When A reeives a parel from the start of
transmission broadast, if A does not already have it stored in its broadast buer, it will add
it, and edge E(A,B) is marked as having already transmitted this information. Additionally,
A will handle the parels onerning blaklisted nodes as desribed below. Finally, when A
has reeived every parel in the start of transmission broadast, it will also remove from its
blaklist any node not impliated in this broadast (i.e. this will ount as A reeives infor-
mation onerning a node to remove from the blaklist, see below), as well as learing its
signature buers for the new transmission.
The reeived information indiates a node N to eliminate. If the information is urrent, then A
will add the new information to its broadast buer and mark edge E(A,B) as already having
passed this information. If N is not already on A's list of eliminated nodes EN , then A will
add N to EN (in its data buer), lear all of its inoming and outgoing buers, its signature
buers, and its broadast buer (with the exeption of start of transmission parels).
The reeived information onerns a node N to add to or remove from the blaklist. If the
reeived information did not originate in the urrent transmission (as signed by the sender)
or A has more reent blaklist information regarding N , then A ignores the new information.
Otherwise, the information is added to A's broadast buer, and edge E(A,B) is marked as
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having already transmitted this information. Additionally, parels that are now outdated in
A's broadast buer are deleted (suh as N 's status report parels or a parel indiating a
node N̂ had N 's omplete status report).
If N = A, then A adds n of its own status report parels to its broadast buer, hoosing
these n parels based on information from the relevant start and end of transmission parels.
A also will add his own signature to eah of these parels, so that they eah one will arry
two signatures bak to the sender (A's signature and the relevant neighbor's signature).
The reeived information indiates B has some node N 's omplete status report. If N is on
A's blaklist for the transmission B laims knowledge for, then A stores the fat that B has
omplete knowledge of N in its data buer (A will later use this information when requesting
a spei parel from B).
The reeived information pertains to some node N 's status report the sender has requested. A will
rst make sure that N is on its version of the blaklist. If so, the information is added to A's
broadast buer, and edge E(A,B) is marked as having already transmitted this information.
If this ompletes A's knowledge of N 's status report, A will add to its broadast buer the
fat that it now knows all of N 's missing status report.
At the end of a transmission, all nodes will lear their broadast buers exept parels onerning a
blaklisted node's status report. All nodes also lear their version of the blaklist (it will be restored
at the beginning of the next transmission).
Update Broadast Buer Rules for Sender and Reeiver. The reeiver has the same rules
as internal nodes for updating its broadast buer, with the addition that when there are exatly
n rounds left in any transmission26, R will add to its broadast buer a single (signed) parel that
indiates the transmission index, whether or not he ould deode the urrent odeword, and the
label of a dupliate paket he reeived (if there was one). We will refer to this as the reeiver's end
of transmission parel.
The rules for the sender updating its broadast buer are slightly more involved, as the sender
will be the one determining whih information it requires of eah node, as well as managing the
blaklisted and eliminated nodes. The below rules ditate how S will update his broadast buer
and status buer at the end of a transmission, or when the sender reeives new (appropriately
signed) broadast information along E(S,B).
A transmission T has just ended. Note that the sender will have neessarily reeived and stored
the reeiver's end of transmission broadast by the end of the transmission (Lemma 11.19).
In the ase that the transmission was suessful, S will lear his outgoing buers and Copy
of Old Pakets Buer, then re-ll them with odewords orresponding to the next message.
If EN denotes the eliminated nodes and BT denotes the nodes on the sender's blaklist at
the end of this transmission, then the sender will set ΩT+1 = (|EN |, |BT|, F, 0), where F
26
We note that beause there is always an ative honest path between sender and reeiver, and the reeiver's nal
broadast has top priority in terms of broadast order, the sender will neessarily reeive this broadast by the end
of the transmission. Alternatively, we ould modify our protool to add an extra n rounds to allow this broadast to
reah the sender. However, the exposition is easier without adding an extra n rounds, and we will show that wasting
the nal n rounds of a transmission by having the reeiver determine if it an deode with n rounds still left is not
important, as the n wasted rounds is insigniant ompared to the O(n3) rounds per transmission.
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denotes the number of failed transmissions that have taken plae sine the last orrupt node
was eliminated. Finally, the sender will delete the information in his data buer onerning
the number of pakets inserted and the number of bloked rounds for the just ompleted
transmission.
In the ase that the transmission failed, S will lear his outgoing buers and then re-ll them
using the Copy of Old Pakets Buer, while leaving the latter buer unhanged. The sender
will determine the reason the transmission failed (F2-F4), and add this fat along with the
relevant information from his own signature buers to the data buer. For any node (not
inluding S or R or eliminated nodes) not on the sender's blaklist, the sender will add the
node to the partiipating list PT in his data buer, and then add eah of these nodes to the
blaklist, reording that T was the most reent transmission that the node was blaklisted.
Also, the sender will set:
ΩT+1 =


(|EN |, |BT|, F, p) if the transmission failed and p was inluded in
the reeiver's end of transmission parel
(|EN |, |BT|, F, 1) if the transmission failed and S inserted D pakets
(|EN |, |BT|, F, 2) otherwise
For both a failed transmission and a suessful transmission, the sender will sign and add to his
broadast buer the following parels, whih will omprise the sender's Start of Transmission
(SOT) broadast: ΩT+1, a list of eliminated and blaklisted nodes, and the reason for failure
of eah of the last (up to n− 1) failed transmissions sine the last node was eliminated. Note
that eah parel added to the broadast buer regarding a blaklisted node inludes the index
of the transmission for whih the node was blaklisted, and all parels added to the broadast
buer inlude the index of the transmission about to start (as a timestamp) and are signed
by S. Notie that the rules regarding priority of transferring broadast information guarantee
that ΩT+1 will be the rst parel of the SOT that is reeived, and beause it reveals the
number of blaklisted and eliminated nodes and the number of failed transmissions to expet,
as soon as eah node reeives ΩT+1, they will know exatly how many more parels remain in
the SOT broadast. Nodes will not be allowed to transfer any (odeword) pakets until the
SOT broadast for the urrent transmission is reeived in its entirety.
The sender reeives the reeiver's end of transmission parel for the urrent transmission. The
sender will store this parel in its data buer.
The sender reeives information along E(S,B) indiating B has some node N 's omplete status
report. If N is on the sender's blaklist for the transmission B laims knowledge for, then the
sender stores the fat that B has omplete knowledge of N in its data buer (the sender will
later use this information when requesting a spei parel from B).
The sender reeives information along E(S,B) that pertains to some node N 's status report that
the sender has requested. The sender will rst make sure that N is on its blaklist and that
the parel reeived ontains the appropriate information, i.e. the sender heks its data buer
to see whih transmission N was added to the blaklist and the reason this transmission
failed, and makes sure the status report parel is from this transmission and ontains the
information orresponding to this reason for failure. If the parel has faulty information that
has been signed by N , i.e. N sent bak information that was not requested by the sender,
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then N is eliminated from the network. Otherwise, the sender will add the information to its
data buer. If the information ompletes N 's missing status report, the sender updates his
broadast buer indiating N 's removal from the blaklist, inluding the index of the urrent
transmission and his signature.
The sender will then determine if he has enough information to eliminate a orrupt node
N ′. If so, N ′ will be added to his list of Eliminate Nodes, and his broadast buer and
data buer will be wiped ompletely (exept for the list of eliminated nodes). Also, he will
abandon the urrent transmission and begin a new one orresponding to the same odeword.
In partiular, he will lear his outgoing buers and re-ll them with the odewords in his Copy
of Old Pakets Buer, leaving the latter unhanged, and he will skip to the A transmission
has just ended ase above, setting the start of transmission parel ΩT+1 = (|EN |, 0, 0, 0).
8.3 Analysis of Our Node-Controlling + Edge-Sheduling Protool
We state our results onerning the orretness, throughput, and memory of our adversarial
routing protool, leaving the analysis and proofs to Setion 10.
Theorem 8.1. Exept for the at most n2 transmissions that may fail due to maliious ativity, our
Routing Protool enjoys linear throughput. More preisely, after x transmissions, the reeiver has
orretly outputted at least x− n2 messages. If the number of transmissions x is quadrati in n or
greater, than the failed transmissions due to adversarial behavior beome asymptotially negligible.
Sine a transmission lasts O(n3) rounds and messages ontain O(n3) bits, information is transferred
through the network at a linear rate.
Theorem 8.2. The memory required of eah node is at most O(n4(k + log n)).
Proofs. See Setion 10. 
9 Pseudo-Code for Node-Controlling + Edge-Sheduling Protool
We now modify the pseudo-ode from our edge-sheduling adversarial protool to pseudo-ode
for the (node-ontrolling + edge-sheduling) adversarial model. The two odes will be very similar,
with dierenes emphasized by marking the line number in bold. The Re-Shue Rules will remain
the same as in the edge-sheduling protool, with the addition of line (7.76) (see Figure 7).
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Setup
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES:
01 n := Number of nodes in G;
02 D := 3n
3
λ
;
03 T := Transmission index;
04 t := Stage/Round index;
05 k := Seurity Parameter;
06 P := Capaity of edge= O(k + log n);
07 for every N ∈ P \ S
08 BB ∈ [n2 + 5n]× {0, 1}P+n; ## Broadast Buer
09 DB ∈ [1..n2]× {0, 1}P ; ## Data Buer. Holds BL and EN below, and info. as on line 151
10 BL ∈ [1..n− 1]× {0, 1}P ; ## Blaklist
11 EN ∈ [1..n − 1]× {0, 1}P ; ## List of Eliminated Nodes
12 SIGN,N ∈ {0, 1}
O(log n)
; ## Holds hange in potential due to loal re-shuing of pakets
13 for every N ∈ G
14 SK, {PK}ni ## Seret Key for signing, Publi Keys to verify sig's of all nodes
15 for every outgoing edge E(N,B) ∈ G,B 6= S and N 6= R
16 OUT ∈ [2n]× {0, 1}P ; ## Outgoing Buer able to hold 2n pakets
17 SIGN,B ∈ [D + 3]× {0, 1}
O(log n)
;## Signature Buer for urrent trans., indexed as follows:
## SIG[1]= net no. of urrent odeword p's transferred aross E(N,B)
## SIG[2]= net hange in B's pot. due to p. transfers aross E(N,B)
## SIG[3]= net hange in N 's pot. due to p. transfers aross E(N,B)
## SIG[p]= net no. of times paket p transferred aross E(N,B)
18 p˜ ∈ {0, 1}P ∪ ⊥; ## Copy of paket to be sent
19 sb ∈ {0, 1}; ## Status bit
20 d ∈ {0, 1}; ## Bit indiating if a paket was sent in prev. round
21 FR ∈ [0..8D] ∪ ⊥; ## Flagged Round (index of round N rst tried to send p˜ to B)
22 RR ∈ [−1..8D] ∪ ⊥; ## Round Reeived (index of round that N last re. a p. from A)
23 H ∈ [0..2n]; ## Height of OUT. Also denoted HOUT when there's ambiguity
24 HFP ∈ [1..2n] ∪ ⊥; ## Height of Flagged Paket
25 HIN ∈ [0..2n] ∪ ⊥; ## Height of inoming buer of B
26 for every outgoing edge E(N,B) ∈ G, inluding B = S and N = R
27 bp ∈ {0, 1}P ; ## Broadast Parel reeived along this edge
28 α ∈ {0, 1}P ; ## Broadast Parel request
29 cbp ∈ {0, 1}; ## Veriation bit of broadast parel reeipt
30 for every inoming edge E(A,N) ∈ G,A 6= R and N 6= S
31 IN ∈ [2n] × {0, 1}P ; ## Inoming Buer able to hold 2n pakets
32 SIGA,N ∈ [D + 3]× {0, 1}
O(log n)
;## Signature Buer, indexed as on line 17
33 p ∈ {0, 1}P ∪ ⊥; ## Paket just reeived
34 sb ∈ {0, 1}; ## Status bit
35 RR ∈ {0, 1}8D; ## Round Reeived index
36 H ∈ [0..2n]; ## Height of IN. Also denoted HIN when there's ambiguity
37 HGP ∈ [1..2n] ∪ ⊥; ## Height of Ghost Paket
38 HOUT ∈ [0..2n] ∪ ⊥; ## Height of outgoing buer or height of Flagged Paket of A
39 sbOUT ∈ {0, 1}; ## Status Bit of outgoing buer of A
40 FR ∈ {0, 1}8D ∪ ⊥; ## Flagged Round index (from adjaent outgoing buer A)
41 for every inoming edge E(A,N) ∈ G, inluding A = R and N = S
42 bp ∈ {0, 1}P ; ## Broadast Parel to send along this edge
43 cbp ∈ {0, 1}; ## Veriation bit of paket broadast parel reeipt
Figure 9: Pseudo-Code for Internal Nodes' Setup for the (Node-Controlling + Edge-Sheduling)
Protool
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INITIALIZATION OF VARIABLES:
44 for every N ∈ G
45 Reeive Keys; ## Reeive {PK}ni and SK from KEYGEN
46 Initialize BB, DB, BL, EN , SIGN,N ; ## Set SIGN,N = 0, set eah entry of DB and BB to ⊥
47 for every inoming edge E(A,N) ∈ G,A 6= R and N 6= S
48 Initialize IN, SIG; ## Set eah entry in IN to ⊥ and eah entry of SIG to zero
49 p,HGP , FR = ⊥;
50 sb, sbOUT , cp, H,HOUT = 0; RR = −1;
51 for every inoming edge E(A,N) ∈ G, inluding A = R and N = S
52 bp = ⊥; cbp = 0;
53 for every outgoing edge E(N,B) ∈ G,B 6= S and N 6= R
54 Initialize OUT, SIG; ## Set eah entry in OUT to ⊥ and eah entry of SIG to zero
54 p˜, HFP , FR,RR = ⊥;
55 sb, d,H,HIN , 0;
57 for every outgoing edge E(N,B) ∈ G, inluding B = S and N = R
58 bp, α = ⊥; cbp = 0;
Sender's Additional Setup
DEFINITION OF ADDITIONAL VARIABLES FOR SENDER:
59 M := {m1,m2, . . . } = Input Stream of Messages;
60 COPY ∈ [D]× {0, 1}P := Copy of Pakets for Current Codeword;
61 BB ∈ [3n] × {0, 1}P := Broadast Buer;
62 DB ∈ [1..n3 + n2 + n]× {0, 1}P := Data Buer, whih inludes:
63 BL ∈ [1..n] × {0, 1}P := Blaklist;
64 EN ∈ [1..n] × {0, 1}P := List of Eliminated Nodes;
65 κ ∈ [0..D] := Number of pakets orresponding to urrent odeword the sender has knowingly inserted;
66 ΩT ∈ {0, 1}
O(logn)
:= First parel of Start of Transmission broadast for transmission T;
67 βT ∈ [0..4D] := Number of rounds bloked in urrent transmission;
68 F ∈ [0..n − 1] := Number of failed transmissions sine the last orrupt node was eliminated;
69 PT ∈ {0, 1}
n
:= Partiipating List for urrent transmission;
INITIALIZATION OF SENDER'S VARIABLES:
70 κ = 0;
71 β1, F = 0;
72 Ω1 = (0, 0, 0, 0);
73 Initialize BB, DB, P1; ## Set eah entry of DB to ⊥, add Ω1 to BB, and set P1 = G
74 Distribute Pakets;
Reeiver's Additional Setup
DEFINITION OF ADDITIONAL VARIABLES FOR RECEIVER:
75 IR ∈ [D]× ({0, 1}
P ∪ ⊥) := Storage Buer to hold pakets orresponding to urrent odeword;
76 κ ∈ [0..D] := Number of pakets reeived orresponding to urrent odeword;
77 ΘT ∈ {0, 1}
O(k+logn)
:= End of Transmission broadast for transmission T;
INITIALIZATION OF RECEIVER'S VARIABLES:
78 κ = 0;
79 Θ1 = ⊥;
80 for every outgoing edge E(R,B) ∈ G:
81 bp, α = ⊥;
82 Initialize IR; ## Sets eah element of IR to ⊥
End Setup
Figure 10: Additional Setup Code for (Node-Controlling + Edge-Sheduling) Protool
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Transmission T
01 for every N ∈ G, N /∈ EN :
02 for every t < 2 ∗ (4D) ## The fator of 2 is for the 2 stages per round
03 if t (mod 2) = 0 then: ## STAGE 1
04 Update Broadast Buer One;
05 for every outgoing edge E(N,B) ∈ G,N 6= R,B 6= S
06 if HFP 6= ⊥: send (H,⊥,⊥); else: send (H − 1,HFP , FR);
07 receive Signed(T, t, HIN , RR, SIG[1], SIG[2], SIG[p]); ## SIG[3], 6
th
oord sent on line 11, is kept as SIG[2]
08 Verify Signature Two:
09 Reset Outgoing Variables;
10 for every inoming edge E(A,N) ∈ G,N 6= S,A 6= R## p on line 11 refers to last p. re'd on E(A,N)
11 send Sign(T, t,H,RR,SIG[1], SIG[3], SIG[p]); ## If p was from an old odeword, send instead:
## Sign(T, t,H, RR, SIG[1], SIG[3],⊥)
12 sbOUT = 0; FR = ⊥;
13 receive (H,⊥,⊥) or (H,HFP , FR); ## If H = ⊥ or FR>RR, set sbOUT=1; and
## HOUT=HFP ; O.W. set HOUT=H; sbOUT=0;
14 else if t (mod 2) = 1 then: ## STAGE 2
15 Send/Reeive Broadast Parels;
16 for every outgoing edge E(N,B) ∈ G,N 6= R,B 6= S
17 if HIN 6= ⊥ then:
18 Create Flagged Paket;
19 if sb=1 or (sb=0 and H > HIN ) then:
20 Send Paket;
21 for every inoming edge E(A,N) ∈ G,N 6= S,A 6= R
22 Reeive Paket;
23 if N /∈ {S,R} and N has re'd SOT broadast for T then: Re-Shue;
24 else if N = R and N has re'd SOT broadast for T then: Reeiver Re-Shue;
25 else if N = S then:
26 Sender Re-Shue;
27 if All (non-⊥) values S reeived on line 07 had HIN = 2n then: βT = βT + 1;
28 if t = 2(4D − n) and N = R then: Send End of Transmission Parel;
29 if t = 2(4D) and N = S then: Prepare Start of Transmission Broadast;
30 if t = 2(4D) then: End of Transmission Adjustments;
End Transmission T
31 Okay to Send Paket
32 if
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
N does not have (ΩT, T) in BB OR
N has (ΩT, T) with ΩT = (|EN |, |BT|, F, ∗), but has not yet re'd |EN | parels as in line 200b,
F parels as in line 200, or |BT| parels as in line 200d OR
N has re'd the omplete SOT broadast, but every parel hasn't yet passed aross E(N,B) OR
N or B ∈ BL OR
N has ΘT ∈ BB, but this has not passed aross E(N,B) yet OR
N has BL info. in BB (as on line 115, items 3 or 4) not yet passed aross E(N,B)
33 Return False;
34 else: Return True;
35 Okay to Reeive Paket
36 if
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
N does not have (ΩT, T) in BB OR
N has (ΩT, T) with ΩT = (|EN |, |BT|, F, ∗), but has not yet re'd |EN | parels as in line 200b,
F parels as in line 200, or |BT| parels as in line 200d OR
N has re'd the omplete SOT broadast, but every parel hasn't yet passed aross E(A,N) OR
N or A ∈ BL OR
N has ΘT ∈ BB, but this has not passed aross E(A,N) yet OR
N has BL info. in BB (as on line 115, items 3 or 4) not yet passed aross E(A,N) OR
37 Return False;
38 else: Return True;
Figure 11: Routing Rules for Transmission T, (Node-Controlling + Edge-Sheduling) Protool
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39 Reset Outgoing Variables
40 cbp = 0;
41 if d = 1: ## N sent a paket previous round
42 d = 0;
43 if RR = ⊥ or ⊥ 6= FR > RR ## Didn't reeive onf. of paket reeipt
44 sb = 1;
45 if RR 6= ⊥:
46 if ⊥ 6= FR ≤ RR: ## B re'd most reently sent paket
47 if N = S then: κ = κ+ 1;
48 For i = 1, 2, p: SIG[i] = value re'd on line 07;
49 SIG[3] = SIG[3] +HFP ; ## If N = S, skip this line
50 OUT[HFP ] = ⊥; Fill Gap; ## Remove p˜ from OUT, shifting down pakets on top
## of p˜ (if neessary) and adjusting SIGN,N aordingly
51 FR, p˜, HFP = ⊥; sb = 0; H = H − 1;
52 if ⊥ 6= RR < FR and ⊥ 6= HFP < H : ## B did not reeive most reently sent paket
53 Elevate Flagged Paket; ## Swap pakets in OUT[H] and OUT[HFP ]; Set HFP=H;
54 Create Flagged Paket
55 if sb = 0 and H > HIN : ## Normal Status, will send top paket
56 p˜ = OUT[H ]; HFP = H ; FR = t;
57 Send Paket
58 d = 1;
59 if Okay to Send Paket then: ## If p˜ is from an old odeword, send instead:
60 send Sign(T, t, p˜, FR, SIG[1]+1, SIG[3] +HFP , SIG[p˜]+1); ## Sign(T, t, p˜, FR, SIG[1], SIG[3] +HFP ,⊥)
61 Reeive Paket
62 receive Sign(T, t− 2, p, FR, SIG[1], SIG[2], SIG[p]); ## SIG[3], 6th oord. sent on line 60, is kept as SIG[2]
63 if HOUT = ⊥ or Okay to Reeive Paket is false: ##Didn't re. A's ht. info, or BB info prevents p. transfer
64 sb = 1;
65 if HGP > H or (HGP = ⊥ and H < 2n):
66 HGP = H + 1;
67 else if sbOUT = 1 or HOUT > H : ## A paket should've been sent
68 Verify Signature One;
69 if (Verify Signature One returns false or ## Signature from A was not valid, or
p = ⊥ or p not properly signed by S) then: ## Paket wasn't re'd. or wasn't signed by S
70 sb = 1;
71 if HGP > H or (HGP = ⊥ and H < 2n):
72 HGP = H + 1;
73 else if RR < FR: ## Paket was re'd and should keep it
74 For i = 1, 2, p: SIG[i] = value re'd on line 62;
75 SIG[3] = SIG[3] +HGP ; ## If N = R, skip this line
76 if HGP = ⊥: HGP = H + 1; ## If no slot is saved for p, put it on top
77 IN[HGP ] = p;
78 sb = 0; H = H + 1; HGP = ⊥; RR = t;
79 else: ## Paket was re'd, but already had it
80 sb = 0; Fill Gap; HGP = ⊥; ## See omment about Fill Gap on line 82 below
81 else: ## A paket should NOT have been sent
82 sb = 0; Fill Gap; HGP = ⊥; ## If pakets oupied slots above the Ghost
## Paket, then Fill Gap will Slide them down one slot,
## updating SIGN,N to reet this shift, if neessary
83 Verify Signature One
84 if Signature is Valid and Values are orret ## N veries the values A sent on line 60 are onsistent:
85 Return true; ## Change in SIG[1] and SIG[p] is `1', hange in SIG[2] is
86 else: ## at least HGP , (T, t) is orret and p. has sender's sig
87 Return false;
88 Verify Signature Two ## N veries the values B sent on line 11 are onsistent:
89 if Signature is NOT Valid or Values are NOT Corret:## Change in SIG[1] and SIG[p] is `1', hange in SIG[2]
90 RR,HIN = ⊥; ## is at most HFP , and T and t are orret
Figure 12: Routing Rules for Transmission T, (Node-Controlling + Edge-Sheduling) Proto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91 Send/Reeive Broadast Parels
92 for every outgoing edge E(N,B) ∈ G, inluding N = R,B = S
93 receive bp;
94 Update Broadast Buer Two;
95 for every inoming edge E(A,N) ∈ G, inluding N = S,A = R
96 Determine Broadast Parel to Send;
97 send bp;
98 Update Broadast Buer One
99 for every outgoing edge E(N,B) ∈ G, inluding N = R,B = S
100 if bp 6= ⊥ then:
101 send cbp;
102 Broadast Parel to Request;
103 send α;
104 for every inoming edge E(A,N) ∈ G, inluding N = S,A = R
105 receive cbp; receive α;
106 if α 6= ⊥ then: Update Broadast Buer; ## Update BB to preferentially send α
107 if cbp = 1 then: Update Broadast Buer; ## Update BB that bp rossed E(A,N)
108 cbp = 0;
109 Update Broadast Buer Two
110 if ⊥ 6= bp has valid sig. and

N has reeived full SOT broadast for T OR
bp is a valid SOT broadast parel re'd in orret order (see 115 and 200)
## Here, a valid signature means both from B and the from node bp originated from, and
## a valid SOT parel means that N has already reeived all SOT parels that
## should have arrived before bp, as indiated by the ordering of line 115, items 2a-2d
111 cbp = 1;
112 if N = S: Sender Update Broadast Buer;
113 else: Internal Node and Reeiver Update Broadast Buer;
114 Determine Broadast Parel to Send
115 Among all information in BB, hoose some bp ∈ BB that has not passed along E(A,N) by priority:
1) The reeiver's end of transmission parel ΘT
2) The sender's start of transmission (SOT) broadast, in the order indiated on line 200:
a) (ΩT, T) b) ( bN ∈ EN, T) ) (T′, F i, T) d) ( bN ∈ BL, T′, T)
3) ( bN, 0, T) = label of a node to remove from the blaklist, see line 165
4) (N, bN, T′) = label of a node bN on BL for whih N has the omplete status report for T′, see line 155
5) A status report parel requested by A as indiated by α (reeived on line 105)
6) An arbitrary status report parel of a node on N 's blaklist
116 Broadast Parel to Request
117 α = ⊥;
118 if B is on N 's blaklist and N is missing a status report from B:
119 Set α to indiate B's label and an index of the parel N is missing from B;
120 else if DB indiates that B has omplete status report for some node bN on BL (see lines 150-151, 155):
121 if N is missing a status report of node bN :
122 Set α to the label of the node bN and the index of a status report parel from bN that N is missing;
Figure 13: Routing Rules for Transmission T, (Node-Controlling + Edge-Sheduling) Proto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123 Internal Node and Reeiver Update Broadast Buer
## Below, a broadast parel bp is Added only if it is not already in BB. Also, view BB as being
## indexed by eah bp with n− 1 slots for eah parel to indiate whih edges bp has already traversed.
## Then when bp is removed from BB, the edge markings are removed as well.
124 if bp = ΘT is reeiver's end of transmission parel (for urrent transmission T, see line 179):
125 Add bp to BB and mark edge E(N,B) as having passed this info.;
126 else if bp = (ΩT, T) is the rst parel of the sender's start of transmission (SOT) broadast (see line 200a):
127 Add bp to BB, and mark edge E(N,B) as having passed this information;
128 if ΩT = (∗, 0, ∗, ∗) : Clear all entries of SIG, and set SIGN,N = 0;
129 else if bp= ( bN, T) is from the SOT broadast indiating a node to eliminate, as on line 200b:
130 Add bp to BB and mark edge E(N,B) as having passed this info.;
131 if
bN /∈ EN : ## N is just learning bN is to be eliminated
132 Add
bN to EN ;
133 Clear all inoming and outgoing buers, lear all entries of SIG, and set SIGN,N = 0;
134 Clear BB, EXCEPT for parels from urrent SOT broadast; Clear DB, EXCEPT for EN ;
135 else if bp= (T′, F i, T) is from the SOT broadast indiating why a previous trans. failed, as on line 200:
136 Add bp to BB and mark edge E(N,B) as having passed this information;
137 else if bp= ( bN, T′, T) is from the SOT broadast indiating a node to blaklist, as on line 200d:
138 Add
bN to BL; Add bp to BB and mark edge E(N,B) as having passed this information;
139 Remove outdated info. from BB and DB;
## This inludes for any trans. T′′ 6= T′ removing from DB all entries of form ( eB, bN, T′′), see line 115, item 4;
## and removing from BB: 1) (N, bN, T′′), see line 115 item 4, and 2) Any status report parel of bN for T′′
140 if
bN = N has not already added its own status report info. orresponding to T′ to BB:
## The following reasons for failure ome from SOT. See lines 190, 193, and 196-197
## The information added in eah ase will be referred to as the node's status report for transmission T
′
141 if entries of SIGN,N and SIG orrespond to a transmission T
′′ 6= T′: Clear SIG and set SIGN,N = 0;
142 if T
′
failed as in F2: For eah inoming and outgoing edge, sign and add to BB: (SIG[2], SIG[3], T′);
143 Also sign and add (SIGN,N , T
′) to BB (see line 12 of Figure 9);
144 else if T
′
failed as in F3: For eah inoming and outgoing edge, sign and add (SIG[1], T′) to BB;
145 else if T
′
failed as in F4: For eah inoming and outgoing edge, sign and add (SIG[p], T′) to BB;
146 if N has reeived |BLT| SOT parels of form ( bN, T′, T) : Clear all entries of SIG and set SIGN,N = 0;
147 else if bp= ( bN, 0, T) is from sender, indiating a node to remove from BL, as on line 165:
148 Remove
bN from BL; Add bp to BB and mark edge E(N,B) as having passed this information;
149 Remove outdated info. from BB and DB as on line 139 above;
150 else if bp= (B, bN, T′) indiates B has a blaklisted node bN 's omplete status report for trans. T′:
151 if ( bN, T′, T) is on N 's blaklist: Add fat that B has bN 's omplete status report to DB;
152 else if bp is a status report parel for trans. T′ of some node ( bN, T′, T) on BL, see lines 140-145 and 200d:
153 if bp has valid sig. from bN and onerns orret info.:
## N nds ( bN, T′, T) and (T′, F i, T) in BB (from SOT broadast) and heks that bp onerns orret info.
154 Add bp to BB, and mark edge E(N,B) as having passed this information;
155 if bp ompletes N 's knowledge of bN 's missing status report for transmission T′: Add (N, bN, T′) to BB;
156 Sender Update Broadast Buer ## Below, a parel bp is Added only if it is not in DB
157 if bp = ΘT is reeiver's end of transmission parel (for urrent transmission T):
158 Add bp to DB;
159 else if bp indiates B has a blaklisted node bN 's omplete status report for trans. T′:
160 if ( bN, T′, T) is on S's blaklist: Add (B, bN, T′) to DB;
161 else if bp is a status report parel of some node bN on the sender's blaklist (see lines 140-145):
162 Add bp to DB;
163 if bp ontains faulty info. but has a valid sig. from bN : Eliminate bN ;
## S heks DB for reason of failure and makes sure bN has returned an appropriate value
164 if bp ompletes the sender's knowledge of bN 's missing status report from transmission T′:
165 Sign ( bN, 0, T) and add to BB; ## Indiates that bN should be removed from blaklist
166 Remove outdated info. from DB; Remove ( bN, T′) from BL;
## Outdated refers to parels as on 159-160 whose seond entry is
bN
167 if bp ompletes sender's knowledge of all relevant status reports from some transmission:
168 Eliminate
bN ; ## S an eliminate a node. See pf. of Thm 8.1 for details
Figure 14: Routing Rules for Transmission T, (Node-Controlling + Edge-S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169 Eliminate
bN
170 Add ( bN, T) to EN ;
171 Clear BB, DB (exept for EN), and signature buers;
172 βT, F = 0;
173 PT+1 = P \ EN ;
174 ΩT+1 = (|EN |, 0, 0, 0);
175 Sign and Add ΩT+1 to BB;
176 for every N ∈ EN , Sign and Add (N, T+ 1) to BB;
177 Halt until End of Transmission Adjustments is alled;## S does not begin inserting p's until next trans.,
## and S ignores all instrutions for T until line 30
178 Send End of Transmission Parel
179 Add signed ΘT = (b, p
′, T) to BB ## b is a bit indiating if R ould deode, p′ is
## the label of a paket R re'd twie, or else ⊥
180 Prepare Start of Transmission Broadast
181 ## Let ΘT = (b, p′, T) denote Sender's value obtained from Reeiver's transmission above (as stored in DB)
182 if b = 1 then: ## R was able to deode
183 Clear eah entry of signature buers holding data orresponding to T;
184 ΩT+1 = (|EN |, |BL|, F, 0);
185 else if b = 0 then: ## R was not able to deode: a failed transmission
186 F = F + 1;
187 Set PT = P \ (EN ∪BL) and add (PT, T) to DB;
188 For eah N ∈ PT \ S: Add (N, T) to BL; ## (N, T) reords the trans. N was added to BL
189 Clear outgoing buers;
190 if p′ 6= ⊥: ## R re'd a dupliate paket
191 Add (p′, T) to DB; Add SIG[p′] to DB; ## Reord that reason T failed was F4
192 ΩT+1 = (|EN |, |BL|, F, p
′);
193 else if κ < D: ## S did not insert at least D pakets
194 Add (1, T) to DB; Add SIG[2] and SIG[3] to DB; ## Reord that reason T failed was F2
195 ΩT+1 = (|EN |, |BL|, F, 1);
196 else:
197 Add (2, T) to DB; Add SIG[1] to DB; ## Reord that reason T failed was F3
198 ΩT+1 = (|EN |, |BL|, F, 2);
199 Clear BB and SIG[i] for eah i = 1, 2, p; Remove ΘT from DB;
200 Sign and Add to BB: ## The Start of Transmission (SOT) broadast
a) (ΩT+1, T+1)
b) For eah N ∈ EN , add the parel (N, T+1)
) For eah failed transmission T
′
sine the last node was eliminated, add the parel (T′, F i, T+1)
## Here, F i is the reason trans. T′ failed (F2, F3, or F4). See pf. of Thm. 8.1 for details
d) For eah N ∈ BL, add the parel (N, T′, T+1), where T′ indiates the trans. N was last added to BL
201 βT = 0;
202 End of Transmission Adjustments
203 if N 6= S : Clear ΘT, BL, all parels from SOT broadast, and info. of form ( bN, 0, T) from BB;
204 for every outgoing edge E(N,B), B ∈ G,N 6= R,B 6= S:
205 if HFP 6= ⊥:
206 OUT [HFP ] = ⊥; Fill Gap; ## Remove any agged paket p˜ from OUT, shifting
## down pakets on top of p˜ if neessary
207 sb = 0; FR,HFP , p˜ = ⊥; H = H − 1;
208 for every inoming edge E(A,N), A ∈ G, A 6= R:
209 HGP = ⊥; sb = 0; RR = −1; Fill Gap;
210 if N = S then: Distribute Pakets;
211 if N = R then: κ = 0; Clear IR; ## Set eah entry of IR to ⊥
212 Distribute Pakets
213 κ = 0;HOUT = 2n; ## Set height of eah outgoing buer to 2n
214 Fill eah outgoing buer with odeword pakets;
## If T was suessful, make new odeword p's, and ll out. buers and COPY with these.
## If T failed or a node was just eliminated, use odeword pakets in COPY to ll out. buers.
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10 Node-Controlling + Edge-Sheduling Protool:
Proofs of Theorems
We restate and prove our two main theorems for the node-ontrolling adversary Routing Proto-
ol:
Theorem 8.2. The memory required of eah node is at most O(n4(k + log n)).
Proof. By looking at the domains of the variables in Figures 9 and 10, it is lear that the Broadast
Buer and Signature Buer maintained by all nodes, and the Data Buer of the sender and Storage
Buer of the reeiver require the most memory. Eah of these require O(n3(k + log n)) bits of
memory, but eah node must maintain O(n) signature buers, whih yields the memory bound of
O(n4(k+log n)). It remains to show that the domains desribed are aurate, i.e. that the protool
never alls for the nodes to store in more (or dierent) information than their domains allow. The
proof of this fat walks through the pseudo-ode and analyses every time information is added or
deleted from eah buer, and it an be found in Setion 11 (see Lemma 11.2). 
Theorem 8.1. Exept for the at most n2 transmissions that may fail due to maliious ativity, the
routing protool presented desribed in Setions 8 and 9 enjoys linear throughput. More preisely,
after x transmissions, the reeiver has orretly outputted at least x − n2 messages. If the number
of transmissions x is quadrati in n or greater, than the failed transmissions due to adversarial
behavior beome asymptotially negligible. Sine a transmission lasts O(n3) rounds and messages
ontain O(n3) bits, information is transferred through the network at a linear rate.
Theorem 8.1 will follow immediately from the following three theorems. As with the proofs for
the edge-sheduling protool, line numbers for the pseudo-ode have form (X.YY), where X refers
to the Figure number, and YY refers to the line number. It will be onvenient to introdue new
terminology:
Denition 10.1. We will say a node N ∈ G partiipated in transmission T if there was at least one
round in the transmission for whih N was not on the (sender's) blaklist. The sender's variable
that keeps trak of nodes partiipating in transmission T (10.69) will be alled the partiipating list
for transmission T, denoted by PT (it is updated at the end of every transmission on 15.187).
Theorem 10.2. Every transmission (regardless of its suess/failure) lasts O(n3) rounds.
Proof. Line (11.02) shows that eah transmission, regardless of suess or failure, lasts 4D = O(n3)
rounds. 
Theorem 10.3. Suppose transmission T failed and at some later time (after transmission T but
before any additional nodes have been eliminated) the sender has reeived all of the status report
parels from all nodes on PT. Then the sender an eliminate a orrupt node.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is rather involved, as it needs to address the three possible reasons
(F2-F4) that a transmission an fail. It an be found in Setion 10.1 below. 
Theorem 10.4. After a orrupt node has been eliminated (or at the outset of the protool) and before
the next orrupt node is eliminated, there an be at most n − 1 failed transmissions {T1, . . . , Tn−1}
before there is neessarily some index 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 suh that the sender has the omplete status
report from every node on PTi .
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Proof. The theorem will follow from a simple observation:
Observation. If N ∈ PT, then the sender is not missing any status report parel for N for
any transmission prior to transmission T. In other words, there is no transmission T
′ < T suh
that N was blaklisted at the end of T′ (as on 15.188) and the sender is still missing status
report information from N at the end of T.
Proof. Nodes are added to the blaklist whenever they were partiipating in a transmission
that failed (15.187-88). Nodes are removed from the blaklist whenever the sender reeives
all of the status report information he requested of them (14.164-166), or when he has just
eliminated a node (15.171), in whih ase the sender no longer needs status reports from
nodes for old failed transmissions
27
(and in partiular, this ase falls outside the hypotheses
of the Theorem). Sine PT is dened as non-blaklisted nodes (15.187), the fat that N ∈ PT
implies that N was not on the sender's blaklist at the end of T. Also, notie the next line
guarantees that all nodes not already on the sender's blaklist will be put on the blaklist
if the transmission fails. Therefore, if N has not been blaklisted sine the last node was
eliminated (15.169-177), then there have not been any failed transmissions, and hene the
sender is not missing any status reports. Otherwise, let T
′ < T denote the last time N was
put on the blaklist, as on (15.188). In order for N to be put on PT on line (15.187) of
transmission T, it must have been removed from the blaklist at some point between T
′
and
the end of T. In this ase, the remarks at the start of the proof of this observation indiate
the sender is not missing any status reports from N . 
Suppose now for the sake of ontradition that we have reahed the end of transmission Tn−1, whih
marks the (n−1)st transmission {T1, . . . , Tn−1} suh that for eah of these n−1 failed transmissions,
the sender does not have the omplete status report from at least one of the nodes that partiipated
in the transmission. Dene the set S to be the set of nodes that were neessarily not on PTn−1 , and
initialize this set to be empty.
Sine the sender is missing some node's omplete status report that partiipated in T1, there is
some node N1 ∈ PT1 from whih the sender is still missing a status report parel orresponding to
T1 by the end of transmission Tn−1. Notie by the observation above that N1 will not be on PT′ for
any T2 ≤ T
′ ≤ Tn−1, so put N1 into the set S. Now looking at T2, there must be some node N2 ∈ PT2
from whih the sender is still missing a status report parel from T2 by the end of transmission Tn−1.
Notie that N2 6= N1 sine N1 /∈ PT2 , and also that N2 /∈ PTn−1 (both fats follow from the above
observation), so put N2 into S. Continue in this manner, until we have found the (n− 2)
th
distint
node that was put into S due to information the sender was still missing by the end of Tn−2. But
then |S| = n − 2, whih implies that all nodes, exept for the sender and the reeiver, are not on
PTn−1 (the sender and reeiver partiipate in every transmission by Lemma 11.21). But now we
have a ontradition, sine Lemma 11.22 says that transmission Tn−1 will not fail. 
We are now ready to prove Theorem 8.1, reserving the proof of Theorem 10.3 to the next setion.
27
The sender already reeived enough information to eliminate a node. Even though it is possible that other nodes
ated maliiously and aused one of the failed transmissions, it is also possible that the node just eliminated aused
all of the failed transmissions. Therefore, the protool does not spend further resoures attempting to detet another
orrupt node, but rather starts anew with a redued network (the eliminated node no longer legally partiipates),
and will address future failed transmissions as they arise.
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Proof of Theorem 8.1. By Theorem 10.2, every transmission lasts at most O(n3) rounds, so it re-
mains to show that there are at most n2 failed transmissions. By Theorem 10.4, by the end of at
most n− 1 failed transmissions, there will be at least one failed transmission T suh that the sender
will have all status report parels from every node on PT. Then by Theorem 10.3, the sender an
eliminate a orrupt node. At this point, lines (15.169-177) essentially all for the protool to start
over, wiping lear all buers exept for the eliminated nodes buer, whih will now ontain the
identity of a newly eliminated node. The transmission of the latest odeword not yet transmitted
then resumes (see omments on (15.214)), and the argument an be applied to the new network,
onsisting of n − 1 nodes. Sine the node-ontrolling adversary an orrupt at most n − 2 nodes
(the sender and reeiver are inorruptible by the onforming assumption), this an happen at most
n− 2 times, yielding the bound of n2 for the maximum number of failed transmissions. 
10.1 Main Tehnial Proof of the Node-Controlling + Edge-Sheduling Protool
In this setion, we aim to prove Lemma 10.3 whih states that the sender will be able to eliminate
a orrupt node if he has the omplete status reports from every node that partiipated in some failed
transmission T. We begin by formally dening the three reasons a transmission may fail, and prove
that every failed transmission falls under one of these three ases.
Theorem 10.5. At the end of any transmission T, (at least) one of the following neessarily happens:
S1. The reeiver has reeived at least D−6n3 distint pakets orresponding to the urrent odeword
F2. S1 does not happen, and the sender has knowingly
28
inserted less than D pakets
F3. S1 does not happen, the sender has knowingly
28
inserted at least D pakets, and the reeiver
has not reeived any dupliated pakets orresponding to the urrent odeword
F4. S1, F2, and F3 all do not happen
Proof. That the four ases over all possibilities (and are disjoint) is immediate. Also, in the ase
of S1, the reeiver an neessarily deode by Lemma 11.20, and hene that ase orresponds to a
suessful transmission. Therefore, all failed transmissions must fall under one of the other three
ases. 
Note that ase F2 roughly orresponds to paket dupliation, sine the sender is bloked from
inserting pakets in at least 4D −D rounds, indiating jamming that annot be aounted for by
edge failures alone. Case F3 roughly orresponds to paket deletion, sine the D pakets the sender
inserted do not reah the reeiver (otherwise the reeiver ould have deoded as by Lemma 11.20),
and ase F4 orresponds to a mixed adversarial strategy of paket deletions and dupliations. We
treat eah ase separately in Theorems 10.6, 10.11 and 10.12 below, thus proving Theorem 10.3:
Proof of Theorem 10.3. Theorem 10.5 guarantees that eah failed transmission falls under F2, F3,
or F4, and the theorem is proven for eah ase below in Theorems 10.6, 10.11 and 10.12. 
We delare one-and-for-all that at any time, G will refer to nodes still a part of the network,
i.e. nodes that have not been eliminated by the sender.
28
Reall that by the denition of inserted (see 6.6), the sender may not have reeived onrmation (as in Denition
7.6) that a paket he outputted along some edge was reeived by the adjaent node. Case F3 requires that the sender
has reeived onrmation for at least D pakets.
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Handling Failures as in F2: Paket Dupliation
The goal of this setion will be to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 10.6. Suppose transmission T failed and falls under ase F2, and at some later time
(after transmission T but before any additional nodes have been eliminated) the sender has reeived
all of the status report parels from all nodes on PT. Then the sender an eliminate a orrupt node.
The idea of the proof is as follows. Case F2 of transmission failure roughly orresponds to
paket dupliation: there is a node N ∈ G who is jamming the network by outputting dupliate
pakets. Notie that in terms of network potential (see Denition 6.10), the fat that N is outputting
more pakets than he is inputting means that N will be responsible for illegal inreases in network
potential. Using the status reports for ase F2, whih inlude nodes' signatures on hanges of
network potential due to paket transfers and re-shuing, we will ath N by looking for a node
who aused a greater inrease in potential than is possible if it had been ating honestly. The formal
proof of this fat will require some work. We begin with the following denitions:
Denition 10.7. The onforming assumption on the node-ontrolling and edge-sheduling adver-
saries demand that for every round there is a path onneting the sender and reeiver onsisting of
edges that are up and through unorrupted nodes. We will refer to this path as the ative honest
path for round t and denote it by Pt, noting that the path may not be the same for all rounds.
Denition 10.8. We will say that some round t (of transmission T) is wasted if there is an edge
E(A,B) on that round's ative honest path suh that either Okay To Send Paket (11.31) or
Okay To Reeive Paket (11.35) returned false.
Intuitively, a round is wasted if an edge on the ative honest path was prevented from passing
a paket either beause one of the nodes was blaklisted or beause there was important broadast
information that had to be ommuniated before pakets ould be transferred.
Lemma 10.9. There are at most 4n3 wasted rounds in any transmission T.
Proof. We will prove this lemma via two laims.
Claim 1. Every wasted round t falls under (at least) one of the following ases:
1. An edge on Pt transfers ΘT or a parel of the sender's Start of Transmission (SOT)
broadast
2. An edge on Pt transfers the label of a node to remove from the blaklist
3. An edge on Pt transfers the information that one of the terminal nodes (on that edge)
has the omplete status report for a blaklisted node
4. A node on Pt learns a status report parel for a blaklisted node. More speially,
there is some node (N̂ , T′, T) that was part of the SOT broadast (i.e. the node began
the transmission on the sender's blaklist) and some other honest node N ∈ G suh that
N learns a new status report parel from N̂ orresponding to transmission T′.
Proof. Let t be a wasted round. Denote the ative honest path for round t by Pt =
N0N1 . . . Nl. By looking at Okay To Send Paket and Okay To Reeive Paket (11.31
and 11.35), we rst argue that that ases 1-3 over all possible reasons for a wasted round,
exept the possibility that one node is on the other's blaklist. To see this, we go through eah
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line of Okay To Send Paket and Okay To Reeive Paket and onsider what happens
along a speied edge on Pt, noting that by assumption this edge is ative and the neighboring
nodes are honest, so the appropriate broadast parel will be suessfully transferred (11.15).
In partiular, it will be enough to show that for every reason a round may be wasted, there
is a node on Pt that has broadast information of type 1-4 (see line (13.115)) that it has yet
to transfer aross an adjaent edge on Pt, as then we will fall under ases 1-3 of the Claim.
 If there is a node Ni on Pt that does not know all parels of the SOT broadast (15.200),
then nd the last index 0 ≤ j < i suh that Nj knows all of SOT but Nj+1 does not (j
is guaranteed to exist sine S = N0 knows all of SOT and Ni does not). Then Nj has
broadast information of type 2 (13.115) it has not yet sent along its edge to Nj+1.
 If there is a node Ni on Pt that knows ΘT or all of SOT but has not yet transferred one
of these parels aross an edge of Pt, or Ni knows the omplete status report for some
blaklisted node N̂ and Ni has not yet passed this fat along an edge on Pt, then Ni has
broadast information of type 1, 2, or 4 (13.115).
 If there is a node Ni on Pt that knows of a node N̂ that should be removed from the
blaklist, but it has yet to transfer this information aross an edge of Pt, then Ni has
broadast information of type 3 (13.115).
It remains to onsider the nal reason one of these two funtions may return false, namely
when there is some Ni on Pt that is on the blaklist of either Ni−1 or Ni+1. Let BLS denote
the sender's blaklist at the start of round t.
 If Ni /∈ BLS, then there will be some index 0 ≤ j < i+1 suh that at the start of round
t, Ni is not on Nj 's blaklist but Ni is on Nj+1's blaklist. We may assume that both
Nj and Nj+1 have reeived the full start of transmission broadast, else we would be
in one of the above overed ases. Sine Ni is on Nj+1's blaklist, Ni must have begun
the transmission on the sender's blaklist (all internal nodes' blaklists are leared at the
end of eah transmission (15.203) and restored when they reeive the SOT broadast
(15.200), (14.137-138)). However, sine Ni is not on Nj 's blaklist as of round t and Nj
has reeived the full SOT broadast, at some point in T, Nj must have reeived a parel
from the sender indiating Ni should be removed from the blaklist, as on (14.147-149).
Sine Nj and Nj+1 are both honest and Nj has reeived the information that Ni should
be removed from the blaklist (but Nj+1 has not reeived this information yet), it must be
that this broadast information of type 3 (13.115) has not yet been suessfully passed
along E(Nj , Nj+1) yet. In partiular, Nj has broadast information of priority at least
3 that he has yet to suessfully send to Nj+1, so he will send a parel of priority 1, 2,
or 3 in round t, whih are in turn overed by Statements 1 and 2 of the Lemma.
 If Ni ∈ BLS, then there exist some 0 ≤ j < i suh that Nj does not have Ni's omplete
status report, but Nj+1 does (sine Ni ∈ BLS implies S does not have the omplete
status report, but Ni has its own omplete status report in its broadast buer, see
Statement 2 of Lemma 11.16). Then if Nj+1 has not yet passed the fat that it has suh
knowledge along E(Nj+1, Nj), then Nj+1 had broadast information of type 4, in whih
ase we fall under ase 3 of the Claim. On the other hand, if this information has already
been passed along E(Nj+1, Nj), then Statement 4 of Lemma 11.16 implies that Nj is
aware that Nj+1 knows the omplete status report of Ni (who by hoie of j is on Nj 's
blaklist), and hene α will neessarily be set as on (13.119 or 13.122) and sent to Nj on
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(13.103)). Consequently, Nj+1 will reeive α (13.105) during Stage 1 ommuniation
of round t, and will have broadast information of type 5 (13.115) it has not sent along
E(Nj , Nj+1) yet. This broadast parel an then be sent in Stage 2 ommuniation of
round t (11.15), and this is overed by ase 4 of the Claim. 
Claim 2. The maximum number of wasted rounds due to Case 1 of Claim 1 is n3, the
maximum number of wasted rounds due to Case 2 of Claim 1 is n3/2, the maximum number
of wasted rounds due to Case 3 of Claim 1 is n3, and the maximum number of wasted rounds
due to Case 4 of Claim 1 is n3.
Proof.
1. ΘT is one parel (15.179), and the SOT is at most 2n− 1 parels (15.200), so together
they are at most 2n parels. Sine eah honest node will only broadast eah of these
parels at most one aross any edge (as long as the broadast is suessful, whih it will
be if the round is wasted due to Case 1) and there are at most n2/2 suh edges, we have
that Case 1 an happen at most n3 times.
2. Lemma 11.23 says that no honest node N will aept more than one distint parel
(per transmission) that indiates some node N̂ should be removed from the blaklist.
Therefore, in terms of broadasting this information, N will have at most one broadast
parel per transmission per node N̂ indiating N̂ should be removed from the blaklist.
Therefore, it an happen at most n times that an edge adjaent to an honest node will
need to broadast a parel indiating a node to remove. Again sine the number of edges
is bounded by n2/2, Case 2 an be responsible for a wasted round at most n3/2 times.
3. Lemma 11.24 says that for any node N ∈ G that has reeived the full SOT broadast for
transmission T, if N is honest then it will transmit along eah edge at most one (per
transmission) the fat that it knows some N̂ 's omplete status report. Sine eah node
has at most n − 1 adjaent edges and there are at most n nodes in G, Case 3 an be
responsible for a wasted round at most n3 times.
4. Notie that Case 4 emphasizes the fat that a node on Pt learned a blaklisted node's
status report parel. Sine there are at most n − 1 blaklisted nodes at any time (see
(15.187-188) and Claim 11.6), and at most n status report parels per blaklisted node
(see (14.142-45) and Lemma 11.7), an honest node an learn a new status report parel
at most n(n − 1) < n2 times per transmission (see Statement 3 of Lemma 11.16 whih
says honest nodes will not ever unlearn relevant status report parels). Sine there are
at most n nodes, Case 4 an be responsible for a wasted round at most n3 times. 
Claim 1 guarantees every wasted round falls under Case 1-4, and Claim 2 says these an happen at
most 4n3 rounds, whih proves the lemma. 
We now dene the notation we will use to desribe the spei information the status reports
ontain in the ase of F2 (see (9.12), (9.17), (9.32), and (14.142-145))
29
:
- SIGA,A denotes the net derease in A's potential due to re-shuing pakets in the urrent
transmission.
29
On a tehnial point, sine our protool alls for internal nodes to keep old odeword pakets in their buers from
one transmission to the next, pakets being transferred during some transmission may orrespond to old odewords.
We emphasize that the quantities in SIGA,A, SIG[2], and SIG[3] inlude old odeword pakets, while SIG[1] and
SIG[p] do not ount old odeword pakets (see 11.11 and 12.59-60).
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- SIGA[2]A,B denotes the net inrease in B's potential due to paket transfers aross direted
edge E(A,B), as signed by B and stored in A's signature buer ((12.75), (11.11), and
(11.07)).
- SIGA[2]B,A denotes the net derease in B's potential due to paket transfers aross direted
edge E(B,A), as signed by B and stored in A's signature buer. Notie that SIGA[2]B,A is
measured as a positive quantity, see lines (12.60), (12.62), and (12.74).
- SIGA[3]A,B denotes the net derease in A's potential due to paket transfers aross di-
reted edge E(A,B), whih is signed by A and stored its own signature buer. Notie that
SIGA[3]A,B is measured as a positive quantity, see line (12.49).
- SIGA[3]B,A denotes the net inrease in A's potential due to paket transfers aross direted
edge E(B,A), whih is signed by A and stored its own signature buer (12.75).
Lemma 10.10. Suppose transmission T failed and falls under ase F2, and at some later time (after
transmission T but before any additional nodes have been eliminated) the sender has reeived all of
the status reports from every node on PT. Then one of the following two things happens:
1. There is some node A ∈ G whose status report indiates that A is orrupt30.
2. There is some A ∈ G whose potential at the start of T plus the net inrease in potential during
T is smaller than its net derease in potential during T. More speially, note that A's net
inrease in potential, as laimed by itself, is given by:
∑
B∈P\A
SIGA[3]B,A
Also, A's net derease in potential, as doumented by all of its neighbors and its own loss
due to re-shuing, is given by:
SIGA,A +
∑
B∈P\A
SIGB [2]A,B
Then ase 2) says there exists some A ∈ G suh that:
4n3 − 4n2 +
∑
B∈P\A
SIGA[3]B,A < SIGA,A +
∑
B∈P\A
SIGB [2]A,B , (16)
where the 4n3 − 4n2 term on the LHS is an upper bound for the maximum potential a node
should have at the outset of a transmission (see proof of Claim 6.2).
Proof. The idea of the proof is to use Lemma 11.12, whih argues that in the absene of maliious
ativity, the network potential should drop by at least n every (non-wasted) round in whih the
sender is unable to insert a paket. Then sine the sender ould not insert a paket in at least 3D
30
This inludes, but is not limited to: 1) The node has returned a (value, signature) pair, where the value is
not in an appropriate domain; 2) The node has returned non-zero values indiating interation with blaklisted or
eliminated nodes; 3)The node has reported values for SIGA[3]S,A that are inonsistent with the sender's quantity
SIGS[2]S,A; or 4) The node has returned outdated information in their status report. By outdated information, we
mean that as part of its status report, A returned a (value, signature) pair using a signature he reeived in round t
from one of A's neighbors N , but in N 's status report, N provided a (value, signature) pair from A indiating they
ommuniated after round t and that A was neessarily using an outdated signature from N .
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rounds (ase F2 states the sender inserted fewer thanD pakets in the 4D rounds of the transmission)
and sine there are at most 4n3 wasted rounds per transmission, the network potential should have
dropped by at least (n)(3D− 4n3) > 2nD+8n4 (sine D = 6n
3
λ
> 12n3 as λ < 1/2). However, this
is impossible, sine the maximum network potential in the network at the start of the transmission
(whih is upper bounded from the apaity of the network) is 4n4 (Lemma 6.2) plus the maximum
amount of network potential inrease during transmission T is 2nD (sine the sender inserted fewer
than D pakets at maximum height 2n), and hene the sum of these is less than 2nD+8n4, resulting
in a negative network potential. Sine network potential an never be negative, there must be illegal
inreases to network potential not aounted for above, and the node responsible for these inreases
is neessarily orrupt. We now formalize this argument, showing how to nd suh an oending node
and prove it is orrupt.
Let β denote the number of rounds in transmission T that the sender was bloked from inserting
any pakets, and P denote the partiipating list for T.
Obs. 1: If there exists A ∈ P suh that one of the following inequalities is not true, then A is
orrupt.
0 ≤ SIGA,A 0 ≤
∑
B∈P\{A,S}
(SIGA[2]B,A − SIG
A[3]B,A)
Proof. The above inequalities state that for honest nodes, the potential hanges due to re-
shuing and paket transfers are stritly non-positive (this was the ontent of Lemma 6.11).
This observation is proved rigorously as Statements 4 and 5 of Lemma 11.9 in Setion 11. 
Obs. 2: The inrease in network potential due to paket insertions is at most 2nD + 2n2. More
preisely, either there exists a node A ∈ G suh that the sender an eliminate A, or the following
inequality is true: ∑
A∈P\S
SIGA[3]S,A < 2nD + 2n
2
(17)
Proof. By hypothesis, the sender knowingly inserted less than D pakets in transmission T,
and eah paket an inrease network potential by at most 2n. The sum on the LHS of
(17) represents the inrease in potential laimed by nodes partiipating in T aused by paket
insertions. This quantity should math the sender's perspetive of the potential inrease
(whih is at most 2nD), with the exeption of potential inreases aused by pakets that
were inserted but S did not reeived onrmation of reeipt (see Denition 7.6). There an
be at most one suh paket per edge, ausing an additional potential inrease of at most 2n
per edge. Adding this additional potential inrease to the maximum inrease of 2nD of the
sender's perspetive is the RHS of (17). The formal proof an be found in Lemma 11.15 in
Setion 11. 
Obs. 3: β ≥ 3D − n. (Reall that β denotes the number of bloked rounds in T.)
Proof. Sine the sender knowingly inserted fewer than D pakets, there ould be at most n
pakets (one paket per edge) that was inserted unbeknownst to S, and hene the sender must
have been bloked for (at least) all but D + n of the rounds of the transmission. Sine the
number of rounds in a transmission is 4D (11.02), we have that β ≥ 3D − n. 
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Let HT ⊆ PT denote the subset of partiipating nodes that are honest (the sender is of ourse
oblivious as to whih nodes are honest, but we will nevertheless make use of HT in the following
argument). For notational onveniene, sine transmission T is xed, we suppress the subsript and
write simply H and P. We make the following simple observations:
Obs. 4: The following inequality is true:
2nD + 4n4 − 4n3 + 2n2 <
∑
A∈H\S
SIGA,A +
∑ ∑
A∈H\S B∈P\{A,S}
(SIGA[2]B,A − SIG
A[3]B,A) (18)
Proof. This follows immediately from Observation 3 and Lemma 11.12, sine:
n(βT − 4n
3) ≥ n(3D − n− 4n3)
≥ 2nD + 4n4 − 4n3 + 2n2,
where the rst inequality is Observation 3, and the seond follows beause D = 6n3/λ ≥
8n3 ≥ 8n3 − 4n2 + 3n. 
Obs. 5: Either a orrupt node an be identied as in Obs. 1 or 2, or there is some A ∈ P suh
that:
4n3 − 4n2 < SIGA,A +
∑
B∈P\A
SIGB [2]A,B − SIG
A[3]B,A (19)
Proof. Consider the following inequalities:
2nD + 4n4 − 4n3 + 2n2 <
∑
A∈H\S
SIGA,A +
∑ ∑
A∈H\S B∈P\{A,S}
(SIGA[2]B,A − SIG
A[3]B,A)
≤
∑
A∈P\S
SIGA,A +
∑ ∑
A∈P\S B∈P\{A,S}
(SIGA[2]B,A − SIG
A[3]B,A)
=
∑
A∈P\S
SIGA,A +
∑ ∑
A∈P\S B∈P\{A,S}
(SIGB [2]A,B − SIG
A[3]B,A) (20)
Above, the top inequality follows from Obs. 4, the seond inequality follows from Obs. 1, and
the third line is a re-arranging and re-labelling of terms. Subtrating 2nD + 2n2 from both
sides:
4n4 − 4n3 <
∑
A∈P\S
SIGA,A +
∑ ∑
A∈P\S B∈P\{A,S}
(SIGB [2]A,B − SIG
A[3]B,A) − 2nD − 2n
2
<
∑
A∈P\S
SIGA,A +
∑ ∑
A∈P\S B∈P\{A,S}
(SIGB [2]A,B − SIG
A[3]B,A) +
∑
A∈P\S
−SIGA[3]S,A
=
∑
A∈P\S
SIGA,A +
∑ ∑
A∈P\S B∈P\{A,S}
(SIGB [2]A,B − SIG
A[3]B,A) +
∑
A∈P\S
(SIGS [2]A,S − SIG
A[3]S,A)
=
∑
A∈P\S
SIGA,A +
∑
A∈P\S
∑
B∈P\A
(SIGB [2]A,B − SIG
A[3]B,A) (21)
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Above, the top inequality is from (20), the seond follows from Obs. 2, the third line is beause
SIGS [2]A,S = 0 for all A ∈ G (S never reeives a paket from anyone, see (11.21-22)), and
the nal line omes from ombining sums. Using an averaging argument, this implies there is
some A ∈ P \ S suh that:
4n3 − 4n2 < SIGA,A +
∑
B∈P\A
(SIGB [2]A,B − SIG
A[3]B,A), (22)
whih is (19). 
Therefore, if a node annot be eliminated as in Obs. 1 or 2 (whih are overed by Case 1 of Lemma
10.10), then Obs. 5 implies that Case 2 of Lemma 10.10 is true. 
Proof of Theorem 10.6. This Theorem now follows immediately from Lemma 10.10 and the fat
that a node A ∈ G for whih (16) is true is neessarily orrupt. Intuitively, suh a node A ∈ G
is orrupt sine the potential derease at A is higher than an be aounted for by A's potential
at the outset of T plus the potential inrease due to paket insertions from the sender. The formal
statement and proof of this fat is the ontent of Corollary 11.14. 
Handling Failures as in F3: Paket Deletion
The goal of this setion will be to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 10.11. Suppose transmission T failed and falls under ase F3, and at some later time
(after transmission T but before any additional nodes have been eliminated) the sender has reeived
all of the status report parels from all nodes on PT. Then the sender an eliminate a orrupt node.
The idea of the proof is as follows. Case F3 of transmission failure roughly orresponds to paket
deletion: there is a node N ∈ G who is deleting some pakets transferred to it instead of forwarding
them on. Using the status reports for ase F3, whih inlude nodes' signatures on the net number
of pakets that have passed aross eah of their edges, we will ath N by looking for a node who
input more pakets than it output, and this dierene is greater than the buer apaity of the
node.
Proof. We rst dene the notation we will use to desribe the spei information the status reports
ontain in the ase of F3 ((9.17), (9.32), and (14.144)):
- SIGA[1]A,B denotes the net number of pakets that have travelled aross direted edge
E(A,B), as signed by B and stored in A's (outgoing) signature buer.
- SIGA[1]B,A denotes the net number of pakets that have travelled aross direted edge
E(B,A), as signed by B and stored in A's (inoming) signature buer.
By the third Statement of Lemma 11.13, either a orrupt node an be eliminated, or the following
is true for all A,B ∈ G:
|SIGA[1]B,A − SIG
B [1]B,A| ≤ 1 and |SIG
A[1]A,B − SIG
B [1]A,B | ≤ 1
Then summing over all A,B ∈ P:∑
A,B∈P,A 6=B
|SIGA[1]B,A − SIG
B [1]B,A| ≤ n
2
(23)
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This in turn implies that:
−n2 ≤
∑
A,B∈P,A 6=B
(SIGA[1]B,A − SIG
B [1]B,A)
=
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈P\A
(SIGA[1]B,A − SIG
A[1]A,B)
=
∑
B∈P\R
SIGR[1]B,R −
∑
B∈P\S
SIGS [1]S,B +
∑
A∈P\{R,S}B∈P\A
∑(
SIGA[1]B,A − SIG
A[1]A,B
)
≤ −6n3 +
∑
A∈P\{R,S}B∈P\A
∑
(SIGA[1]B,A − SIG
A[1]A,B)
The rst inequality is from (23), the seond line is from re-labelling and re-arranging terms, the
third line omes from separating out the terms A = S and A = R and noting that SIGR[1]R,B =
SIGS [1]B,S = 0 (sine the reeiver will never output pakets to other nodes and the sender will
never input pakets, see (11.16-20) and (11.21-22)), and the nal inequality is due to the fat
that we are in ase F3, so the sender knowingly inserted D pakets, but the reeiver reeived fewer
than D − 6n3 pakets orresponding to the urrent odeword31. Using an averaging argument, we
an nd some A ∈ G suh that:
4n2 − 8n < 6n2 − n <
∑
B∈P\A
(SIGA[1]B,A − SIG
A[1]A,B), (24)
where the rst inequality is obvious. Statement 7 of Lemma 11.9 now guarantees that A is orrupt32.

Handling Failures as in F4: Paket Dupliation + Deletion
The goal of this setion will be to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 10.12. Suppose transmission T failed and falls under ase F4, and at some later time
(after transmission T but before any additional nodes have been eliminated) the sender has reeived
all of the status report parels from all nodes on PT. Then the sender an eliminate a orrupt node.
The idea of the proof is as follows. Case F4 of transmission failure roughly orresponds to paket
dupliation and paket deletion: there is a node N ∈ G who is replaing valid pakets with opies of
old pakets it has already passed on. Therefore, simply traking potential hanges and net pakets
into and out of N will not help us to loate N , as both of these quantities will be onsistent with
honest behavior. Instead, we use the fat that ase F4 implies that the reeiver will have reeived
some paket p (from the urrent odeword) twie. We will then use the status reports for ase F4,
whih inlude nodes' signatures on the net number of times p has rossed eah of their edges, to
nd a orrupt node N by looking for a node who output p more times than it input p.
31
More preisely, F3 states that the sender knowingly inserted at least D pakets and the reeiver did not reeive
any paket (from the urrent odeword) more than one. By Fat 1', sine we are not in ase S1, the reeiver got
fewer than D − 6n3 distint pakets orresponding to the urrent odeword.
32
Intuitively, A must be orrupt sine the sum on the RHS of (24) represents the net number of pakets A input
minus the number of pakets A output. Sine this dierene is larger than the apaity of A's internal buers, A
must have deleted at least one paket and is neessarily orrupt.
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Proof. By denition of F4, the reeiver reeived some paket p (orresponding to the urrent ode-
word) at least twie. Therefore, when (15.178-179) is reahed, the reeiver will send the label of
p bak to the sender (whih reahes S by the end of the transmission by Lemma 11.19), and this is
in turn broadasted as part of the sender's start of transmission broadast in the following trans-
mission ((15.190-192) and (15.200)). We will use the following notation to desribe the spei
information the status reports ontain in the ase of F4 (see (9.17) and (9.32)):
- SIGA[p]A,B denotes the net number of times p has travelled aross direted edge E(A,B), as
signed by B and stored in A's (outgoing) signature buer.
- SIGA[p]B,A denotes the net number of times p has travelled aross direted edge E(B,A), as
signed by B and stored in A's (inoming) signature buer.
Consider the following string of equalities:
0 =
∑
A∈PT
∑
B∈PT
(SIGA[p]B,A − SIG
A[p]B,A)
=
∑
A∈PT
∑
B∈PT
(SIGB [p]A,B − SIG
A[p]B,A)
=
∑
A∈PT\{R,S} B∈PT
∑
(SIGB [p]A,B − SIG
A[p]B,A) +
∑
B∈PT
(SIGB [p]R,B − SIG
R[p]B,R) +
∑
B∈PT
(SIGB [p]S,B − SIG
S [p]B,S)
=
∑
A∈PT\{R,S} B∈PT
∑
(SIGB [p]A,B − SIG
A[p]B,A) +
∑
B∈PT
(SIGB [p]S,B − SIG
R[p]B,R) (25)
The rst equality is trivial, the seond equality omes from re-labelling and rearranging the terms
of the sum, the third omes from separating out the A = S and A = R terms, and the nal equality
results from the fat that R never outputs pakets and S never inputs pakets, and hene they will
never sign non-zero values for SIG[p]R,B or SIG[p]B,S , respetively (see (11.16-20) and (11.21-
22)). Beause p was reeived by R at least twie (by hoie of p) and S will never send any paket
to more than one node
33
, we have that:∑
B∈PT
(SIGB [p]S,B − SIG
R[p]B,R) ≤ −1 (26)
Plugging this into (25) and rearranging:
1 ≤
∑
A∈PT\{R,S} B∈PT
∑
(SIGB [p]A,B − SIG
A[p]B,A) (27)
By an averaging argument, there must be some A ∈ PT \ {R,S} suh that:
1 ≤
∑
B∈PT
(SIGB [p]A,B − SIG
A[p]B,A) (28)
Now Statement 8 of Lemma 11.9 says that A is neessarily orrupt34. 
33
This was proven in Observations 2-3 of Lemma 7.13 for the edge-sheduling protool. However, the proofs of
these observations remain valid in the (node-ontrolling+edge-sheduling) model beause the sender is honest (by
the onforming adversary assumption).
34
Intuitively, A is orrupt sine (28) says that it has output p more times than it input p.
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11 Node-Controlling + Edge-Sheduling Protool:
Pseudo-Code Intensive Proofs
In this setion, we give detailed proofs that walk through the pseudo-ode of Figures 9 - 15
to argue very basi properties the protool satises. The following lemma will relieve the need to
re-prove many of the lemmas of Setions 6 and 7.
Lemma 11.1. Dierenes between the edge-sheduling adversary protool and the (node-ontrolling
+ edge-sheduling) adversary protool all fall under one of the following ases:
1. Extra variables in the Setup Phase
2. Length of transmission and odeword being transmitted for the urrent transmission
3. Need to authentiate signatures on pakets, as on (11.08) and (12.68)
4. Need to hek if it is okay to send/reeive pakets, as on (12.59) and (12.63)
5. Broadasting information, i.e. transmission of broadast parels and modiations of Broadast
Buer, Data Buer, and Signature Buer
Furthermore, dierenes as in Cases 3 and 4 are idential to having an edge-fail in the edge-
sheduling adversary protool. Also, dierenes as in Case 5 aet the routing protool only insofar
as their aet on Cases 3 and 4 above. Furthermore, between any two honest nodes, the authen-
tiations of Case 3 never fail, and Case 4 failures orrespond to wasted rounds (see Denition
10.8).
Proof. Comparing the pseudo-ode of Figures 5, 6, and 7 to Figures 11, 12, and 15, as emphasized
by line numbers in bold fae in the latter three, it is lear that all dierenes fall under Cases 1-5
of the lemma. Also, all of the other methods in Figures 13-15 fall under Cases 4 and 5.
As for the dierenes as in Cases 3 and 4, it is lear that failing Verify Signature One on
(12.86-87) is equivalent to the edge failing during Stage 2 (i.e. as if p = ⊥ on (12.62) ausing
(12.69) to fail); failing Verify Signature Two on (12.89-90) is equivalent to the edge failing
during Stage 1 (sine this sets HIN and RR to ⊥ on (12.90), whih is equivalent to the ommu-
niation on (5.06) not being reeived); failing Okay to Send Paket on (12.59) is equivalent to
the edge failing during Stage 2 (so that nothing is reeived on lines (11.22/12.62)); and failing
Okay to Reeive Paket on (12.63) is equivalent to the edge failing during Stage 1 (i.e. as if
nothing is reeived on (11.13), so that HOUT = ⊥ on (12.63)). Finally, dierenes as in Case 5
do not diretly aet routing (exept their aets aptured by Cases 3 and 4) sine the transfer of
broadast parels and maintenane of the related buers (signature, broadast, and data buers)
happen independently of the routing of odeword pakets. This is evident by investigating the
relevant bold lines in Figures 11, 12, and 15.
The seond part of the last sentene is true by denition of wasted (see Denition 10.8), and
the rst part follows from lines (11.11), (12.49), (12.60), (12.75), and Lemma 11.17. 
Lemma 11.2. The domains of all of the variables in Figures 9 and 10 are appropriate. In other
words, the protool never alls for more information to be stored in an honest node's variable (buer,
paket, et.) than the variable has room for.
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Proof. The proof for variables and buers that also appear in the edge-sheduling protool follows
from Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2, sine all dierenes between the edge-sheduling protool and the (node-
ontrolling + edge-sheduling) protool are equivalent to an edge-failure (Lemma 11.1). So it
remains to prove the lemma for the new variables appearing in Figures 9 and 10 (i.e. the bold line
numbers). The distribution of publi and private keys (9.14) is performed by a trusted third party,
so these variables are as speied. Below, when we refer to a spei node's variable, we impliitly
assume the node is honest, as the lemma is only onerned about honest nodes.
Bandwidth P (9.06). We look at all transfers along eah direted edge in eah stage of any
round. In Stage 1, this inludes the transfer of HOUT , HFP , FR (11.06), cbp, α (11.04),
and the seven signed items on (11.11). All of these have olletive size O(k + log n) ((9.03-
04), (9.21), (9.23), (9.24), (9.27), (9.29), (9.32), (9.35), and (9.36)). In Stage 2, this
inludes the transfer of the seven items on (12.60) and bp (11.15). Colletively, these have
size O(k + log n) ((9.03-04), (9.17), (9.18), (9.21), and (9.42)).
Potential Lost Due to Re-Shuing SIGN,N (9.12). This is initialized to zero on (10.46), after
whih it is only updated on (7.76), (12.50), (12.80), (12.82), (14.128), (14.133), (14.141),
and (14.146). The rst four of these inrement SIGN,N by at most 2n, and the latter four all
reset SIGN,N to zero. We will see in Lemma 11.16 below that SIGN,N will always represent
the potential lost due to re-shuing in at most one failed transmission, and onsequently
SIGN,N is polynomial in n, as required.
Broadast Parel bp to Reeive (9.27). This is initialized to ⊥ on (10.58), after whih it is
only updated on (13.93). Either no value was reeived on (13.93) (in whih ase bp = ⊥),
or it orresponds to the value sent on (13.97). As disussed below, the value of bp sent on
(13.97) lies in the appropriate domain, and hene so does bp.
Broadast Buer Request α (9.28). This is initialized to ⊥ on (10.58), after whih it is only
updated as in Broadast Parel to Request (13.117-122). On (13.117), α is set to ⊥,
and on (13.119) and (13.122), α inludes the label of a node and a status report parel (see
14.142-145), and so α is bounded by O(k + log n) = P as required.
Outgoing Veriation of Broadast Parel Bit cbp (9.29). This is initialized to zero on (10.58),
after whih it is only updated as on (12.40) and (13.111), where it learly lies in the appro-
priate domain.
Broadast Parel bp to Send (9.42). This is initialized to ⊥ on (10.52), after whih it is
only updated as in Determine Broadast Parel to Send (13.115). Looking at the six
types of broadast parels on line (13.115) and omparing the orresponding domains of these
variables in Figures 9 and 10, we see that in eah ase, bp an be expressed in O(k+log n) = P
bits.
Inoming Veriation of Broadast Parel Bit cbp (9.43). This is initialized to zero on (10.52),
after whih it is only updated as on (13.105) and (13.108). The value it takes on (13.105)
will either be set to zero (if no value was reeived), or it will equal the value of cbp sent on
(13.101), whih as shown above is either a one or zero. Meanwhile, the value it takes on
(13.108) is zero, so at all times cbp equals one or zero, as required.
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First Parel of Start of Transmission Broadast ΩT (10.66). This is initialized to (0, 0, 0, 0) on
(10.72) and is only hanged on (15.174), (15.184), (15.192), (15.195), and (15.198). In
all of these ases, it is lear that ΩT an be expressed in O(log n) bits, as required.
Number of Rounds Bloked βT (10.67). This is initialized to zero on (10.71) and is only
hanged on (11.27), (15.172), and (15.201). Notie that in the latter two ases, βT is
reset to zero, while βT an only be inremented by one on (11.27) at most 4D times per
transmission by (11.02). Sine either line (15.172) or line (15.201) is reahed at the end of
every transmission (in the ase a node is not eliminated as on line (14.163) or (14.168), line
(15.201) will be reahed by the all on (11.29)), βT ∈ [0..4D] at all times, as required.
Number of Failed Transmissions F (10.68). This is initialized to zero on (10.71) and is only
hanged on (15.172) and (15.186). Notie that F is only inremented by one as on line
(15.186) when a transmission fails. As was shown in Theorem 10.4, there an be at most
n−1 failed transmissions before a node an neessarily be eliminated, in whih ase F is reset
to zero on (15.172).
Partiipating List PT (10.69). This is initialized to G on (10.73) and is only hanged on
(15.173) and (15.187), where it is lear eah time that PT ⊆ G in both plaes.
End of Transmission Parel ΘT (10.77). This is initialized to ⊥ on (10.79) and is only hanged
on (15.179), where it is lear that ΩT an be expressed in O(k+log n) bits as required (pakets
have size O(k + log n), and the index of a transmission requires O(log n) bits).
Broadast Buer BB (9.08). We treat the sender's broadast buer separately below, and
onsider now only the broadast buer of any internal node or the reeiver. Notie that the
broadast buer is initially empty (10.46). Looking at all plaes information is added to
BB (lines (13.106-107), (14.125), (14.127), (14.130), (14.136), (14.138), (14.142-145),
(14.148-149), (14.154), and (14.155)), we see that there are 7 kinds of parels stored in the
broadast buer, as listed on (13.115) (the 7th type is to indiate whih parel to send aross
eah edge, as on (13.106)). We look at eah one separately, stating the maximum number of
bits it requires in any broadast buer. For all of the items below, the omments on (14.123)
ensure that there are never dupliates of the same parel in BB at the same time, and also
that every parel in BB has assoiated with it n − 1 bits to indiate whih edges the parel
has travelled aross (see e.g. (13.107), (14.125), (14.127), (14.130), (14.136), (14.138),
(14.148), and (14.154)). Totaling all numbers below, we see that the BB needs to hold at
most n2 + 5n broadast parels, with eah parel needing to reord whih of the n− 1 edges
it has traversed, whih proves the domain on (9.08) is orret.
1. Reeiver's End of Transmission Parel ΘT. This is added to a node's broadast
buer on (14.125), and removed on (15.203). Sine every internal node and the reeiver
will reah (15.203) at the end of every transmission ((11.30) and (15.203)), and by
the inforgibility of the signature sheme, there is only one valid ΘT per transmission T.
Therefore, eah node will have at most one broadast parel of this type in BB at any
time.
2. Sender's Start of Transmission Parels. These are added to a node's broad-
ast buer on (14.127), (14.130), (14.136), and (14.138), and they are removed on
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(15.203). Sine every internal node and the reeiver will reah (15.203) at the end of
every transmission ((11.30) and (15.203)), by the inforgibility of the signature sheme,
for every transmission T, there is only one valid ΩT in BB at any time. Notie that ΩT
an hold up to 1 parel for 200a, n− 1 valid parels for 200b and 200d together, and up
to n − 1 valid parels for 200 (see (15.200), and use the fat that S /∈ EN,BL and
Theorem 10.4). Therefore, eah node will have at most 2n broadast parels of this type
in BB at any time.
3. Label of a Node to Remove from the Blaklist. Parels of this nature are added
to a node's broadast buer on (14.148) and removed on (15.203). Sine every internal
node and the reeiver will reah (15.203) at the end of every transmission ((11.30)
and (15.203)), we argue that in any transmission, every node will have at most n − 1
parels in their broadast buer orresponding to the label of a node to remove from
the blaklist. To see this, we argue that the sender will add (N̂ , 0, T) to his broadast
buer as on (14.165) at most one for eah node N̂ ∈ P \ S per transmission, and then
use the inforgibility of the signature sheme to argue eah node will add a orresponding
broadast parel to their broadast buer as on (14.148) at most n− 1 times. That the
sender will enter line (14.165) at most one per node per transmission is lear sine one
the sender has reahed (14.165) for some node N̂ , the node will be removed from his
blaklist on (14.166), and nodes are not re-added to the blaklist until the end of any
transmission, as on (15.188). Therefore, one the sender has reeived some node N̂ 's
omplete status report as on (14.164), that same line annot be entered again by the
same node N̂ in the same transmission. In summary, there are at most n− 1 broadast
parels of this type in any node's broadast buer at any time.
4. The Label of a Node N̂ Whose Status Report is Known to N . We show that
for any node N ∈ P \S, there are at most (n−1) broadast parels of type 4 (13.115) in
BB at any time35. This follows from the same argument as above, where it was shown
that (14.164) an be true at most one per node per transmission. The inforgibility
of the signature sheme ensures that the same will be true for internal nodes regarding
line (14.155), and sine this is the only line on whih broadast parels of this kind are
added to BB, this an happen at most n − 1 times per transmission. However, we are
not yet done with this ase, beause broadast information of this type is not removed
from BB at the end of eah transmission like the above forms of broadast information.
Therefore, we x N̂ ∈ G, and show that if N adds a broadast parel to BB of form
(N, N̂ , T′) as on (14.155) of transmission T, then neessarily BB was not already storing
a broadast parel of form (N, N̂ , T′′) for some other T′′ 6= T′ (if T′′ = T′, then there is
nothing to show, as nothing new will be added to BB by the omments on 14.123).
For the sake of ontradition, suppose that BB is already storing a parel of form
(N, N̂ , T′′) when (14.155) of transmission T is entered and N is alled to add (N, N̂, T′)
to BB for some T′ 6= T′′. Sine (14.155) is reahed, we must have that (14.152) was
satised for the bp appearing there. In partiular, N̂ is on N 's version of the blaklist.
Sine the blaklist is leared at the end of every transmission (15.203), it must be
that (N̂ , T′, T) was added to N 's version of the blaklist during the SOT broadast for
the urrent transmission T, as on (14.137-138). Therefore, all parels in BB of form
35
The (n− 1) omes from the fat that there are no status reports for the sender.
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(N, N̂ , T′′) for T′′ 6= T′ should have been removed from BB on line (14.139), yielding the
desired ontradition.
5-6. Status Report Parels. We x N ∈ G and show that for every N̂ ∈ P \ {S,N},
there are at most n status report parels orresponding to N̂ in N 's broadast buer,
and hene N 's broadast buer will hold at most n(n − 1) status report parels at any
time. Sine a single node's status report for a single transmission onsists of at most n
parels (see lines (14.142-145)
36
), it will be enough to show that for every N̂ ∈ P \ S,
at all times N 's broadast buer only holds status report parels for N̂ orresponding to
a single failed transmission T
′
.
For the sake of ontradition, suppose that during some transmission T, there is some
node N̂ ∈ P \ S and two transmissions T′ and T′′ suh that N 's broadast buer holds
at least one status report parel for N̂ from both T′ and T′′. Notie that status report
parels are only added to BB as on (14.154), and without loss of generality suppose
that the status report parel of N̂ orresponding to T′′ was already in BB when one
orresponding to T
′
is added to BB as on (14.154) of transmission T. As was argued
above, sine (14.154) is reahed in T, (14.152) must have been satised, and sine N 's
blaklist is leared at the end of every transmission (15.203), it must be that a broadast
parel of form (N̂ , T̂, T), adding N̂ to N 's version of the blaklist, was reeived earlier
in transmission T. Notie that neessarily T̂ = T′, sine otherwise line (14.153) will not
be satised. But then sine T
′′ 6= T′, all status report parels of N̂ orresponding to
transmission T
′′
should have been removed from BB on (14.139), yielding the desired
ontradition.
Now for a N 's own status report parels, these are added to BB on (14.142-145).
Investigating lines (14.137), (14.139), and (14.140), we see that status reports of N
an oupy BB for at most one failed transmission.
7. Requested Parel for Eah Edge. For any edge E(A,N), N will have at most
one opy of a parel like α as on (13.106) at any time, sine the old version of α is
simultaneously deleted when the new one is added on (13.106). Sine eah node has
(n− 1) inoming edges, BB need hold at most n− 1 parels of this form at any time.
Data Buer DB, Eliminated List EN , and Blaklist BL (9.09-11). We treat the sender's
broadast buer separately below, and onsider now only the data buer of any internal node
or the reeiver. The data buer (whih inludes the blaklist and list of eliminated nodes) is
initially empty (10.46). A node N 's data buer holds three dierent kinds of information:
blaklist, list of eliminated nodes, and for eah neighbor B̂ ∈ G, a list of nodes N̂ ∈ G for
whih B̂ knows the omplete status report (see item 4 on line (13.115)). Below, we show
that these ontribute at most n − 1, n − 1, and (n − 1)2 parels (respetively), so that DB
requires at most n2 parels at any time.
Blaklist BL. Eah entry of BL is initialized to ⊥ on (10.46), and BL is only modied
on lines (14.134), (14.138), (14.148), and (15.203). BL is an array with n− 1 entries,
indexed by the nodes in P \S. When a node (N̂ , T) is added to BL as on (14.138), this
means that the entry of BL orresponding to N̂ is swithed to be T. When a node (N̂ , T)
36
We assume that the signature buer information for two direted edges E(A,B) and E(B,A) are ombined into
one status report parel.
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is removed from BL as on (14.148), this means that the entry of BL orresponding to
N̂ is swithed to ⊥. Finally, when BL is to be leared as on (14.134) and (15.203), this
means that BL eah entry of BL is set to ⊥. Thus, in all ases, BL ∈ [1..n− 1]×{0, l}P
as required.
List of Eliminated Nodes EN . Eah entry of EN is initialized to ⊥ on (10.46),
and is only modied on line (14.132). EN is an array with n − 1 entries, indexed by
the nodes in P \ S. Here, when a node (N̂ , T) is added to EN , this means the entry of
EN orresponding to N̂ is swithed to T. Thus, at all times EN ∈ [1..n− 1]×{0, l}P as
required.
Whih Neighbor's Know Another Node's Status Report. Parels of this kind
are only added to or removed from DB on lines (14.134), (14.139), (14.149), and
(14.151). We will now show that for any pair of nodes N̂ , B̂ ∈ P \ S, the data buer
of any node N ∈ G will have at most one parel of the form (B̂, N̂ , T′), from whih we
onlude that this portion of N 's data buer need hold at most (n − 1)2 parels. To
see this, we x B̂ and N̂ in G and suppose for the sake of ontradition that N 's data
buer holds two dierent parels (B̂, N̂ , T′) and (B̂, N̂ , T′′), for T′ 6= T′′. We onsider the
transmission T for whih this rst happens, i.e. without loss of generality, (B̂, N̂ , T′) is
added to DB as on (14.151) of T. Sine the seond part of (14.151) is reahed, the
rst part of (14.151) must have been satised, and sine the blaklist is leared at the
end of every transmission (15.203), it must be that a broadast parel of form (N̂ , T̂, T)
adding N̂ to N 's version of the blaklist was reeived earlier in transmission T. Notie
that neessarily T̂ = T′, sine otherwise line (14.151) will not be satised. But then sine
T
′′ 6= T′, (B̂, N̂ , T′′) should have been removed from DB as on (14.139) of transmission
T, yielding the desired ontradition.
Adding these three ontributions, we see that that DB requires at most n2 parels, as required.
Outgoing Signature Buers SIG (9.17). Eah outgoing signature buer is initially empty
(10.54), and they are only modied on (12.48-49), (14.128), (14.133), (14.141), and
(14.146). The rst of these inrements SIG[3] by at most 2n, inrements SIG[1], and SIG[p]
by at most 1, and inrements SIG[2] by at most 2n, and the latter four lines all reset all entries
of SIG to ⊥. Sine our protool is only intended to run polynomially-long (in n), eah entry
of SIG is polynomial in n, as required.
Inoming Signature Buers SIG (9.32). Eah inoming signature buer is initially empty
(10.48), and they are only modied on (12.74-75), (14.128), (14.133), (14.141), and
(14.146). The rst of these inrements SIG[3] by at most 2n, SIG[1] and SIG[p] by at
most 1, and SIG[2] by at most 2n, and the latter four lines all reset all entries of SIG to
⊥. Sine our protool is only intended to run polynomially-long (in n), eah entry of SIG is
polynomial in n, as required.
Copy of Pakets Buer COPY (10.60). COPY is rst lled on (10.74)/(15.214), with a
opy of every paket orresponding to the rst odeword. The only plae it is modied after
this is on (15.214), where the old opies are rst deleted and then replaed with new ones.
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Sender's Broadast Buer BB. In ontrast to an internal node's broadast buer, the only thing
the sender's broadast buer holds is the Start of Transmission broadast (15.200) and the
information that a node should be removed from the blaklist, see (14.165). Notie that at the
outset of the protool, BB only holds the Start of Transmission broadast, whih is omprised
by only Ω1 = (0, 0, 0, 0) (10.72-73). After this, the only hanges made to BB appear on lines
(14.165), (15.171), (15.199), and (15.200). Notie that for every transmission, neessarily
either (15.171) or (15.199) will be reahed, and hene at any time of any transmission T, BB
ontains parels orresponding to at most one Start of Transmission broadast, and whatever
parels were added to BB so far in T. By investigating line (15.200) and using Lemma 10.4,
the former requires at most 2n parels, and by the omment on (14.156), the latter requires
at most n parels (14.165). Therefore, the sender's broadast buer requires at most 3n
parels, as required.
Sender's Data Buer DB, Eliminated List EN , and Blaklist BL (10.62-64). We will show that
the sender's DB needs to hold at most n3+n2+n parels at any time, and that the blaklist
and list of eliminated nodes need at most n parels eah. Notie that every entry of DB is
initialized to ⊥ on (10.73), after whih modiations to DB our only on lines (14.158),
(14.160), (14.162), (14.166), (15.170), (15.171), (15.187), (15.188), (15.191), (15.194),
(15.197), and (15.199). The sender's data buer holds eight dierent kinds of information:
end of transmission parel ΘT, status report parels, the partiipating list for up to n − 1
failed transmissions, the reason for failure for up to n− 1 failed transmissions, its own status
reports for up to n−1 failed transmissions, the blaklist, list of eliminated nodes, and for eah
neighbor B ∈ G, a list of nodes N̂ ∈ G for whih B̂ knows the omplete status report (see
item 4 on line (13.115)).
1. End of Transmission Parel ΘT. Modiations to this our only on lines (14.158),
(15.171), and (15.199). Every transmission, the inforgibility of the signature sheme
and the omment on line (14.156) guarantee that the sender will add ΘT to DB as on
(14.158) at most one. Meanwhile, for every transmission, either (15.171) or (15.199)
will be reahed exatly one. Therefore, there is at most one End of Transmission parel
in DB at any time.
2. Blaklist BL. We show that BL onsists of at most n parels at any time. More
speially, we will show that BL lives in the domain [1..n]× {0, 1}O(log n), i.e. an array
with n slots indexed by eah N ∈ G, with eah slot holding ⊥ (if the orresponding
node is not on the blaklist) or the index of the transmission in whih the orresponding
node was most reently added to the blaklist. To see this, notie that modiations to
the blaklist our only on lines (14.166), (15.171), and (15.188). Removing a node
N̂ from BL as on (14.166) means hanging the entry indexed by N̂ to ⊥. Clearing
the blaklist as on (15.171) means making every entry of the array equal to ⊥. Finally,
adding a node to the blaklist as on (15.188) means swithing the entry indexed by N̂
to be the index of the urrent transmission.
3. Status Report Parels. Modiations to this our only on lines (14.162) and
(15.171). We show in Lemma 11.3 below that for any node N̂ ∈ P \S, DB will hold at
most n(n − 1) status report parels from N̂ at any time, from whih we onlude that
DB need hold at most n(n− 1)2 status report parels.
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4. Partiipating Lists. We will view the partiipating list orresponding to transmission
T as an array [1..n] × {0, 1}P , where the array is indexed by the nodes, and an entry
orresponding to node N ∈ G is either the index of the transmission T (if N partiipated
in T) or ⊥ otherwise. Therefore, sine eah partiipating list onsists of n parels, we an
argue that partiipating lists require at most n(n − 1) parels if we an show that DB
need hold at most n−1 partiipating lists at any time. To see this, notie that (15.187)
is reahed only in the ase the transmission failed (15.185), and we showed in Lemma
10.4 that there an be at most n − 1 failed transmissions before a node is neessarily
eliminated and DB is leared as on (15.171).
5. Reason Transmissions Failed. Modiations to this our only on lines (15.171),
(15.191), (15.194), and (15.197). Notie that of the latter three, exatly one will be
reahed if and only if the transmission failed. Also, eah one of the three will add at
most one parel to DB. Sine DB is leared any time Eliminate Node is alled as on
(15.171), we again use Lemma 10.4 to onlude that Reason for Transmission Failures
require at most n− 1 parels of DB.
6. Sender's Own Status Reports. These are added to DB on lines (15.191), (15.194),
and (15.197), and removed from DB on (15.171). Notie that of the former three lines,
exatly one will be reahed if and only if the transmission failed. Also, eah one of
the three will add at most n parels to DB. Sine DB is leared any time Eliminate
Node is alled as on (15.171), we again use Lemma 10.4 to onlude that Reason for
Transmission Failures require at most n(n− 1) parels of DB.
7. List of Eliminated Nodes EN . Modiations to this our only on line (15.170).
Sine EN is viewed as living in [1..n] × {0, 1}O(log n), adding a node N̂ to EN means
hanging the entry indexed by N̂ from ⊥ to the index of the urrent transmission. Notie
that EN ∈ [1..n]× {0, 1}O(log n) an be expressed using n parels.
8. The Label of a Node N̂ Whose Status Report is Known to B. Modiations
to this our only on lines (14.160), (14.166), and (15.171). We show in Lemma 11.5
below that for any pair of nodes B, N̂ ∈ P \ S, DB will hold at most one parel of the
form (B, N̂, T′) at any time (see e.g. (14.160)), from whih we onlude that DB need
hold at most (n− 1)2 parels of this type.
Adding together these hanges, the sender's DB needs to hold at most n3 + n2 + n parels,
as required.
We have now shown eah of the variables of Figures 9 and 10 have domains as indiated. 
Lemma 11.3. For any node N̂ ∈ P \ S, the sender's data buer will hold at most n(n− 1) status
report parels from N̂ at any time. More speially, let {T1, . . . , Tj} denote the set of transmissions
for whih the sender has at least one status report parel from N̂ . Then j ≤ n − 1 and for every
i < j, the sender has N̂ 's omplete status report for transmission Ti.
Proof. We rst note that the rst sentene follows immediately from the latter two sine eah
status report onsists of at most n status report parels (14.142-145). Fix N̂ ∈ P \ S and let
{T1, . . . , Tj} be as in the lemma, ordered hronologially. We rst show that j ≤ n−1. For the sake
of ontradition, suppose j ≥ n. We rst argue that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j, transmission Ti neessarily
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failed. Fix 1 ≤ i ≤ j. Sine DB ontains a status report parel from N̂ for transmission Ti, it must
have been added on (14.162) of some transmission T̂. Therefore, line (14.161) must have been
satised, and in partiular, (N̂ , Ti) must have been on BL during T̂. Therefore, (N̂ , Ti) must have
been added to BL as on (15.188) of transmission Ti, whih in turn implies transmission Ti failed
(15.185). Therefore, transmission Ti failed for eah 1 ≤ i ≤ j.
By Lemma 10.4, there an be at most n − 1 failed transmissions before a node is eliminated
as on (15.169-177). Sine j ≥ n, onsidering failed transmissions {T2, . . . , Tj}, there must have
been a transmission T2 ≤ T ≤ Tj suh that Eliminate N (15.169) was entered in transmission T.
We rst argue that T < Tj as follows. If T = Tj , then (N̂ , Tj) would not be added to BL as on
(15.188) (one the protool enters (15.169), it halts until the end of the transmission (15.177),
thus skipping (15.188)). But then (14.161) of any transmission after Tj annot be satised for any
status report parel orresponding to Tj , and hene none of N̂ 's status report parels orresponding
to Tj ould be added to DB after transmission Tj . Similarly, none of N̂ 's status report parels
orresponding to Tj an be added to DB before or during transmission Tj by Claim 11.4 below.
This then ontradits the fat that at some point in time, DB ontains one of N̂ 's status report
parels orresponding to Tj .
We now have that for some transmission T1 < T < Tj , Eliminate N is entered during T.
Therefore, all of N̂ 's status report parels for T1 are removed from DB on (15.171) and (N̂ , T1) is
removed from BL on (15.171) of transmission T ≤ Tj . Sine T1 < T, (N̂ , T1) will never be put on
BL as on (15.190) for any transmission after T, and onsequently, (14.161) will never be satised
after T for any of N̂ 's status report parels from T1. Therefore, none of N̂ 's status report parels will
be put into DB after they are removed on (15.171) of T. Meanwhile, by the end of transmission
T < Tj , DB annot have any of N̂ 's status report parels orresponding to Tj by Claim 11.4 below.
We have now ontradited the assumption that DB simultaneously holds some of N̂ 's status report
parels from T1 and Tj . Thus, j ≤ n− 1, as desired.
We now show that for every i < j, the sender has N̂ 's omplete status report for transmission Ti.
If j = 1, there is nothing to prove. So let 1 < j ≤ n− 1, and for the sake of ontradition suppose
there is some i < j suh that the sender has at least one of N̂ 's status report parels for Ti, but not
the entire report. Let T̂i denote the transmission that the status report parel orresponding to Ti
was added to DB as on (14.162), and let T̂i+1 denote the transmission that the parel orresponding
to Ti+1 was added to DB as on (14.162). Without loss of generality, we suppose that T̂i ≤ T̂i+1.
Sine (14.162) is entered during transmission T̂i, it must be that (14.161) was satised, and in
partiular (N̂ , Ti) was on BL during T̂i. Similarly, (N̂ , Ti+1) was on BL during T̂i+1. Lemma 11.6
below states that for eah N ∈ G, N is on BL at most one, i.e. there is at most one entry of the
form (N, T̂) on BL at any time. Sine nodes are only added to BL at the very end eah transmission
(15.188), we may onlude that we have strit inequality: T̂i < T̂i+1. In partiular, (N̂ , Ti+1) was
not on BL at the start of T̂i, but (N̂ , Ti) was. Therefore, (N̂ , Ti+1) was added to BL as on (15.188)
of transmission Ti+1, and so N̂ ∈ PT (15.187-188). In partiular, N̂ is not blaklisted by the end
of Ti+1 (15.187). Therefore, there must be some transmission T ∈ [T̂i, Ti+1] suh that (N̂ , Ti) is
removed from BL as on (14.166) or (15.171). Both of these lead to a ontradition, as the rst
implies the sender has N̂ 's omplete status report for Ti, while the latter implies that all status
reports orresponding to Ti should have been removed from DB. 
Claim 11.4. For any N̂ ∈ G and for any transmission T, the sender's data buer DB will never
hold any of N̂ 's status report parels orresponding to T before or during transmission T.
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Proof. Let N̂ ∈ G, and for the sake of ontradition, let T be a transmission suh that DB has
one of N̂ 's status report parels from T before or during T. Sine status reports are only added to
DB on (14.162), this implies that there is some transmission T′ ≤ T suh that (14.161) is satised
at some point of T
′
before the Prepare Start of Transmission Broadast of transmission T
′
is
alled. This in turn implies that (N̂ , T) was on BL before the Prepare Start of Transmission
Broadast of transmission T
′ ≤ T was alled. However, this ontradits the fat that the only
time (N̂ , T) an be added to BL is during the Prepare Start of Transmission Broadast of
transmission T on (15.188). 
Claim 11.5. For any pair of nodes B, N̂ ∈ G \ S, the sender's data buer will hold at most one
status report parels of the form (B, N̂, T′) at any time.
Proof. Fix B, N̂ ∈ G\S, and suppose for the sake of ontradition that there are two transmissions
T
′
and T
′′
suh that both (B, N̂, T′) and (B, N̂, T′′) are in DB at the same time (note that T′ 6= T′′
by the omment on 14.156). Sine parels of this form are only added to DB on (14.160), we
suppose without loss of generality that T is a transmission and t is a round in T suh that (B, N̂, T′′)
is already in DB when (B, N̂, T′) is added to DB as on (14.160) of round t. Sine (14.160) is
reahed, (14.159) was satised, so in partiular (N̂ , T′) is on the sender's (urrent version of the)
blaklist. Similarly, sine (B, N̂, T′′) was (most reently) added to DB as on (14.160) of some
round t̂ of some transmission T̂ ≤ T, it must have been that (N̂ , T′′) was on the sender's (version of
the) blaklist during round t̂ of T̂. By Lemma 11.6 below, sine (N̂ , T′) is on the sender's urrent
blaklist (as of round t of transmission T), and (N̂ , T′′) was on an earlier version of the sender's
blaklist, it must be that (N̂ , T′′) was removed from the blaklist at some point between round t̂ of T̂
and round t of T. Notie that nodes are removed from the blaklist only on (14.166) and (15.171).
However, in both of these ases, (B, N̂, T′′) should have been removed from DB (see (14.166) and
(15.171)), ontraditing the fat that it is still in DB when (B, N̂, T′) is added to DB in round t
of transmission T. 
Lemma 11.6. A node is on at most one blaklist at a time. In other words, whenever a node (N, T)
is added to the sender's blaklist as on (15.188), we have that (N, T′) /∈ BL for any other (earlier)
transmission T
′
. Additionally, if (N, T′) ∈ BL at any time, then:
1. Transmission T
′
failed
2. No node has been eliminated sine T
′
to the urrent time
3. The sender has not reeived N 's omplete status report orresponding to T′
Proof. The rst statement of the lemma is immediate, sine the only plae a (node, transmission)
pair is added to BL is on (15.188), and by the previous line, neessarily any suh node is not
already on the blaklist. Also, Statement 1) is immediate sine (15.188) is only reahed if the
transmission fails (14.185). To prove Statements 2) and 3), notie that (N, T′) is only added to
the blaklist at the very end of transmission T
′
(15.188). In partiular, if (N, T′) is ever removed
from the blaklist during some transmission T
37
as on (14.166) or (15.171), then (N, T′) an never
again appear on the blaklist (as remarked in the footnote, T > T′, and so at any point during or
37
If (N, T′) is removed from the blaklist as on (14.166) or (15.171) of transmission T, then neessarily T > T′,
sine (N, T′) an only be added to BL at the very end of a transmission (15.188), i.e. lines (14.166) and (14.171)
annot be reahed after line (15.188) in the same transmission.
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after transmission T, (N, T′) an never again be added to BL as on (15.188) sine T′ has already
passed). Therefore, if during transmission T a node is eliminated as on (15.169-177) or the sender
reeives N 's omplete status report of transmission T′ as on (14.164), then N will be removed from
the blaklist as on (14.166) or (15.171), at whih point (N, T′) an never be added to BL again
(sine neessarily T > T′ as remarked in the footnote). This proves Statements 2) and 3). 
Lemma 11.7. For any (N, T) on the sender's blaklist, the sender needs at most n parels from N
in order to have N 's omplete status report, and subsequently remove N from the blaklist (14.164-
165).
Proof. This was proven when disussing the appropriateness of variable domains in Lemma 11.2. 
We set the following notation for the remainder of the setion. T will denote a transmission,
GT will denote the set of non-eliminated nodes at the start of T, PT will denote the partiipating
list for T, and HT will denote the unorrupted nodes in the network. If the transmission is lear or
unimportant, we suppress the subsripts for onveniene, writing instead G,P, and H.
Lemma 11.8. For any honest node A ∈ G and any transmission T, A must reeive the omplete
Start of Transmission (SOT) broadast before it transfers or re-shues any pakets. Additionally,
the signature buers SIGA,A and SIG
A
of any honest node A ∈ G are always leared upon reeipt
of the omplete SOT broadast (and hene before any pakets are transferred to/from/within A).
Proof. Fix an honest node A ∈ G and a transmission T. If A has not reeived the full Start of
Transmission (SOT) broadast for T yet, then A will not transfer any pakets (12.59), (11.31-33),
(12.63) and (11.35-37). This means that (12.63) will always be satised, and hene (12.78)
an never be reahed, and so RR will remain equal to −1 ((10.50), and (15.209)) so long as no
odeword pakets have been transferred. This in turn implies (12.46) annot be satised before
any odeword pakets have been transferred. Putting these fats together, the signature buers
annot hange as on (12.48-50), (12.74-75), (12.80), or (12.82) before A reeives the omplete
SOT broadast. Also, no pakets will be re-shued during the all to Re-Shue if no pakets have
moved during the Routing Phase, as the ondition statement on (7.74) was eventually false in the
last round of the previous transmission, and the state of the buers will not have hanged if no
pakets have been transferred in the urrent transmission. Therefore, before A has reeived the
omplete SOT broadast, no paket movement to/from/within A is possible, and hanges to the
signature buers are onned to the ones appearing on lines (14.128), (14.133), (14.141), and
(14.146), all of whih lear the signature buers.
Suppose now that A has reeived the full SOT broadast for T. Reall that part of the SOT
broadast ontains ΩT = (|EN |, |BL|, F, ∗), where EN refers to the eliminated nodes, BL is the
sender's urrent blaklist, F is the number of failed transmissions sine the last node was eliminated,
and the last oordinate denotes the reason for failure of the previous transmission (in the ase it
failed) (15.200). If |BL| = 0, then A will lear all its entries of SIGA and SIGA,A on (14.128).
Otherwise, |BL| > 0, and N will lear all its entries of SIGA and SIGA,A when it learns the last
blaklisted node on (14.146). Therefore, in all ases A's signature buers are leared by the time
it reeives the full SOT broadast, and in partiular before it transfers any pakets in transmission
T. 
In order to prove a variant of Lemma 6.13 in terms of the variables used in the (node-ontrolling
+ edge-sheduling) adversary protool, we will need to rst re-state and prove variants of Lemmas
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6.11, 7.14, and 7.15. We begin with a variant of Lemma 6.11 (the rst 5 Statements orrespond
diretly with Lemma 6.11, the others do not, but will be needed later):
Lemma 11.9. For any honest node A ∈ G and at all times of any transmission:
1. For inoming edge E(S,A), all hanges to SIGA[3]S,A are stritly non-negative. In partiular,
at all times:
0 ≤ SIGA[3]S,A (29)
2. For outgoing edge E(A,R), all hanges to SIGA[3]A,R are stritly non-negative
38
. In parti-
ular, at all times:
0 ≤ SIGA[3]A,R (30)
3. For outgoing edges E(A,B), B 6= R, all hanges to the quantity (SIGA[3]A,B − SIG
A[2]A,B)
are stritly non-negative. This remains true even if B is orrupt. In partiular, at all times:
0 ≤
∑
B∈P\{A,S}
(SIGA[3]A,B − SIG
A[2]A,B) (31)
4. For inoming edges E(B,A), B 6= S, all hanges to the quantity (SIGA[2]B,A − SIG
A[3]B,A)
are stritly non-negative. This remains true even if B is orrupt. In partiular, at all times:
0 ≤
∑
B∈P\{A,S}
(SIGA[2]B,A − SIG
A[3]B,A) (32)
5. All hanges to SIGA,A are stritly non-negative. In partiular, at all times:
0 ≤ SIGA,A (33)
6. The net derease in potential at A (due to transferring pakets out of A and re-shuing
pakets within A's buers) in any transmission is bounded by A's potential at the start of the
transmission, plus A's inrease in potential aused by pakets transferred into A. In partiular:
SIGA,A +
∑
B∈P\A
SIGA[3]A,B ≤ (4n
3 − 6n2) +
∑
B∈P\A
SIGA[3]B,A (34)
7. The number of pakets transferred out of A in any transmission must be at least as muh as
the number of pakets transferred into A during the transmission minus the apaity of A's
buers. In partiular:
4n2 − 8n ≥
∑
B∈P\A
(SIGA[1]B,A − SIG
A[1]A,B) (35)
38SIGA[3] along outgoing edges measures the derease in potential as a positive quantity. Thus, a positive value
for SIGA[3] along an outgoing edge orresponds to a derease in non-dupliated potential.
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8. The number of times a paket p orresponding to the urrent odeword has been transferred
out of A during any transmission is bounded by the number of times that paket has been
transferred into A. In partiular39:
0 ≥
∑
B∈P
(SIGB [p]A,B − SIG
A[p]B,A) (36)
Proof. We prove eah inequality separately, using an indutive type argument on a node A's signa-
ture buers. First, note that all signature buers are leared at the outset of the protool (10.46),
(10.48), and (10.54). Also, anytime the signature buers are leared as on (14.128), (14.133),
(14.141), and (14.146), then all of the statements (exept possible Statement 8, whih depends on
values from potentially orrupt nodes B ∈ G) will be true. So it remains to hek the other plaes
signature buers an hange values ((12.48-50), (12.74-75), (12.80), (12.82), and (7.76)), and
argue indutively that all suh hanges will preserve the inequalities of Statements 1-7 (Statement
8 will be proven separately). Sine all of these lines represent paket movement, they an only be
reahed if A has reeived the omplete SOT broadast for the urrent transmission (Lemma 11.8),
and so we may (and do) assume this is the ase in eah item below. In partiular, Lemma 11.8
states that beause we are assuming A has reeived the omplete SOT broadast for transmission
T, all of A's signature buers will be leared before any hanges are made to them.
1. Aside from being leared, in whih ase (29) is trivially true, the only hanges made to
SIGA[3]S,A our on (12.75), where it is lear that all hanges are non-negative sine HGP
is non-negative (Statement 9 of Lemma 7.1 together with Lemma 11.1).
2. Aside from being leared, in whih ase (30) is trivially true, the only hanges made to
SIGA[3]A,R our on (12.49), where it is lear that all hanges are non-negative sine HFP
is non-negative (Statement 9 of Lemma 7.1 together with Lemma 11.1).
3. Fix B ∈ P \ S,A. Intuitively, this inequality means that onsidering direted edge E(A,B),
the derease in A's potential aused by paket transfers must be greater than or equal to B's
inrease, whih is a onsequene of Lemma 6.11. Formally, we will trak all hanges to the
relevant values in the pseudo-ode and argue that at all times and for any xed B ∈ G (honest
or orrupt), if A is honest, then 0 ≤ SIGA[3]A,B − SIG
A[2]A,B . All hanges to these values
(aside from being leared) our only on (12.48-49) sine here we are onsidering A's values
along outgoing edge E(A,B). Notie that HFP annot hange between (11.08) of some round
and (12.49) of the same round. Sine lines (12.48-49) are only reahed if Verify Signature
Two aepts the signature (otherwise RR is set to⊥ on (12.90) and hene (12.45) will fail), we
have that SIGA[2]A,B hanges by at most the value that HFP had on (12.89) (see omments
on line (12.88-90)), and this is the value sent/reeived on lines (11.07) and (11.11) and
eventually stored on (12.48). Meanwhile, when SIGA[3]A,B hanges, for honest nodes it will
always be an inrease of HFP (12.49), and as noted above, this value of HFP is the same as it
had on (12.89). Therefore, for honest nodes, whenever the relevant values hange on (12.48-
49), the hange will respet the inequality SIGA[3]A,B − SIG
A[2]A,B ≥ HFP −HFP = 0.
39
Notie that (36) is the only statement of the Lemma that involves quantities in the neighbors' signature buers
(in addition to A's buers). Sine there is no assumption made about the honesty of the neighbor's of A, this may
seem problemati. However, we show in the proof that regardless of the honesty of A's neighbors B ∈ G, (36) will be
satised if A in honest.
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4. Fix B ∈ P \ S,A. Intuitively, this inequality means that onsidering direted edge E(B,A),
the derease in B's potential aused by paket transfers must be greater than or equal to A's
inrease, whih is a onsequene of Lemma 6.11. Formally, we will trak all hanges to the
relevant values in the pseudo-ode and argue that at all times and for any xed B ∈ G (honest
or orrupt), if A is honest, then 0 ≤ SIGA[2]B,A − SIG
A[3]B,A. All hanges to these values
(aside from being leared) our only on (12.74-75) sine here we are onsidering A's values
along inoming edge E(B,A). When SIGA[2]B,A hanges on (12.74), they take on the values
sent by B on (12.60) and reeived by A on (12.62). However, in order to reah (12.74),
the all to Verify Signature One on (12.69) must have returned true. In partiular, the
omments on (12.84-86) require that A verify that the hange in SIGA[2]B,A that B sent to A
is at least HGP bigger than the previous value A had from B. Meanwhile, when SIG
A[3]B,A
hanges, for honest nodes it will always be an inrease of HGP (12.75). Therefore, sine
HGP annot hange between (12.84) of some round and (12.75) later in the same round for
honest nodes, whenever the relevant values hange on (12.74-75), the hange will respet the
inequality SIGA[2]B,A − SIG
A[3]B,A ≥ HGP −HGP = 0.
5. Intuitively, this inequality says that all hanges in potential due to paket re-shuing should
be stritly non-positive (SIGA,A measures potential drop as a positive quantity), whih is a
onsequene of Lemma 6.11. Formally, all hanges made to SIGA,A (aside from being leared)
our on (7.76), where the hange is M +m− 1. The fat that this quantity is stritly non-
negative for honest nodes follows from Claim 6.4.
6. Sine the inequality onerns SIGA,A and SIG[3] (along both inoming and outgoing edges),
we will fous on hanges to these values when a paket is transferred (or re-shued). More
speially, we will look at a spei paket p and onsider p's aet on A's potential during
eah of p's stays in A, where a stay refers to the time A reeives (an instane of) p as on
(12.77) to the time it sends and gets onrmation of reeipt (as in Denition 7.6) for (that
instane of) p40. We x p and distinguish between the four possible ways p an stay in A:
(a) The stay is initiated by A reeiving p during T and then sending p at some later round of
T, and getting onrmation of p's reeipt as in Denition 7.6. More speially, the stay
inludes an inrease to some inoming signature buer SIGA[3] as on (12.75) and then
an inrease to some outgoing signature buer SIGA[3] as on (12.49). Let B denote the
edge along whih A reeived p in this stay, and B′ denote the edge along whih A sent p.
Then SIGA[3]B,A will inrease by HGP on (12.75) when p is aepted. LetM denote the
value of HGP when p is reeived. The paket p is eventually re-shued to the outgoing
buer along E(A,B′). Let m denote the value of HFP when (12.49) is reahed, so that
the hange to SIGA[3]A,B′ due to sending p is m. By Statement 3 of Claim 7.7 (whih
remains valid by Lemma 11.1), any paket that is eventually deleted as on (12.50-51)
will be the agged paket, and so the paket that is deleted did atually have height m
in A's outgoing buer. In partiular, the paket began its stay in an inoming buer
at height M , and was eventually deleted when it had height m in some outgoing buer.
In partiular, sine SIGA,A aurately traks hanges in potential due to re-shuing
(Statement 1 of Lemma 11.16), we have that during this stay of p, SIGA,A hanged by
40
A given paket p may have multiple stays in A during a single transmission, one for eah time A sees p.
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M −m. Therefore, onsidering only p's aet on the following terms, we have that:
SIGA,A + SIG
A[3]A,B′ − SIG
A[3]B,A = (M −m) +m−M = 0 (37)
(b) The stay begins at the outset of the protool, i.e. p started the transmission in one of A's
buers, and the stay ends when p is deleted (after having been sent aross an edge) in some
round of T. More speially, there is no inoming signature buer SIGA[3] that hanges
value as on (12.75) due to this stay of p, but there is an inrease to some outgoing
signature buer SIGA[3] as on (12.49). Using the notation from (a) above with the
exeption that M denotes the initial height of p in one of A's buers at the start of T,
then onsidering only p's aet on the following terms, we have that:
SIGA,A + SIG
A[3]A,B′ = (M −m) +m = M (38)
() The stay is initiated by A reeiving p during T, but p then remains in A through the end of the
transmission (either as a normal or a agged paket). More speially, the stay inludes
an inrease to some inoming signature buer SIGA[3] as on (12.75), but there is no
outgoing signature buer SIGA[3] that hanges value as on (12.49) due to this stay of
p. Using the notation from (a) above with the exeption that m denotes the nal height
of p in one of A's buers at the end of T, then onsidering only p's aet on the following
terms, we have that:
SIGA,A − SIG
A[3]B,A = (M −m)−M = −m ≤ 0 (39)
(d) The stay begins at the outset of the protool, i.e. p started the transmission in one of A's
buers, and p remains in A's buers through the end of the transmission (either as a normal
or a agged paket). More speially, there is no inoming signature buer SIGA[3]
that hanges value as on (12.75) due to this stay of p, and there is no outgoing signature
buer SIGA[3] that hanges value as on (12.49) due to this stay of p. Letting M denote
the initial height of p in one of A's buers at the start of T and m the nal height of p in
one of A's buers at the end of T, then onsidering only p's aet on the following terms,
we have that:
SIGA,A = M −m ≤M (40)
We note that the above four ases over all possibilities by Claim 6.8 (whih remains valid
sine A is honest, and Lemma 11.1). We will now bound SIGA,A +
∑
B∈P\A SIG
A[3]A,B −
SIGA[3]B,A by adding all ontributions to SIGA,A and SIG
A[3]A,B′ and SIG
A[3]B,A from
all stays of all pakets and for all adjaent nodes B,B′. Notie that ignoring ontributions
as in Case () will only help our desired equality, and ontributions as in Case (a) are zero,
so we onsider only paket stays as in (38) and (40). Sine these ontributions to potential
orrespond to the initial height the paket had in one of A's buers at the outset of T, the
sum over all suh ontributions annot exeed A's potential at the outset of T, whih for an
honest node A is bounded by 2(n− 2)2n(2n+1)/2 < 4n3 − 6n2 (see e.g. proof of Claim 6.2).
7. Intuitively, this inequality means that beause a node an hold at most 2(n − 2)(2n) pakets
at any time, the dierene between the number of pakets reeived and the number of pakets
sent by an honest node will be bounded by 4n2 − 8n. Formally, during a transmission T, the
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only plaes the quantities SIG[1] hange are on (12.74) and (12.48). As with the proof of
Statement 6 above, we onsider the ontribution of eah paket p's stay in A41:
(a) The stay is initiated by A reeiving p during T and then sending p at some later round of
T, and getting onrmation of p's reeipt as in Denition 7.6. More speially, the stay
inludes an inrease to some inoming signature buer SIGA[1] as on (12.74) and then
an inrease to some outgoing signature buer SIGA[1] as on (12.48). Let B denote
the edge along whih A reeived p in this stay, and B′ denote the edge along whih A
sent p. Sine A will be verifying that B (respetively B′) signed the orret values (see
omments on (12.84-86) and (12.88-90)), we have that SIGA[1]B,A will inrease by 1
on (12.74) due to reeiving p for the rst time, and SIGA[1]A,B′ will inrease by 1 when
it reeives onrmation of reeipt for sending p as on (12.48). Therefore, onsidering
only p's aet on the following terms, we have that:
SIGA[1]B,A − SIG
A[1]A,B′ = 1− 1 = 0 (41)
(b) The stay is initiated by A reeiving p during T, but p then remains in A through the end of the
transmission (either as a normal or a agged paket). More speially, the stay inludes
an inrease to some inoming signature buer SIGA[1] as on (12.74), but there is no
outgoing signature buer SIGA[1] that hanges value as on (12.48) due to this stay of
p. Using the notation from (a) above, then onsidering only p's aet on the following
terms, we have that:
SIGA[1]B,A = 1 (42)
We note that the above two ases over all possibilities by Claim 6.8 (whih remains valid sine
A is honest, see Lemma 11.1). We now add all ontributions to SIGA[1]A,B′ and SIG
A[1]B,A
from all stays of all pakets from all neighbors. Notie that the only non-zero ontributions
ome from pakets stays as in (42), and these ontributions will orrespond to pakets that
are still in A's buers at the end of the transmission. Sine an honest node A an end the
transmission with at most 2(n − 2)(2n) pakets, summing over all suh ontributions results
annot exeed 4n2 − 8n, as required.
8. Intuitively, this is saying that an honest node annot output a paket more times than it
inputs the paket (see Claim 6.8). Note that this is the only plae in the theorem that
depends on status reports not originating from A (SIGB [p] is a status report parel from
B). A priori, there is the danger that a orrupt B an return a faulty status report, thereby
framing A. However, beause SIGB [p]A,B inludes a valid signature from A, the inforgibility
of the signature sheme guarantees that the only way a orrupt node B an frame A in this
manner is by reporting out-dated signatures. But if A is honest, then SIGB [p]A,B is stritly
inreasing in value as the transmission progresses (the only plae it hanges is (12.74), whih
omes from the value reeived on (12.62), orresponding to the value sent on (12.60)), and
hene a orrupt B annot frame A by reporting outdated signatures for SIGB [p]A,B; indeed
suh a ourse of ation only helps the inequality stated in the theorem. Also notie that
41
Note that neessarily p is a paket orresponding to the urrent odeword, sine pakets orresponding to old
odewords do not inrement SIG[1], see omments on (11.59-60) and (11.11). Therefore, there are only two ases
to onsider.
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(other than out-dated signatures) the only plae B gets valid signatures from A is on (12.62),
and this value is one higher than the value that A itself is reording (12.60) until A updates
SIGA[p]A,B on (12.48). We argue in ase (b) below, that whenever B has reeived an updated
SIGB [p]A,B as on (12.74) but A has not yet updated SIG
A[p]A,B as on (12.48) (and so these
two values dier by one), then Case (b) will ontribute -1 to the sum in (36), and therefore
the dierene of +1 between SIGB [p]A,B and SIG
A[p]A,B will exatly anel. These two fats
allow us to argue (36) by using SIGA[p]A,B instead of SIG
B [p]A,B.
Formally, during a transmission T, the only plaes the quantities SIG[p] hange are on (12.74)
and (12.48). As with the proof of Statement 3 above, we onsider the ontribution of eah
paket p's stay in A42:
(a) The stay is initiated by A reeiving p during T and then sending p at some later round of
T, and getting onrmation of p's reeipt as in Denition 7.6. More speially, the stay
inludes an inrease to some inoming signature buer SIGA[p] as on (12.74) and then
an inrease to some outgoing signature buer SIGA[p] as on (12.48). Let B denote
the edge along whih A reeived p in this stay, and B′ denote the edge along whih A
sent p. Sine A will be verifying that B (respetively B′) signed the orret values (see
omments on (12.84-86) and (12.88-90)), we have that SIGA[p]B,A will inrease by 1
on (12.74) due to reeiving p for the rst time, and SIGA[p]A,B′ will inrease by 1 when
it reeives onrmation of reeipt for sending p as on (12.48). Therefore, onsidering
only p's aet on the following terms, we have that:
SIGA[p]A,B′ − SIG
A[p]B,A = 1− 1 = 0 (43)
(b) The stay is initiated by A reeiving p during T, but p then remains in A through the end of the
transmission (either as a normal or a agged paket). More speially, the stay inludes
an inrease to some inoming signature buer SIGA[p] as on (12.74), but there is no
outgoing signature buer SIGA[p] that hanges value as on (12.48) due to this stay of
p. Using the notation from (a) above, then onsidering only p's aet on the following
terms, we have that:
− SIGA[1]B,A = −1 (44)
We note that the above two ases over all possibilities by Claim 6.8 (whih remains valid sine
A is honest, see Lemma 11.1). We now add all ontributions to SIGA[p]A,B′ and SIG
A[p]B,A
from all stays of p from all neighbors on P (note that it is enough to onsider only neighbors
on P by Claim 11.18). Notie that (43) does not ontribute anything, so we have that:
∑
B∈P
(SIGA[p]A,B − SIG
A[p]B,A) = −x, (45)
where x is the number of times Case (b) ours. Notie that (36) is interested in SIGB [p]A,B
(as opposed to SIGA[p]A,B). However, sine B annot report values of SIG
B [p]A,B from
42
Note that neessarily p is a paket orresponding to the urrent odeword, sine pakets orresponding to old
odewords do not inrement SIG[p], see omments on (12.59-60) and (11.11). Therefore, there are only two ases
to onsider.
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previous transmissions
43
, the only inaurate value that B an report in its status report
parel onerning SIGB [p]A,B is by using an older value from T. As disussed above, heating
in this manner only serves to help (36). On the other hand, if B does report the valid
value for SIGB [p]A,B (i.e. not outdated), then Lemma 11.17 guarantees that SIG
B [p]A,B −
SIGA[p]A,B ≤ 1, with equality if SIG
B [p]A,B has been updated as on (12.74) and SIG
A[p]A,B
has not yet been updated after this point as on (12.48). Notie that every time this happens,
we fall under Case (b) above, and in partiular it an happen at most x times (see denition
of x above). Therefore:∑
B∈P
(SIGB [p]A,B − SIG
A[p]B,A) ≤ x+
∑
B∈P
(SIGA[p]A,B − SIG
A[p]B,A) = x− x = 0, (46)
whih is (36).
All Statements of the Theorem have now been proven. 
We now prove a variant of Lemma 7.14.
Lemma 11.10. Suppose that A,B ∈ G are both honest nodes, and that in round t, B aepts (as
in Denition 6.5) a paket from A. Let OA,B denote A's outgoing buer along E(A,B), and let H
denote the height the paket had in OA,B when Send Paket was alled in round t (11.20). Also
let IB,A denote B's inoming buer along E(A,B), and let I denote the height of IB,A at the start
of t. Let ∆ϕB denote the hange in potential aused by this paket transfer, from B's perspetive.
More speially, dene:
ϕB := SIG
B [2]A,B − SIG
B [3]A,B (47)
and then ∆ϕB measures the dierene between the value of ϕB at the end of t and the start of t.
Then:
∆ϕB ≥ H − I − 1 OR ∆ϕB ≥ H (if B = R) (48)
Furthermore, after the paket transfer but before re-shuing, IB,A will have height I + 1.
Proof. By denition, B aepts the paket in round t means that (12.77) was reahed in round
t, and hene so was (12.74-75). In partiular, SIGB [3]A,B will inrease by HGP on (12.75) (if
B = R, then SIGB [3]A,B will not hange on this line- see omment there). By Statements 1 and
2 of Lemma 7.1 (whih remain valid sine B is honest by Lemma 11.1), HGP ≤ I + 1, and hene
SIGB [3]A,B will inrease by at most I + 1. Also, sine B had height I at the start of the round,
and B aepts a paket on (12.77) of round t, B will have I + 1 pakets in I when the re-shuing
phase of round t begins, whih is the seond statement of the lemma.
Meanwhile, SIGB [2]A,B will hange on (12.74) to whatever value B reeived on (12.62) (as sent
by A on (12.60) earlier in the round). Sine A is honest, this value is HFP larger than A's urrent
value in SIGA[3]A,B (12.60). By Lemma 11.17, the value of SIG
A[3]A,B at the start of t equals the
value of SIGB [2]A,B at the start (before B has aepted the paket) of t. Therefore, the hange in
SIGB [2]A,B from the start of the round to the end of the round will be the value of HFP = H when
A reahed (12.60) in round t (by denition of H and Statement 3 of Claim 7.7). Sine these are
the only plaes SIGB [3]A,B and SIG
B [2]A,B hange, we have that ∆ϕB = H −HGP ≥ H − I − 1,
as desired (if B = R, then ∆ϕB = H). 
43
We are only interested in pakets p orresponding to the urrent odeword, and all signatures that A provides
for SIGB[p]A,B inlude the transmission index, so A's honesty plus the inforgibility of the signature sheme imply
that B annot have any valid signatures from A ontributing to SIGB [p]A,B before the urrent transmission T.
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The following is a variant of Lemma 7.15.
Lemma 11.11. Let C = N1N2 . . . Nl be a path onsisting of l honest nodes, suh that R = Nl and
S /∈ C. Suppose that in some non-wasted round t, all edges E(Ni, Ni+1), 1 ≤ i < l are ative for
the entire round. For 1 ≤ i < l, let ∆φ denote the following hanges to SIGNi,Ni and SIG
Ni
during
round t:
1. Changes to ϕNi (see notation of Lemma 11.10),
2. Changes to SIGNi,Ni
Then if ON1,N2 denotes N1's outgoing buer along E(N1, N2), we have:
- If ON1,N2 has a agged paket that has already been aepted by N2 before round t, then:
∆φ ≥ O − l + 1 (49)
- Otherwise,
∆φ ≥ O − l + 2 (50)
where O denotes its height at the outset of t.
Proof. Sine A and B are honest, we use Lemma 11.1 and then follow exatly the proof of the
analogous laim for the edge-sheduling model (Lemma 7.15). In partiular, the exat proof an be
followed, using the fat that signature buers reord aurate hanges in non-dupliated potential
(Statement 1 of Lemma 11.16), and using Lemma 11.9 in plae of Lemma 6.11, and Lemma 11.10
in plae of Lemma 7.14. 
Lemma 11.12. If at any point in any transmission T, the number of bloked rounds is βT, then
the partiipating honest nodes of G will have reorded a drop in non-dupliated potential of at least
n(βT − 4n
3). More speially, the following inequality is true:
n(βT − 4n
3) <
∑
A∈H\S
SIGA,A +
∑ ∑
A∈H\S B∈P\{A,S}
(SIGA[2]B,A − SIG
A[3]B,A) (51)
Proof. For every bloked, non-wasted round t, by the onforming assumption there exists a hain Ct
onneting the sender and reeiver that satises the hypothesis of Lemma 11.11. Letting N1 denote
the rst node on this hain (not inluding the sender), the fat that the round was bloked (and
not wasted) means that N1's inoming buer was full (see Lemma 11.1), and then by Lemma 6.3,
so was N1's outgoing buer along E(N1, N2). Sine the length of the hain l is neessarily less than
or equal to n, Lemma 11.11 says that the hange of ∆φ (see notation there) in round t satises:
∆φ ≥ ON1,N2 − l + 1 ≥ 2n− n+ 1 > n (52)
Sine ∆φ only reords some of the hanges to the signature buers, we use Lemma 11.9 to argue
that the ontributions not ounted will only help the bound sine they are stritly non-negative.
Sine we are not double ounting anywhere, eah non-wasted, bloked round will orrespond to an
inrease in ∆φ of at least n, whih then yields the lemma sine the number of wasted rounds is
bounded by 4n3 (Lemma 10.9). 
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Lemma 11.13. If there exists A,B ∈ G suh that one of the following inequalities is not true, then
either A or B is neessarily orrupt, and furthermore the sender an identify onlusively44 whih
is orrupt
45
:
1. SIGB [2]A,B ≤ SIG
A[3]A,B + 2n
2. SIGA[3]S,A − SIG
S [2]S,A ≤ 2n
3. |SIGA[1]B,A − SIG
B [1]B,A| ≤ 1 and |SIG
A[1]A,B − SIG
B [1]A,B | ≤ 1
(53)
Proof. As in the rst paragraph of the proof of Lemma 11.9, we may assume that both A and B have
reeived the full Start of Transmission broadast for T, so SIGA and SIGB should both be leared
(if A and B are both honest) of its values from the previous transmission before being updated with
values orresponding to the urrent transmission T. We prove eah Statement separately:
1. That either A or B is neessarily orrupt follows from Lemma 11.17. It remains to show
that the sender an identify a node that is neessarily orrupt. We begin by assuming that
SIGB [2]A,B and SIG
A[3]A,B have appropriate signatures orresponding to T (otherwise, they
either would not have been aepted as a valid status report parel on (14.161), or a node will
be eliminated as on 14.163). We now show that if the inequality in Statement 1 is not true for
some A,B ∈ G, then A is neessarily orrupt. Notie that if A is honest, then SIGA[3]A,B is
monotone inreasing (other than being leared upon reeipt of the SOT broadast, SIGA[3]A,B
is only updated on 12.49). Similarly, other than being leared upon reeipt of the SOT
broadast, SIGB [2]A,B is only updated on (12.74), and traing this bakwards, this omes
from the value reeived on (12.62) whih in turn was sent on (12.60). Therefore, sine B
annot forge A's signature (exept with negligible probability or in the ase A and B are
both orrupt and olluding), SIGB [2]A,B an only take on values A sent B as on (12.60).
Meanwhile, as mentioned, if A is honest, SIGA[3]A,B is monotone inreasing, and thus an
honest A will never send a value for SIGA[3]A,B on (12.60) of some round that is smaller
than a value it sent for SIGA[3]A,B on (12.60) of some earlier round. Therefore, sine the
value A is supposed to send B is HFP ≤ 2n (the inequality follows from Statement 9 of
Lemma 7.1 and Lemma 11.1), unless A is orrupt or B has broken the signature sheme, B
will never have a signed value from A suh that SIGB [2]A,B > 2n + SIG
A[3]A,B . Therefore,
if the inequality in the rst statement is not satised, A is neessarily orrupt (exept with
negligible probability).
2. That A is neessarily orrupt follows from Lemma 11.17 and the fat that the sender annot
be orrupted by the onforming restrition plaed on the adversary.
3. Note that the two statements are redundant, sine the seond is idential to the rst after
swapping the terms on the LHS and re-labelling. We therefore only onsider the seond
inequality of Statement 3. That either A or B is neessarily orrupt follows from Lemma
11.17. It remains to show that the sender an identify a node that is neessarily orrupt. As
44
As long as the adversary does not break the signature sheme, whih will happen with all but negligible probability,
the sender will never falsely identify an honest node.
45
The values of the quantities SIGB and SIGA all orrespond to a ommon transmission T and refer to values the
sender has reeived in the form of status reports for T as on (14.161).
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in the proof of Statement 1 above, we begin by assuming that SIGB [1]A,B and SIG
A[1]A,B
have appropriate signatures orresponding to T (otherwise, they either would not have been
aepted as a valid status report parel on (14.161), or a node will be eliminated as on
14.163). We now show that if |SIGA[1]A,B − SIG
B [1]A,B | > 1 for some A,B ∈ G, then
either A or B is neessarily orrupt, and the sender an identify whih one is orrupt.
Notie that the quantities SIGB [1]A,B and SIG
A[1]A,B inlude the round in whih the
quantity last hanged ((11.11) and (12.60)). Let tB denote the round SIG
B [1]A,B indiates it
was last updated (whih has been signed by A), and tA denote the round SIG
A[1]A,B indiates
it was last updated (whih has been signed by B. Note that these quantities refer to the values
returned to the sender in the form of status report parels, and node A (respetively B) has
signed the entire parel SIGA[1]A,B (respetively SIG
B [1]A,B), indiating this is indeed the
parel he wishes to ommit to as his status report. We assume |SIGA[1]A,B−SIG
B [1]A,B | > 1,
and break the proof into the following two ases:
Case 1: tA > tB. We will show that B is orrupt. Notie that the fat that A has a
valid signature on SIGA[1]A,B from B for round tA means that (with all but negligible
probability that A ould forge B's signature, or if A and B are both orrupt, allowing
A to forge B's signature) B sent ommuniation as on (11.11) of tA with the fth
oordinate equal to the value A used for SIGA[1]A,B . In partiular, this fth oordinate
represents the value B has stored for SIGB [1]A,B during tA. Sine tB < tA, B does not
update SIGB [1]A,B from tB through the end of T, and hene the value for SIG
B [1]A,B
that B returns the sender in its status report should be the same as the value B sent
to A on (11.11) of round tA, whih as noted above equals the value of SIG
A[1]A,B
that A returned in its status report. However, sine this is not the ase (SIGB [1]A,B 6=
SIGA[1]A,B), B has returned an outdated signature and must be orrupt.
Case 2: tA ≤ tB . If tA = tB = 0, i.e. both nodes agree that they did not update their
signature buers along E(A,B) in the entire transmission (exept to lear them when
they reeived the SOT broadast), then neessarily both SIGA[1]A,B and SIG
B [1]A,B
should be set to ⊥, so if one of them is not ⊥, the node signing the non-⊥ value an
be eliminated. So assume that one of the nodes has a valid signature from the other
for some round in T (i.e. that tB > 0). We will show that A is orrupt in a manner
similar to showing B was orrupt above. Indeed, sine B has a valid signature from
A on SIGB [1]A,B from round tB , unless A and B are olluding or B has managed to
forge A's signature, this value for SIGB [1]A,B omes from the ommuniation sent by
A on (12.60). In partiular, sine tA ≤ tB and A laims he was not able to update
SIGA[1]A,B after round tA, the value A signed and sent on (12.60) should be exatly
one l more than the value stored in SIGA[1]A,B as of line (11.07) of round tA, the latter
of whih was returned by A in its status report (by denition of tA and the inforgibility
of the signature sheme). But sine |SIGA[1]A,B − SIG
B [1]A,B | > 1, this must not be
the ase, and hene A is orrupt. 
Corollary 11.14. If there exists a node A ∈ G suh that:
4n3 − 4n2 < SIGA,A +
∑
B∈P\A
SIGB [2]A,B − SIG
A[3]B,A, (54)
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then either a node an be eliminated as in Statement 1 of Lemma 11.13 or as in Statement 6 of
Lemma 11.9.
Proof. Suppose no node an be eliminated beause of Statement 1 of Lemma 11.13, so that for all
B ∈ G:
SIGB [2]A,B ≤ SIG
A[3]A,B + 2n. (55)
Then if (54) is true, we have that:
4n3 − 4n2 < SIGA,A +
∑
B∈P\A
SIGB [2]A,B − SIG
A[3]B,A
≤ SIGA,A + 2n
2 +
∑
B∈P\A
SIGA[3]A,B − SIG
A[3]B,A (56)
where the seond inequality follows from applying (55) to eah term of the sum. Therefore, A an
be eliminated by Statement 6 of Lemma 11.9. 
Corollary 11.15. In the ase a transmission fails as in F2, the inrease in network potential due
to paket insertions is at most 2nD + 2n2. In other words, either there exists a node A ∈ G suh
that the sender an eliminate A, or the following inequality is true46:
∑
A∈P\S
SIGA[3]S,A < 2nD + 2n
2
(57)
Proof. If the inequality in Statement 2 of Lemma 11.13 fails for any node A ∈ P \ S, the sender
an immediately eliminate A. So assume that the inequality in Statement 2 of Lemma 11.13 holds
for every A ∈ P \ S. The orollary will be a onsequene of the following observation:
Observation. If a transmission T fails as in F2, then:
∑
A∈P\S
SIGS [2]S,A < 2nD (58)
Proof. Let κT denote the value that κ had at the end of T. Then formally, a transmission
falling under F2 means that κT is less than D. The struture of this proof will be to rst
show that for any A ∈ P \ S, anytime SIGS [2]S,A is updated as on (12.48), it will always
be the ase that 2n ∗ SIGS [1]S,A ≥ SIG
S [2]S,A (so that in partiular that the nal value for
SIGS [2]S,A at the end of T is less than or equal to 2n times the nal value for SIG
S [1]S,A).
We will then show that at the end of T:
∑
A∈P\S SIG
S [1]S,A = κT. From these two fats, we
will have shown:
∑
A∈P\S
SIGS [2]S,A ≤
∑
A∈P\S
2n ∗ SIGS [1]S,A = 2nκT < 2nD (59)
as required.
46
The values of the quantities SIGA orrespond to some transmission T and refer to values the sender has reeived
in the form of status reports for T as on (14.161).
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The rst fat is immediate, sine for any A ∈ P \ S, whenever SIGS [2]S,A is updated as on
(12.48), the statement on (12.45) must have been satised, and so the statement on (12.89)
must have been false. In partiular, the hange in SIGS [1]S,A was exatly one, and the hange
in SIGS [2]S,A was at most HFP ≤ 2n, where the inequality omes from Statement 9 of Lemma
7.1 and Lemma 11.1 (see omments on lines (12.88-90)). The seond fat is also immediate,
as κ and SIGS [1]S,A all start the transmission with value zero (or ⊥) by lines (10.54), (10.70),
(15.199), and (15.213), and then κ is inremented by one on line (12.47) of the outgoing
buer along some edge E(S,N) if and only if SIGS [1]S,N is inremented by one as on (12.48)
(as already argued, hanges to SIGS [1]S,A as on (12.48) are always inrements of one, see
e.g. the omments on lines (12.88-90)). 
The orollary now follows immediately from the following string of inequalities:
2nD >
∑
A∈P\S
SIGS [2]S,A
≥ −2n2 +
∑
A∈P\S
SIGA[3]S,A
where the top inequality is the statement of the Observation and the seond inequality omes from
applying the inequality in Statement 2 of Lemma 11.13 to eah term of the sum. 
Lemma 11.16. For any honest node N ∈ G and for any transmission T:
1. Upon reeipt of the omplete Start of Transmission (SOT) broadast for transmission T,
SIGN,N will be leared. After this point through the end of transmission T, SIGN,N stores
the orret value orresponding to the urrent transmission T (as listed on 9.12).
2. Suppose that N transfers at least one paket during T (i.e. N sends or reeives at least one
paket, as on (12.60) or (12.74-78)). Then through all transmissions after T until the trans-
mission and round (T′, t′ ∈ T′) that N next reeives the omplete SOT transmission for T′,
one of the following must happen:
(a) All of N 's signature buers ontain information (i.e. signatures from neighbors) pertain-
ing to T, or
(b) All of N 's signature buers are lear and N 's broadast buer47 ontains all of the in-
formation that was in the signature buers at the end of T, or
() (N, T, T′) is not on the blaklist for transmission T′
3. If N has reeived the full SOT broadast for T, then all parels in N 's broadast buer47BB
orresponding to some node N̂ 's status report are urrent and orret. More preisely:
(a) If (N̂ , T̂) is on the sender's blaklist, and at any time N has stored a parel of N̂ 's
orresponding status report in its broadast buer BB, then this parel will not be deleted
until (N̂ , T̂) is removed from the sender's blaklist.
47
Or the Data Buer in the ase N = S.
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(b) If (N̂ , T̂, T′) is a part of the SOT broadast of transmission T′, then upon reeipt of this
parel, all of N̂ 's status report parels in N 's broadast buer orrespond to transmission
T
′
and are of the form as indiated on (14.141-144), where the reason for failure of
transmission T
′
was determined as on (15.190), (15.193), or (15.196).
4. If at any time N is storing a parel of the form (B, N̂, T̂) in its broadast buer (indiating B
knows N̂ 's omplete status report for transmission T̂), then this will not be deleted until (N̂ , T̂)
has been removed from the blaklist.
Proof. Fix an honest N ∈ G and a transmission T. We prove eah Statement separately:
1. The rst part of statement 1 is Lemma 11.8. To prove the seond part, we trak all hanges
to SIGN,N and show that eah hange aurately reords the value SIGN,N is supposed to
hold. The only hanges made to SIGN,N after reeiving the full SOT broadast our on
lines (7.76), (12.50), (12.80), and (12.82). Meanwhile, SIGN,N is supposed to trak all
paket movement that ours within N 's own buers (i.e. all paket movement exept paket
transfers). The only plaes pakets move within buers of N are on lines (7.89-90), (12.50),
(12.80), and (12.82). By the omments on lines (12.50), (12.53), (12.80), and (12.82), it is
lear that SIGN,N appropriately traks hanges in potential due to the all to Fill Gap, while
paket movement as on (12.53) does not need to hange SIGN,N as pakets are swapped, and
so there is no net hange in potential. In terms of re-shuing (7.89-90), we see that every
paket that is re-shued auses a hange in SIGN,N of M −m− 1 (7.76). Notie the atual
hange in potential mathes this amount, sine a paket is removed from a buer at height
M (7.90), reduing the height of that buer from M to M − 1 (a drop in potential of M),
and put into a buer at height m+1, inreasing the height of the buer from m to m+1 (an
inrease of m+ 1 to potential).
2. If N = S, there is nothing to show, sine the sender's signature buers' information is stored
as needed on (15.191), (15.194), and (15.197), and they are then leared at the end of
every transmission on (15.171) or (15.199). For any N 6= S, we show that from the time N
reeives the full SOT broadast in a transmission T through the next transmission T
′
in whih
N next hears the full SOT broadast, either all of N 's signature buers ontain information
from the last time they were updated in some round of T, or they are empty and either this
information has already been transferred to N 's broadast buer or N is not on the blaklist
for transmission T
′
(this will prove Statement 2). During transmission T, there is nothing to
show, as all hanges made to any signature buer over-write earlier hanges, so throughout
T, the signature buers will always ontain the most urrent information. It remains to show
that between the end of T and the time N reeives the full SOT broadast of transmission T′,
the only hange that N 's signature buers an make is to be leared, and this an happen
only if either the information ontained in them is rst transferred to N 's broadast buer, or
if (N, T, T′) does not appear in the SOT broadast of transmission T′ (and hene the signature
information will not be needed anyway). To do this, we list all plaes in the pseudo-ode
that all for a hange to one of the signature buers or removing data from the broadast
buer, and argue that one of these two things must happen. In partiular, the only plaes
the signature buers of N hange (after initialization) are: (12.48-49), (12.50), (12.74-75),
(12.80), (12.82), (14.128), (14.133), (14.141), (14.146), and (7.76). The only plae that
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information that was one in one of N 's signature buers is removed from the broadast buer
is (14.134).
First notie that beause N transfers a paket in transmission T, N must have reeived the
omplete SOT broadast for transmission T (Lemma 11.8). For all rounds of all transmissions
between T + 1 and the time N reeives the full SOT broadast for transmission T′, lines
(12.48-51), (12.74-78), and (7.76) will never be reahed by N (see Lemma 11.8 and its
proof). Similarly, line (12.80) will never be reahed sine (12.63) will always be satised.
Although (12.82) may be reahed, we argue that it will not hange SIGN,N by arguing that
for all rounds between T+ 1 and the time N reeives the full SOT broadast for transmission
T
′
, there will never be odeword pakets oupying a higher slot than the ghost paket. More
preisely, we will show that for all rounds between T+1 and the time N reeives the full SOT
broadast for transmission T
′
, either HGP = ⊥ or HGP = HIN + 1, and then by Statements
1 and 2 of Lemma 7.1 (together with the fat that N is honest and so we may apply Lemma
11.1), Fill Gap on (12.82) will not be performed (see omments on that line). That HGP = ⊥
or HGP = HIN + 1 for all of these rounds follows from the fat that HGP will be set to ⊥
at the end of T (15.209), after whih it an only be modied on (12.66), (12.72), (12.76),
(12.78), (12.80), or (12.82). Notie that all of these set HGP to ⊥ or HIN + 1 and that
HIN + 1 annot hange for all rounds between T + 1 and the time N reeives the full SOT
broadast for transmission T
′
by Lemma 11.8.
It remains to onsider lines (14.128), (14.133), (14.141), (14.146), and (14.134); the
rst four lear the signature buers, and the last lears the broadast buer. So it remains
to argue that if any of these lines are reahed, either the broadast buer is storing all of
the information that the signature buers held at the end of T, or (N, T, T′) annot appear
as part of the SOT broadast of transmission T
′
. Line (14.128) is learly overed by the
latter ase, sine if a parel of this form is reeived in some transmission T̂ ∈ [T + 1..T′], then
(N, T) is not on the sender's blaklist as of T̂ > T, and hene (N, T) will never be able to be
re-added to the blaklist after this point (see (15.188)). Similar reasoning shows that line
(14.146) is overed by one of these two ases. In partiular, if N reahes line (14.146) in some
transmission T̂ ∈ [T+1..T′], then either N will add the information in its signature buers into
its broadast buers as on (14.142-145) before reahing (14.146), or else N was not on the
blaklist as of T̂, and hene it is impossible for (N, T, T′) to be a part of the SOT broadast for
transmission T
′
. Now suppose N reahes (14.133-134) in some round of a transmission T̂ > T
indiating that a node N̂ is to be eliminated. In order to reah (14.133-134) in transmission
T̂, N must not have known that N̂ was to be eliminated before that point (14.131), and sine
N reeived the omplete SOT broadast of transmission T (by Lemma 11.8 together with the
hypotheses that N is honest and transferred a paket in T), N̂ must have been eliminated
in some transmission T˜ ≥ T. In partiular, if T˜ = T, then (N, T) an never be added to the
blaklist (sine (14.188) annot be reahed in transmission T if Eliminate Node is reahed in
that transmission); while if T˜ > T, then (N, T) will be leared from the blaklist as on (14.171)
(if it was on the blaklist), and as already remarked, (N, T) an never again appear on the
blaklist after this.
Now suppose (14.141) is reahed in some transmission T̂ > T and the signature buers
are leared on this line. Now before line (14.141) was reahed, by indution, one of the three
statements (a), (b), or () was true. If (b) or () was true, then hanges made on (14.141) will
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not aet the fat that (b) or () will remain true. Therefore, assume that we are in ase (a)
before reahing (14.141), i.e. that when (14.141) is reahed in transmission T̂, N 's signature
buers ontain the information that they had at the end of T. Sine (14.141) was reahed,
it must have been that (N, T˜, T̂) was reeived on (14.137) as part of the SOT broadast for
transmission T̂, for some T˜. We rst argue T˜ ≥ T. To see this, sine N is honest, it will not
transfer any pakets in T if it is on its own version of the blaklist ((11.31-33) and (11.35-
37)). Sine we know that N did transfer pakets in transmission T (by hypothesis), and also
N reeived the full SOT broadast of that same transmission (Lemma 11.8), either N was not
on the blaklist as of the start of transmission T, or N reeived information as on (14.147)
indiating N ould be removed from the blaklist. Both of these ases imply that by the end
of T, (N, T˜) an never be on the blaklist for any T˜ < T. Thus, T˜ ≥ T, as laimed. Sine we
are assuming ase (a), if T˜ = T, then (14.141) will not be satised. On the other hand, if
T˜ > T, then N has appeared on the blaklist for some transmission after T, and then Lemma
11.6 guarantees that (N, T) is not on the blaklist as of T̂ > T, whih as noted above implies
(N, T, T′) annot be part of the SOT broadast of transmission T′.
3. For Statement (a), we trak all the times parels are removed from N 's broadast buer BB,
and ensure that if ever N removes a status report parel belonging to N̂ for some transmission
T̂, then (N̂ , T̂) is no longer on the sender's blaklist. If N = S, notie the only plae that
information onerning other nodes' status report parels is removed from the sender's data
buer is (15.171), and at this point N̂ is not on the blaklist sine the blaklist is leared on
this same line.
If N 6= S, hanges to BB our only on lines (14.134), (14.139), (14.149), (14.142-
145), and (14.154). The former three lines remove things from BB, while the latter lines
add things to BB. In terms of statement (a), we must ensure whenever one of the former
three lines is reahed, there will never be a status report parel from N̂ and orresponding
to transmission T̂ that is removed from BB if (N̂ , T̂) is on the blaklist. Looking rst at line
(14.134), suppose that N reahes line (14.134) in some transmission T˜ ≥ T. If (N̂ , T̂, T˜) was
not a part of the SOT broadast of transmission T˜, then there is nothing to show (sine N̂ is
not on the blaklist as of the outset of T˜). So suppose that (N̂ , T̂, T˜) was a part of the SOT
broadast of transmission T˜. Sine reahing line (14.134) requires that N has newly learned
that a node has been added to EN (14.131), let N ′ denote this node, and let T′ denote the
round that N ′ was eliminated from the network as on (15.170). First note that neessarily
T
′ < T̂. After all, the blaklist will be leared on line (15.171) of round T′, and hene if (N̂ , T̂)
is still on the blaklist as of the outset of T˜, it must have been added afterwards. We now argue
that beause T
′ < T̂, the priority rules of transferring broadast information will ditate that
all honest nodes will neessarily learn N ′ has been eliminated before they learn that (N̂ , T̂) is
on the blaklist. From this, we will onlude that when N reahes (14.134) in transmission
T˜ and learns that N ′ should be eliminated, that N has not yet learned that (N̂ , T̂) is on the
blaklist, and hene N 's broadast buer will not be storing any of N̂ 's status report parels
for T̂ (14.152).
It remains to show that any honest node A ∈ G will learn that N ′ has been eliminated
before they learn (N̂ , T̂) is on the blaklist. So x an honest node A ∈ G. Suppose A rst
learns (N̂ , T̂) is on the blaklist via a parel of the form (N̂ , T̂, X) that it reeived as on (14.137)
of transmission X. Clearly, X > T̂, sine (N̂ , T̂) an only be put on the blaklist at the very
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end of transmission T̂. Therefore, sine T
′ < T̂ < X, we have that (N ′, X) will be a part of the
SOT broadast for transmission X, indiating that N ′ has been eliminated (15.200). Sine
A is honest, it will therefore reeive (N ′, X) before it reeives (N̂ , T̂, X) (see priority rules for
reeiving broadast parels, (13.110) and (13.115))
We next onsider when status report parels are removed from BB as on (14.139). In this
ase, N has reeived a SOT broadast parel of form (N̂ , T̂, T′) (14.137), and N is removing
from BB all of N̂ 's status report parels orresponding to transmissions other than T̂. First
note that Lemma 11.6 guarantees that N̂ is on at most one blaklist at any time. Sine N
reeived a SOT parel of the form (N̂ , T̂, T′) during transmission T′, it must be that (N̂ , T̂) was
on the sender's blaklist at the outset of T
′
, and sine nothing an be added to the blaklist
until the very end of a transmission (15.188), only (N̂ , T̂) an be on the sender's blaklist at
the outset of T
′
. This ase is now settled, as we have shown that N does not remove any of the
status report parels from N̂ orresponding to T̂ on (14.139), and this is the only transmission
for whih N̂ an be on the blaklist (at least through T′).
To omplete Statement (a), it remains to onsider line (14.149). But this is immediate,
as if the sender at any time removes (N̂ , T̂) from the blaklist, then it an never again be
re-added (sine nodes are added to the blaklist at the very end of a transmission (15.188),
they are not removed as on (14.166) or (15.171) until at least the next transmission, at whih
point the same (node, transmission) pair (N̂ , T̂) an never again be added to the blaklist as
on (15.188) sine T̂ has already passed). Therefore, when N reahes (14.149), if the items
deleted from BB orrespond to N̂ , then N must have reeived a broadast parel of form
(N̂ , 0, T) as on (14.147), indiating that N̂ was no longer on the blaklist. Consequently,
the status parels deleted will never again be needed sine (N̂ , T̂) an never again be on the
blaklist.
Part (a) of Statement 3 of the lemma (now proven) states that no status report parel still
needed by the sender will ever be deleted from a node's broadast buer. Part (b) states that
a node's broadast buer will not hold extraneous status report parels, i.e. status reports
orresponding to multiple transmissions for the same node. This is immediate, sine whenever
a node N learns a node (N̂ , T′) is on the blaklist as on (14.137), then N will immediately
delete all of its status report parels from N̂ orresponding to transmissions other than T′
(14.139). The fat that the stored parels have the orret information (i.e. that they address
the appropriate reason for failure as on (14.142-145)) follows from the fat that N will only
initially store a status report parel if it ontains the orret information (14.153).
4. There are three lines on whih the broadast parels of the kind relevant to Statement 4) are
removed from N 's broadast buer: (14.134), (14.139), and (14.149). We onsider eah of
these three lines. Suppose rst that the parel (B, N̂ , T̂) is removed from N 's broadast buer
as on line (14.134) of some transmission T
′
. In partiular, N learns for the rst time in the
SOT broadast of transmission T
′
that some node N˜ has been eliminated. Let T˜ denote the
transmission that the sender eliminated this node (as on (15.169-177)). If T˜ > T̂, then (N̂ , T̂)
will be leared from the blaklist on line (15.171) of T˜, and hene when (B, N̂, T̂) is removed
from N 's broadast buer in transmission T′ > T˜, (N̂ , T̂) will no longer be on the blaklist, as
required. Therefore, assume T˜ < T̂ (equality here is impossible sine lines (15.169-177) and
(15.188) an never both be reahed in a single transmission, see e.g. (15.177)). Let X denote
the transmission in whih N rst learned that (N̂ , T̂) was on the blaklist, i.e. N reeived a
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parel of the form (N̂ , T̂, X) on (14.137) of transmission X. Clearly, X > T̂, sine (N̂ , T̂) an only
be added to the blaklist at the end of T̂ (15.188). Also, X ≤ T′, sine by hypothesis a parel of
the form (B, N̂, T̂) is removed from N 's broadast buer on line (14.134) of T′, and this parel
an only have been added to N 's broadast buer in the rst plae if N already knew that
(N̂ , T̂) was blaklisted (14.151). Lastly, X ≥ T′, sine T˜ < T̂ implies that N˜ was eliminated
before (N̂ , T̂) was added to the blaklist, and therefore by the priorities of sending/reeiving
broadast parels ((13.110) and (13.115)), we have that an honest N will learn that N˜ has
been eliminated before it will learn that (N̂ , T̂) is on the blaklist. Combining these inequalities
shows that X ≥ T′ and X ≤ T′, so X = T′. But this implies that when (14.134) is reahed in
T
′
, N does not yet know that (N̂ , T̂) is on the blaklist, and onsequently the parel (B, N̂ , T̂)
annot yet be stored in N 's broadast buer, whih ontradits the fat that it was removed
on (14.134) of T
′
. Therefore, whenever (14.134) is reahed, either (N̂ , T̂) will no longer be
on the blaklist, or there will be no parels of the form (B, N̂, T̂) that are removed.
Suppose now that the parel (B, N̂, T̂) is removed from N 's broadast buer as on line
(14.139) or (14.149) of some transmission T
′
. In either ase, by looking at the omments on
these lines together with Lemma 11.6, (N̂ , T̂) has already been removed from the blaklist if
a parel of the form (B, N̂, T̂) is removed on either of these lines. 
Lemma 11.17. If A,B ∈ G are honest (not orrupt), in any transmission T for whih both A and
B have reeived the full SOT broadast:
1. Between the time B aepts a paket from A on line (12.77) through the time A gets onr-
mation of reeipt (see Denition 7.6) for it as on (12.50), we have:
• SIGB [1]A,B = 1 + SIG
A[1]A,B
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• SIGB [p]A,B = 1 + SIG
A[p]A,B
48
• SIGB [2]A,B = M +SIG
A[3]A,B, where M is the value of HFP on (12.60) (aording to
A's view) in the same round in whih (12.77) was reahed by B
• SIGB [3]A,B = m+ SIG
A[2]A,B, where m is the value of HGP on (12.75) (aording to
B's view) in the same round in whih (12.77) was reahed by B
2. At all other times, we have that SIGB [1]A,B = SIG
A[1]A,B, SIG
B [2]A,B = SIG
A[3]A,B,
SIGB [3]A,B = SIG
A[2]A,B, and SIG
B [p]A,B = SIG
A[p]A,B for eah paket p that is part of
the urrent odeword.
Proof. The struture of the proof will be as follows. We begin by observing all signature buers are
initially empty (10.48) and (10.54), and that for any transmission T, both SIGA and SIGB are
leared before any pakets are transferred (Lemma 11.8). We will then fous on a single transmission
for whih A and B have both reeived the full SOT broadast, and prove that all hanges made to
SIGA and SIGB during this transmission (after the buers are leared upon reeipt of the SOT
broadast) respet the relationships in the lemma. Sine the only hanges our on lines (12.48-49)
and (12.74-75), it will be enough to onsider only these 4 lines. Furthermore, if lines (12.48-49)
were reahed x times by A in the transmission, and lines (12.74-75) were reahed y times by B,
then:
48
If the paket aepted orresponds to an old odeword, then SIGB [1]A,B = SIG
A[1]A,B and SIG
B[p]A,B =
SIGA[1]A,B = ⊥.
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(a) Either y = x or y = x+ 1,
(b) Neither set of lines an be reahed twie onseutively (without the other set being reahed
in between)
() Lines (12.74-75) are neessarily reahed before lines (12.48-49) (i.e. in any transmission,
neessarily y will hange from zero to 1 before x does).
Notie that the the top statement follows from the seond two statements, so we will only prove
them below.
We rst prove the three statements above. We rst dene x more preisely: x begins eah
transmission set to zero, and inrements by one every time line 50 is reahed (just after A's signature
buers are updated on lines (12.48-49)). Also, dene y to begin eah transmission equal to zero,
and to inrement by one when line (12.74) is reahed (just before B's signature buers are updated
on lines (12.74-75)). Statement () is immediate, sine RR begins every round equal to −1 (lines
(10.50) and (15.209)), and an only be hanged to a higher index on (12.78). Therefore, (12.46)
an never be satised before (12.78) is reahed, whih implies (12.48) is never reahed before
(12.74) is. We now prove Statement (b). Suppose lines (12.48-49) are reahed in some round t.
Notie sine we are in round t when this happens, and beause RR an never have a higher index
than the urrent round index, and the most reent round RR ould have been set is the previous
round, we have that B's value for RR (and the one A is using on the omparison on (12.45-46))
is at most t − 1. Also, HFP and FR will be set to ⊥ on (12.51) of t. If FR ever hanges to a
non-⊥ value after this, it an only happen on (12.56), and so the value it takes must be at least t.
Therefore, if at any time after t we have that FR 6= ⊥, then if RR has not hanged sine t − 1,
then (12.46) an never pass, sine RR ≤ t− 1 < t ≤ FR. Consequently, (12.78) must be reahed
before (12.48-49) an be reahed again after round t, and hene so must (12.74-75). This shows
that (12.48-49) an never be reahed twie, without (12.74-75) being reahed in between.
Conversely, suppose lines (12.74-75) are reahed in some round t. Notie sine we are in round
t when this happens, and beause FR an never have a higher index than the urrent round index,
we have that A's value for FR (and the one B is using on the omparison on (12.73)) is at most t.
Also, RR will be set to t on (12.78) of round t, and RR annot hange again until (at some later
round) (12.73) is satised again (or the end of the transmission, in whih ase their is nothing to
show). If line (12.56) is NOT reahed after (12.74-75) of round t, then FR an never inrease to a
larger round index, so FR will remain at most t. Consequently, line (12.73) an never pass, sine if
B reeives the ommuniation from A on line (12.62), then by the above omments RR ≥ t ≥ FR.
Consequently, (12.56) must be reahed before (12.73) an be reahed again after round t. However,
by Statement 3 of Lemma 7.7, (12.56) annot be reahed until A reeives onrmation of reeipt
from B (see Denition 7.6), i.e. (12.56) an be reahed after (12.74-75) of round t only if lines
(12.48-49) are reahed.
We now prove the lemma by using an indutive argument on the following laim:
Claim. Every time line (12.74) is reahed (and y is inremented), we have that equalities of
Statement 2 of the lemma are true, and between this time and the time line (12.48) is reahed (or
the end of the transmission, whihever omes rst), we have that the equalities of the rst statement
of the lemma are true.
To prove the base ase, notie that before lines (12.74-75) are reahed for the rst time, but after
both nodes have reeived the transmission's SOT broadast, all entries to both signature buers are
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⊥, and so the indution hypothesis is true. Now onsider any time in the transmission for whih
y is inremented by one in some round t (i.e. line (12.74) is reahed). Sine neither x nor y an
hange between lines (11.20) and (11.22), by the indution hypothesis we have that the equalities
of the seond statement of the lemma are true when A sends the ommuniation as on (12.60)
of round t. Sine A has atually sent (SIGA[1] + 1, SIGA[p] + 1, SIGA[3] +HFP ), and these are
the quantities that B stores on lines (12.74-75), we have that the rst statement of the lemma
will be true after leaving line (12.75) (and in partiular the laim remains true). More speially,
letting M denote the value of HFP (respetively letting m denote the value of HGP ) when (12.60)
(respetively (12.74)) is reahed in round t, we will have that immediately after leaving (12.75):
1. SIGB [1]A,B = 1 + SIG
A[1]A,B
2. SIGB [p]A,B = 1 + SIG
A[p]A,B
3. SIGB [2]A,B = M + SIG
A[3]A,B
4. SIGB [3]A,B = m+ SIG
A[2]A,B
as required by Statement 1 of the Lemma. By Statement (b) above, either the signature buers along
E(A,B) do not hange through the end of the transmission, or the next hange neessarily ours
as on (12.48-49). In the former ase, the Claim ertainly remains true. In the latter ase, let t
′
denote the time that (12.48) is next reahed. Notie that t
′ > t, as Statement (b) above guarantees
(12.48) is reahed after (12.74), and by examining the pseudo-ode, this annot happen until at
least the next round after t. In partiular, the values reeived on (11.07) of round t
′
neessarily
reet the most reent values of SIGB (i.e. B's signature buers have already been updated as on
(12.74-75) when B sends A the ommuniation on (12.11)). Consequently, A will hange SIGA[1],
SIGA[2], and SIGA[p] to the values B is storing in SIGB [1], SIGB [3], and SIGB [p], respetively.
Therefore, the laim (and hene the lemma) will be true provided we an show that when A updates
SIGA[3] as on (12.49), that the new value for SIGA[3] equals the value stored in SIGB [2]. Sine
before (12.49) is reahed, we have by the indution hypothesis that SIGB [2]A,B = M+SIG
A[3]A,B ,
it is enough to show that when SIGA[3] is updated on (12.49), that the value of HFP there equals
M . We argue that this by showing HFP will not hange from line (12.60) of round t (when M was
set to HFP ) through line (12.49) of round t
′
. To see this, notie that the only possible plaes HFP
an hange during a transmission are lines (12.51), (12.53), and (12.56). Clearly, (12.51) annot
be reahed between these times, sine (12.49) is not reahed during these times. Also, Statement 3
of Lemma 7.7 implies that (12.56) annot be reahed between these times either. Finally, (12.53)
annot be reahed, sine RR will be set to t on (12.78) of round t, and by statement (b), (12.78)
annot be reahed again until after (12.49) is reahed in round t
′
, and hene RR will be equal to
t from (12.78) of round t through (12.49) of round t
′
. Also, FR will not hange between these
times (also by Statement 3 of Lemma 7.7), and sine the only non-⊥ value FR is ever set to is the
urrent round as on (12.56), we have that FR ≤ t. Putting these fats together, we have that
for all times between line (12.60) of round t through line (12.49) of round t
′
, either A does not
reeive RR (in whih ase RR = ⊥ when (12.52) is reahed) or A reeives RR, whih as noted
obeys RR = t ≥ FR. In either ase, (12.52) will fail, and (12.53) annot be reahed. 
Lemma 11.18. For any transmission T, reall that PT denotes the list of nodes that partiipated
in that transmission, and it is set at the end of eah transmission on (15.187). For any honest (not
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orrupt) node A ∈ G, during any transmission T, A will not exhange any odeword pakets with
any node that is not put on PT at the end of the transmission.
Proof. Restating the lemma more preisely, for any node N that is NOT put on PT as on (15.187)
and for any honest node A ∈ G, then along (direted) edge E(A,N), A will never reah line (11.60),
and along (direted) edge E(N,A), A will never reah lines (12.67-82). Fix a transmission T in
whih (12.187) is reahed (i.e. a node is not eliminated as on (15.169-177) of T), let N /∈ PT be
any node not put on PT on (15.187) of T, and let A ∈ G be an honest node. Sine N /∈ PT, we have
that either N ∈ EN or N ∈ BL when (15.187) is reahed. Sine no nodes an be added to EN or
BL from the outset of T through line (15.187) of T, we must have that N ∈ EN or N ∈ BL as of
either line (15.188) or (15.170) of the previous transmission. Therefore, either (N, T) or (N, T′, T)
is added to the SOT broadast of transmission T (on (15.176) or (15.200) of transmission T− 1),
indiating N is an eliminated/blaklisted node. If A has not reeived the full Start of Transmission
(SOT) broadast for T yet, then the lemma is true by Lemma 11.8. If on the other hand A has
reeived the full SOT broadast, then in partiular A has reeived the parel indiating that N is
either eliminated or blaklisted. Thus, by lines (12.59), (11.31-33), (12.63) and (11.35-37), A
will not transfer any pakets with N . 
Lemma 11.19. The reeiver's end of transmission broadast takes at most n rounds to reah the
sender. In other words, the sender will have always reeived the end of transmission broadast by
the time he enters the Prepare Start of Transmission Broadast segment on (11.29).
Proof. By the onforming assumption, for every round t of every transmission there is a path Pt
between the sender and reeiver onsisting of edges that are always up and nodes that are not
orrupt. We onsider the nal n rounds of any transmission, and argue that for eah round, either
the sender already knows the end of transmission parel Θ, or there is a new honest node N ∈ G
that learns Θ for the rst time. Sine the latter ase an happen at most n− 1 times (the reeiver
already knows Θ when there are n rounds remaining, see (11.28) and (15.178-179)), it must be
that the sender has learned Θ by the end of the transmission. Therefore, let 4D − n < t ≤ 4D be
one of the last n rounds of some transmission. If the sender already knows Θ, then we are done.
Otherwise, let Pt = N0N1 . . . NL (here N0 = S and NL = R) denote the ative honest path for
round t that onnets the sender and reeiver. Sine S does not know Θ but R does, there exists
some index 0 ≤ i < L suh that Ni does not know Θ but Ni+1 does know Θ. Sine edge E(Ni, Ni+1)
is ative and the nodes at both ends are honest (by hoie of Pt), node Ni+1 will send Ni a broadast
parel on (11.15). Looking at the manner in whih broadast parels are hosen (13.115), it must
be that Ni+1 will send Θ to Ni in round t, and hene Ni will learn Θ for the rst time, whih was
to be showed. 
Lemma 11.20. If the reeiver has reeived at least D − 6n3 distint pakets orresponding to the
urrent odeword, he an deode the odeword (exept with negligible probability of failure).
Proof. Fat 1′ guarantees that if the reeiver obtains D − 6n3 distint pakets orresponding to
a odeword, then he an deode. Sine all odeword pakets are signed by the sender to prevent
modifying them, the seurity of the signature sheme guarantees that any properly signed odeword
paket the reeiver obtains will be legitimate (exept with negligible probability of failure). 
Lemma 11.21. For every transmission T: S,R ∈ PT.
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Proof. The partiipating list PT is set at the end of every transmission on line (15.187). By looking
at the ode there, we must show that S,R /∈ EN ∪ BL at the end of any transmission. That an
honest node an never be identied as orrupt and eliminated is the ontent of the proof of Theorem
8.1, so S,R /∈ EN . Sine S is never put on the blaklist (15.188), it remains to show R /∈ BL
when (15.187) is reahed. Sine nodes are removed from the blaklist on line (14.166) and not put
on it again until (15.188), it is enough to show that if R is ever plaed on the blaklist at the end
of some transmission T− 1, then it will be removed as on (14.166) of transmission T. If R is ever
plaed on the blaklist, we argue that: 1) R will learn what status report parels the sender requires
of it after at most 2n2 rounds; and 2) S will reeive all of these parels by at most 4n3 rounds
later. Therefore, R will neessarily be removed from the blaklist by round 4n3 + 2n2 < 4D (sine
D ≥ 6n3), as required. To prove 1), rst note that all honest nodes remove the reeiver's end of
transmission parel for T− 1 at the very end of T− 1 (15.203). Therefore, no honest node will have
any End of Transmission Parel in its broadast buer at any point during T until one is reated
for the urrent transmission on (15.178-179). Therefore, for the rst n3 rounds, the sender's SOT
broadast will have top priority in terms of sending/reeiving broadast parels (13.115). Sine S
and R are onneted by an ative honest path at eah round, we follow the proof as in Lemma 11.19
to argue that for every round between the outset of T and round n3, either R has learned the full
SOT broadast, or there is an honest node that is learning a new SOT broadast parel for the rst
time. Sine there are (at most) n nodes, and the SOT broadast has at most 2n parels (see proof
of Lemma 11.2, and Statement 2 of the Broadast Buer therein), it takes at most 2n2 rounds for
R to reeive the full SOT broadast, and hene to learn it has been blaklisted. This proves 1).
Upon reeipt of this information, R adds the neessary information (i.e. its status report)
to its broadast buer (14.137-145). Looking at the proof of Theorem 10.9 and in partiular
Claim 2 within the proof, edges along the ative honest path an take at most 4n3 < 4D rounds
to ommuniate aross their edges the broadast information of priorities 1-6 on lines (13.115),
and sine the reeiver is onneted to the sender every round via some ative honest path (by the
onforming assumption), its requested status report information will neessarily reah the sender
within 4n3 rounds, proving 2). 
Lemma 11.22. For any transmission T, if PT = {S,R}, then the transmission was neessarily
suessful.
Proof. PT is set on line (15.187). Sine the only plae the sender adds nodes to the blaklist
is on (15.188), whih happens at the very end of eah transmission, and beause the hypothesis
states that every non-eliminated node exept for S and R is on the blaklist when line (15.187) of
transmission T is reahed, it must be the ase that transmission T began with every non-eliminated
node on the blaklist, with the possible exeption of the reeiver (and the sender who is never
blaklisted). Sine all internal nodes are still blaklisted by the end of the transmission, the sender
will never transfer any pakets to any node other than R during transmission T (line (12.59) will
always fail for any other node, see (11.31-33)). Theorem 10.9 indiates there are at most 4n3 rounds
that are wasted, and sine the only edge the sender an ever use to transfer odeword pakets during
T is E(S,R), the onforming assumption implies edge E(S,R) is ative every round of T. We may
therefore view the graph as redued to a single edge onneting S and R (see Lemma 11.18), where
there are at least 4D − 4n3 > 3D (non-wasted) rounds per transmission. Sine both S and R are
honest, orretness is guaranteed as in the edge-sheduling protool by Lemma 11.1. In partiular,
the transmission will neessarily be suessful. 
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Lemma 11.23. No honest node will aept more than one distint parel (per node N̂ per trans-
mission) indiating that N̂ should be removed from the blaklist.
Proof. Line (13.110) guarantees that any node A will only aept the parel if it has already
reeived the sender's start of transmission broadast orresponding to the urrent transmission. In
partiular, this means that A has reeived an updated blaklist (and a list of eliminated nodes)
before it aepts any removals from the blaklist. Therefore, in some transmission T, if A ever does
aept the information that a node N̂ should be removed from the blaklist, then this information
will not beome out-dated until (if) N̂ is added to the blaklist again, whih an happen at the
earliest at the very end of transmission (15.188). Therefore, after reeiving the information for
the rst time that N̂ should be removed, the omments on line (14.123) will guarantee A will not
aept additional blaklist information regarding N̂ until the following transmission, proving the
lemma. 
Lemma 11.24. For any node N̂ ∈ G, after reeiving the omplete SOT broadast, an honest node
N will transmit along eah edge at most one per transmission the fat that it knows N̂ 's omplete
status report.
Proof. Eah parel stored in N 's broadast buer BB is aompanied by a list of whih edges the
parel has been suessfully transmitted aross (see omments on line (14.123)). Therefore, as long
as the parel is not deleted from the broadast buer, line (13.115) guarantees that eah parel
of broadast information will only pass along eah edge one, as required. Therefore, it remains
to prove the lemma in the ase that the relevant broadast parel is deleted at some point in a
transmission. Fix a transmission T and an arbitrary N̂ ∈ G. Sine broadast parels of the relevant
type (i.e. that N has N̂ 's omplete status report) are only removed on (14.139) and (14.149), we
need only onsider the ase that (14.149) is reahed in transmission T (the former line an only
be reahed as part of the SOT broadast, and therefore lies outside the hypotheses of the lemma).
In partiular, we will show that if (14.149) deletes from N 's broadast buer the parel indiating
that N knows N̂ 's omplete status report, then N will never again add a parel of this form to
its broadast buer (as on (14.155)) for the remainder of T. But this is immediate, sine if N
removes this parel from BB on (14.149) of T, then N̂ must have been removed from the blaklist
(see (14.147)), and sine N̂ annot be re-added to the blaklist until the end of T (15.188), line
(14.152) (of N 's ode, with the N̂ that appears there equal to the N̂ used in the present notation)
annot be satised for the remainder of T, and hene (14.155) annot be reahed. This proves that
one the parel is deleted, it annot be later added in the same transmission, proving the lemma. 
12 Conlusion and Open Problems
In this paper, we have desribed a protool that is seure simultaneously against onforming
node-ontrolling and edge-sheduling adversaries. Our results are of a theoretial nature, with
rigorous proofs of orretness and guarantees of performane. Surprisingly, our protool shows
that the additional protetion against the node-ontrolling adversary, on top of protetion against
the edge-sheduling adversary, an be ahieved without any additional asymptoti ost in terms of
throughput.
While our results do provide a signiant step in the searh for protools that work in a dynami
setting (edge-failures ontrolled by the edge-sheduling adversary) where some of the nodes are
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suseptible to orruption (by a node-ontrolling adversary), there remain important open questions.
The original Slide protool
49
requires eah internal node to have buers of size O(n2 log n), while
ours requires O(n4 log n), though this an be slightly improved with additional assumptions50. In
pratie, the extra fator of n2 may make our protool infeasible for implementation, even for
overlay networks. While the need for signatures inherently fore an inrease in memory per node
in our protool verses the original Slide protool, this is not what ontributes to the extra O(n2)
fator. Rather, the only reason we need the extra memory is to handle the third kind of maliious
behavior, whih roughly orresponds to the mixed adversarial strategy of a orrupt node replaing
a valid paket with an old paket that the node has dupliated. Reall that in order to detet this,
for every paket a node sees and for every neighbor, a node must keep a (signed) reord of how
many times this paket has traversed the adjaent edge (the O(n3) pakets per odeword and O(n)
neighbors per node yield the O(n4) bound on memory). Therefore, one open problem is nding a
less memory-intensive way to handle this type of adversarial behavior.
Our model also makes additional assumptions that would be interesting to relax. In partiular, it
remains an open problem to nd a protool that provides eient routing against a node-ontrolling
and edge-sheduling adversary in a network that is fully asynhronous (without the use of timing
assumptions, whih an be used to replae full synhrony in our solution) and/or does not restrit
the adversaries to be onforming. As mentioned in the Introdution, if the adversary is not onform-
ing, then he an simply permanently disonnet the sender and reeiver, disallowing any possible
progress. Therefore, results in this diretion would have to rst dene some notion of onnetedness
between sender and reeiver, and then state throughput eieny results in terms of this denition.
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